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Abstract 
 
Tittle:  Charging for the railway infrastructure use during the last five years: state 
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Author: Patricia Chica Herranz 
Supervisor: Professor Andrés López Pita and Diego Fernández Belmonte 
 
 
The railway transport appeared in the first half of the nineteenth century, with the Industrial Revolution, and 
rose to be the primary mode of transport, stimulating the economy of most European countries. During the 
first half of the twentieth century, the railways were the monopolist terrestrial transport mode. From the end 
of the Second World War on, the role played by rail in transport market has been in constant decline. 
 
Given the situation of the rail in the transport market, the European Commission has engaged in a long 
process of revitalising the railways. It was stated that in order to ensure efficient use of, and non 
discriminatory access to, the rail infrastructure, it was necessary to establish an appropriate set of charges for 
infrastructure use. The railway restructuring began in the early nineties with the publishment of Council 
Directive 91/440 on the development of the Community’s railways and it followed a slow evolution until the 
publishment of the First Railway Package of Directives. One of the Directives composing this Railway 
Package was Directive 2001/14/EC, focused on the allocation of capacity and development of access charges 
for infrastructure. This Directive established the legislative framework for the railway infrastructure charging 
and, in consequence, the European countries have been implementing its conditions into national law during 
the last five years.  
 
The form in which the implementation of the European Norms has been addressed, widely varies among the 
European countries. European Governments have been (and still are) implementing the EU Directives 
depending on their point of view over the failures and successes of the current railways organisation. 
 
This dissertation is aimed at describing the current charging schemes applied in the European countries and 
assessing them from a qualitative point of view, while evaluating the degree of fulfillment of Directive 
2001/14/EC as well as realizing a SWOT analysis. 
 
Then, in this dissertation is given a general overview of the evolution of the railways and of the European 
Union policy on the rail transport mode. Afterwards, a selection of relevant countries is made in order to be 
able to describe, in a synthetic way, the charging schemes that they are currently applying. 
 
The main issue treated in this dissertion is the assessment of the national charging scheme. This assessment 
has carried at two levels: assessment according to legislative framework and assessment according to 
economic principles. Previously to the assessment, it has been defined the methodology of assessment for 
each level. On the one hand, the methodology for the assessment according to legislative framework consists 
on selecting the main objectives and conditions established by Directive 2001/14/EC and on defining how 
these issues have been interpreted. On the other hand, the methodology for the assessment according to 
economic principles has been intentionally open and flexible in order to smooth the process of identification 
of issues that could go beyond the legal framework but which, at the same time, could be considered as 
strengths or weaknesses of the concerning charging scheme. 
 
The assessment according to legislative framework consists on determining the degree of fulfillment of the 
main objectives and conditions selected by the national charging schemes. The assessment according to 
economic principles consists on a SWOT analysis, which is focused on determining the internal (Strengths 
and Weaknesses) and external (Opportunities and Threats) issues that distinguish each charging practice. 
After these two levels of assessment, it can be considered that the national charging schemes selected are 
totally characterized. 
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Resumen 
 
Título:  5 años de tarifas por uso de infraestructura ferroviaria en Europa: estado 
del arte y oportunidades para la revitalización del ferrocarril 
Autor: Patricia Chica Herranz 
Tutor: Profesor Andrés López Pita y Diego Fernández Belmonte 
 
El transporte ferroviario apareció en la primera mitad del siglo XIX, con la Revolución Industrial, y se 
convirtió en el principal modo de transporte, potenciando la economía de muchos países Europeos. Durante 
la primera mitad del siglo XX, el ferrocarril fue el modo de transporte terrestre monopolista. Desde el final de 
la Segunda Guerra Mundial en adelante, el papel del ferrocarril en el mercado del transporte ha estado en 
constante declive. 
 
Dada la situación del ferrocarril en el mercado del transporte, la Comisión Europea ha emprendido un largo 
proceso de revitalización del modo ferroviario. Se declaró que para garantizar un uso eficiente de, y un 
accesso no discriminatorio a, la infraestructura ferroviaria era necesario establecer un conjunto apropiado de 
tarifas por el uso de la infraestructura. La restructuración del ferrocarril empezó a principios de los noventa 
con la publicación de la Directiva 91/440 del Consejo sobre el desarrollo de los ferrocarriles comunitarios y 
continuó con una lenta evolución hasta la publicación del Primer Paquete Ferroviario de Directivas. Una de 
las Directivas que componían este Paquete Ferroviario fue la Directiva 2001/14/EC, enfocada en la 
adjudicación de capacidad y en la aplicación de cánones por el uso de la infraestructura ferroviaria. Esta 
Directiva establece el marco legislativo para la tarificación del ferrocarril y, en consecuencia, los países 
Europeos han estado implementando sus requerimientos en la legislación nacional durante los últimos cinco 
años. 
 
La forma en que la Normativa Europea se ha implementado, varía ampliamente entre los países Europeos. 
Los gobiernos Europeos han estado (y aún están) implementando las Directivas de la Unión Europea en 
función de su particular punto de vista sobre los fracasos y éxitos de la actual organización de sus 
ferrocarriles. 
 
Esta tesina tiene como objetivo la descripción de los diferentes sistemas tarifarios actualmente vigentes en los 
países Europeos y su evaluación cualitativa, considerando el grado de cumplimiento de la Directiva 
2001/14/EC y realizando un análisis DAFO. 
 
Como punto de partida, en esta tesina se da una descripción general de la evolución del ferrocarril y de la 
política de la Unión Europea sobre el modo ferroviario. A continuación, se realiza una selección de países 
significativos para poder describir, sintéticamente, los esquemas tarifarios que actualmente están aplicando. 
 
La cuestión principal de esta tesina reside en la evaluación de los diferentes esquemas tarifarios. Esta 
evaluación se ha realizado a dos niveles: evaluación de acuerdo con el marco legislativo y evaluación de 
acuerdo con los pricipios económicos. Antes de la evaluación, se ha definido la metodología de evaluación 
para cada nivel. Por una parte, la metodología para la evaluación de acuerdo con el marco legislativo consiste 
en realizar una selección de objetivos y condiciones principales establecidos por la Directiva 2001/14/EC y 
en definir cómo han sido interpretados estos aspectos. Por otra parte, la metodología para la evaluación de 
acuerdo con los principios económicos se ha dejado abierta y flexible intencionadamente para facilitar el 
proceso de identificación de cuestiones que pueden incumplir el marco legal pero que, a la vez, se puedan 
considerar como fortalezas o debilidades del correspondiente esquema tarifario. 
 
La evaluación de acuerdo con el marco legislativo consiste en determinar el grado de cumplimiento de los 
objetivos y condiciones principales por los esquemas tarifarios nacionales. La evaluación de acuerdo con los 
principios económicos consiste en un análisis DAFO, que se basa en determinar las cuestiones internas 
(Debilidades y Fortalezas) y externas (Amenazas y Oportunidades) que distinguen cada práctica de 
tarificación. Después de estos dos niveles de evaluación, se puede considerar que los esquemas tarifarios 
nacionales de los países significativos están totalmente caracterizados. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The railway transport appeared in the first half of the nineteenth century, with the 
Industrial Revolution, and rose to be the primary mode of transport, stimulating the 
economy of most European countries. During the first half of the twentieth century, the 
railways were the monopolist terrestrial transport mode. From the end of the Second 
World War on, the role played by rail in transport market has been in constant decline. 
 
Given the situation of the rail in the transport market, the European Commission has 
engaged in a long process of revitalising the railways. It was stated that in order to ensure 
efficient use of and non discriminatory access to the rail infrastructure, it was necessary to 
establish an appropriate set of charges for infrastructure use. The railway restructuring 
began in the early nineties with the publishment of Council Directive 91/440 and it 
followed a slow evolution until the publishment of the First Railway Package of Directives. 
 
One of the Directives composing this First Railway Package was Directive 2001/14/EC, 
focused on the allocation of capacity and development of access charges for infrastructure. 
This Directive established the legislative framework for the railway infrastructure charging 
and, in consequence, the European countries have been implementing its conditions into 
national law during the last five years.  
 
The form in which the implementation of the European Norms has been addressed widely 
varies among the European countries. European Governments have been (and still are) 
implementing the EU Directives depending on their point of view over the failures and 
successes of the current railways organisation. Therefore, there are countries that follow 
the conditions established by the directives but not the objectives of the Community’s 
policy. 
 
This dissertation is aimed at describing the current charging schemes applied in the 
European countries and assessing them from a qualitative point of view, while evaluating 
the degree of fulfillment of Directive 2001/14/EC. 
 
In order to achieve this objective, this dissertation has been structured in the following 
chapters: 
• General framework 
• Description of national charging schemes 
• Assessment methodology 
• National charging schemes’ assessment 
• Conclusions 
  
The first chapter, General Framework, seeks to show a general overview of the evolution 
of the railways and of the European Union policy on the rail transport mode. Then, it is 
described the development of the Community’s Norms since the beginning of the nineties. 
 
In the following chapter, Description of national charging schemes, the basis for charging 
are established while defining the main economic principles. Afterwards, it has been 
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necessary to choose a set of relevant countries which supposed a totally representative 
sample and their charging schemes have been described in a synthetic way. 
 
The third chapter, Assessment methodology, is aimed at defining the methodology for the 
assessment of the current charging practices. Given that the assessment has carried at two 
levels, the methodology has been defined for each level. On the one hand, the 
methodology for the assessment according to legislative framework consists on selecting 
the main objectives and conditions established by Directive 2001/14/EC and on defining 
how these issues have been interpreted. On the other hand, the methodology for the 
assessment according to economic principles has been intentionally open and flexible in 
order to smooth the process of identification of issues that could go beyond the legal 
framework but which, at the same time, could be considered as strengths or weaknesses of 
the concerning charging scheme. 
 
The following chapter, National charging schemes’ assessment, is carried at the two 
mentioned levels. The assessment according to legislative framework consists on 
determining the degree of fulfillment of the main objectives and conditions selected by the 
national charging schemes. The assessment according to economic principles consists on a 
SWOT analysis, which is focused on determining the internal (Strengths and Weaknesses) 
and external (Opportunities and Threats) issues that distinguish each charging practice. 
 
The final chapter, Conclusions, consists on describing the findings attained after the 
assessment of the actual national charging schemes. These findings are oriented on 
analysing the role of the railway infrastructure charging in the European rail reform, 
considering the degree of coherence of the charging schemes assessed and referring to the 
possible evolution of the current situation and the national charging schemes that could be 
taken as a reference.  
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2. General Framework 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to establish the general framework where the rail sector is currently 
situated, so as to be able, in further chapters, to support and understand the different 
charging schemes adopted among the countries. 
 
Then, it is important to emphasize the main causes that have lead to the long process of 
the railway reform. Furthermore, the objectives of the EU policy on the revitalisation of 
the railways are summarized in order to understand the main concerns of the Community. 
 
Moreover, the development of the Community’s norms is described in a chronological 
order. This is helpful to understand the evolution experienced by these norms from the 
1990’s to the present time and, in parallel, also to be aware of the evolution of the railways 
in the same years. 
 
Finally, a brief description of the implications of the Community’s norms is done in order 
to evidence the wide variety of charging schemes that appeared since its implementation. 
 
 
2.2. Background 
As a starting point, is important to understand the motivations of the European 
Community’s railway reform. Over the years, rail has experienced an important loss of 
market shares relative to the road mode. This fact is due to external factors but especially is 
derived from the organisation of the rail sector in natural monopolies. (Transport & 
Mobility Leuven (2005))  
 
Indeed, rail has characteristics which could make it an increasingly attractive form of 
transport in Europe: it is a reliable, safe, cheap and fast transport as well as an 
environmental friendly mode. However, there are some actions required to revitalise the 
rail sector so that it performs better and fully satisfies the society’s demands. The railways 
need to become more efficient, customer oriented and attractive to users but less expensive 
and requiring fewer subsidies.  
 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the railways have suffered a constant 
decline in its market share. There are several causes (White Paper, 1996): 
• Increase of other transport modes offering a more flexible and less 
expensive transport. 
• Decrease of production of traditional heavy industries whose products were 
transported by rail. 
• Road transport has become more efficient and cheaper. Although external 
costs in road are higher, they are not sufficiently reflected in the prices paid 
by users so road is favoured in the competition with other modes. 
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• Given the national organisation of rail, the long distance freight transport 
has moved to road transport. The variety of physical characteristics (wide of 
gauge, signalling, electrification,…) of the national infrastructures leads 
important problems of interoperability. 
• Incorrect management of the railways, as traditionally States have denied 
railways enterprises to carry out a commercial business. Thus, the 
infrastructure investments have been usually inadequate and this has lead to 
infrastructure backwardness. 
• The low flexibility of the railway sector. This implies that in the rail sector, 
in order to adapt the infrastructure to market changes, a very high 
investment is needed.  
 
The decline of the railways over the last years is shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. It is to 
notice the great growth of the road transport which is one of the main causes of the 
railways decline. 
 
Figure 1 – Passenger transport. Growth of traffic by mode of transport, EU-15: 1970-1999 
 
   Source: White Paper 2001 
 
Figure 2 – Goods transport. Growth of traffic by mode of transport, EU-15: 1970-1999 
 
   Source: White Paper 2001 
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The conclusion is that a new kind of railways is needed (White Paper, 1996). The main fact 
is that the railways should be a business carried out by railway enterprises sufficiently 
independent from the State and with enough resources to compete with other transport 
modes. Then, the different national systems should be integrated in order to reduce the 
barriers that make the railways less competitive. 
 
Finally, in order to meet these challenges the European Commission has carried out a long 
process of railway reform with the main objective of revitalising this sector. 
 
 
2.3. Objectives of the railway reform 
The main objective of the transport European policy is the free circulation of passengers 
and goods, guaranteeing the security. In the nineteen’s, the European Commission 
perceived that the best way of revitalising the railways was to drive a sole market composed 
by a European rail network. Thus, it was necessary the correct integration of the different 
national systems and networks in order to develop a modern and efficient infrastructure. 
 
According to ECMT (2005a), the policies adopted by the European Union were based on a 
few main objectives that can be summarized as follows: 
• Increase of the economic efficiency of the transport sector, particularly of 
the railways. 
• Reflecting social costs of transport in the Government budgetary decisions, 
in the business decisions of the railway enterprises and in the charging 
schemes for the services provided. 
• Promotion of competition in the railway sector, opening access to railway 
infrastructure and privatizing the operation. 
• Clarifying government role on the support of railways and the promotion of 
competition. This leads to the separation of accounts related to operation 
and infrastructure management. 
• Increase of transparency of public contributions in order to prevent cross-
subsidies. 
• Financial stability of the infrastructure provider.  
• The infrastructure management and the railways’ operation must be seen as 
a business. 
• Attraction of private investment in order to increase competition towards 
road. 
 
 
2.4. Development of the Community’s Norms 
The process of introducing competition into the rail sector started in the 1990s. The first 
step consisted on the publishment of the Council Directive 91/440/CEE of 29th July 1991 
on the development of the Community’s railways. This directive established the basic 
framework for the separation of accounts between infrastructure management and 
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operation in order to obtain a clear transparency of the management. It required the 
infrastructure manager to charge a fee for access to infrastructure. However, it did not 
require the creation of separate institutions to carry out these two activities. 
 
The second step of the railway reform was the publishment of first White Paper, in 1992, 
on the future development of the common transport policy focusing on the opening of the 
rail market, the sustainable balance of the sector and the increase of mobility. 
 
In 1994, the European governments met in Essen in order to elaborate a list composed of 
the 30 priority transport projects (see Figure 3). Two years later, the European Parliament 
and Council adopted the Decision 1692/96/EC on the development of the Transeuropean 
Rail Network based on the 30 projects determined in Essen. This common Network was 
more precisely described in 1997 in the “Trans-European Rail Freight Freeways”. 
 
Figure 3 – Priority projects defined by the TEN-T 
 
         Source: European Commission 
 
In 1995, the European Parliament and the Council authorized the entry of the private 
sector in the railways through Directive 95/18/EC. This Directive permitted the private 
finance of new infrastructures and the private operation of services. Moreover, it was 
published Directive 95/19/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure and the charging 
of infrastructure fees. This Directive introduced the concept of financial stability of the 
infrastructure manager and required governments to lay down rules for establishing fees for 
the use of the infrastructure, to publish the capacity allocation procedures and to appoint 
an independent body for appeals on capacity allocation decisions. 
 
One year later, in July 1996, was published another White Paper namely “A strategy for 
revitalising the Community’s railways” which proposed a series of measures related to 
pricing as well as to revitalising other modes of transport rather than road. Moreover, this 
White Paper provided measures to reduce the railway enterprises’ debt so in the future they 
can assume an independent finance management. Mainly, this White Paper argued for 
stronger actions to open up the railways to market forces. 
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In 1998, was published the third White Paper “Fair Payment for Infrastructure Use: A 
phased approach to a common transport infrastructure charging framework in the EU”. 
This paper analysed the problems resulting from existing charging systems and proposed a 
Community approach to infrastructure charging. As well, it was proposed a step-by-step 
approach in order to implement this Community approach through three phases: in the 
first phase (1998-2000), should be established charging framework; in the second phase 
(2001-2004), the Commission and the Member States should begin to adapt the charging 
schemes in order to implement the framework; and in the third phase (beyond 2004), the 
transition would be completed.  
 
Since the experience of the Trans-European Rail Network, were stated the real differences 
between the Member states with respect to the infrastructure, the legislation, the customs 
and the exploitation of the European railway lines. Thus, in order to increase the railways’ 
competitivity it was concluded the necessity of reducing the institutional barriers of the 
frontier services, given that the road mode has open access. 
 
In consequence, the 15th March 2001, was published the First Railway Package consisting 
on four community directives aimed at the consolidation of Directives 91/440/CEE, 
95/18/EC, 95/19/EC and 96/48/EC abovementioned. These directives were substituted 
by Directives 2001/12/EC, 2001/13/EC, 2001/14/EC and 2001/16/EC, respectively 
(First Railway Package), which main objective was the improvement of the efficiency of the 
current legislation. 
 
Directive 2001/12/EC was aimed at determining some main aspects: increase the 
independence of the railway undertakings and the infrastructure manager from the 
budgetary accounting of the Government; required the separation of accounts between 
passenger services and freight in order to avoid cross-subsidies from a socially significant 
service to another service operated in competition with unsupported suppliers; defined the 
New Trans-European Rail Freight Network, on which railway freight undertakings were to 
be granted open access after March 2008. 
 
Directive 2001/13/EC was focused on the provision of operating licences valid across the 
European Union. 
 
Directive 2001/14/EC focused on the allocation of infrastructure capacity and 
development of access charges for infrastructure. This directive set the framework for the 
levying of charges establishing that charges must be based on “costs directly incurred as a 
result of operating the train service”. It was based on some clear main objectives such as 
non-discriminatory access to rail infrastructure, fair intermodal competition between rail 
and road, fair intramodal competition in the provision of services and incentives to cost 
and operational efficiency. Moreover, it established that the charges for the infrastructure 
use may include a charge which reflects the scarcity of capacity, the costs of the 
environmental effects caused by the operation of a train, a certain mark-up in order to 
recover full costs, discounts, compensation for unpaid costs on other modes and a 
performance scheme that encourages railway undertakings and the infrastructure manager 
to minimise disruption and improve performance of the railway network. 
 
Directive 2001/16/EC set out new procedures for making technical standards in order to 
promote interoperability of national networks, making governments responsible for 
standards rather than the rail industry. 
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At the end of year 2001, was published a new White Paper namely “European transport 
policy for 2010: time to decide” were the European Commission proposed approximately 
sixty measures in order to create a transport system which is capable to balance the modal 
distribution of transport, revitalise the railways, foster the maritime and fluvial transport 
and to control the air transport rise. 
 
This White Paper aimed the intermodality, especially of the railways, in order to reduce the 
congestion and the contamination of the environment and maintain the mobility. Another 
important objective was the equitative charging of the different modes of transport, 
reflecting the externals costs inherent in each mode, in order to obtain a higher economic 
and environmental efficiency. 
 
In 2004, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the Second Railway Package, 
based on the measures established in the last White Paper. This infrastructure package 
proposed the complete opening of the rail freight markets, including cabotage, and focused 
on railway safety and on the establishment of a European Railway Agency which provides 
technical support for the interoperability and safety work. 
 
Finally, in March 2004, the European Commission presented the Third Railway Package in 
order to complete some aspects of the previous Railway Packages. These directives 
continue the railways reform focusing on the opening of the international passenger 
services to the European Union, the integration of the European railways and the revival of 
this mode of transport. However, this Railway Package of directives is still under 
discussion, since it has already been approved by the Commission but not by the 
Parliament. 
 
 
 
2.5. Implications of the Community’s Norms 
As a result of the related process of revitalising the railways, the form in which the 
implementation of the European Norms has been addressed varies among countries. 
According to ECMT (2002), European Governments are implementing the EU Directives 
depending on their point of view over the failures and successes of the current railways 
organisation. Therefore, all the European Union Member Governments, and many other 
Governments, are implementing the EU Directives but each in its own way and in forms 
that complement national priorities, respecting the letter of the European law but not 
always the spirit of the Commission’s policy papers. The results are far from uniform. 
 
The cornerstone of the rail reform in all European countries has been the conferred 
freedom to management to run railways as commercial business. This was based on the 
separation of the political decisions of Governments from the commercial management of 
railways. Then, this management was limited by several conditions such as charging 
regulation and control of borrowing. 
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At that time, freedom to set prices has lead to the arisen of a wide variety of charging 
schemes among all the European countries. These charging schemes vary since the costs 
taken into consideration (maintenance, renewals, investments, operation costs, general 
costs,...), to the pricing principles adopted (marginal cost or full cost recovery) or to the 
charging structure (simple or two-part tariff). The analysis of several national charging 
schemes will be carried out in next chapter. 
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3. Description of national charging schemes 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The definition of charging schemes is a crucial fact for an efficient use of the infrastructure, 
for guaranteeing competition on the network and for ensuring fair and non-discriminatory 
access to it. Given that most national rail networks are operated under monopoly 
conditions, public authorities have to regulate infrastructure charging in order to ensure 
that these monopolists don’t abuse his position and to provide them with clear signals as 
the way to develop the network to accommodate demand for capacity. 
 
The calculation procedure is also a key fact, given that undercharging trains threatens the 
long-term financial sustainability of the network and postponing renewals can increase 
costs to crisis point in the long run. 
 
Therefore, it is important to analyse the different elements acting on the determination of a 
charging scheme in order to improve economic and operational efficiency in the network 
as well as revitalising the railway market in its competition with other modes. 
 
Then, this chapter is aimed at describing the charging schemes applied by a set of relevant 
countries. In order to carry this description, it has been necessary to define the main 
charging parameters considered and to make a justified selection of significant countries. 
 
 
3.2. Definition of charging parameters 
3.2.1. Pricing principles 
 
Depending on the criteria used to recover financial costs, there are two principles to set rail 
infrastructure access charges. Thus it is possible, on the one hand, to fix the charge and 
afterwards compensate the gap between the operating incomes and the total expenses by 
means of government support. On the other hand, the charge can be established as from 
the difference between full financial costs and the government support. According to these 
two principles, appear to be four basic approaches used by the different countries in order 
to determine their charging scheme.  
 
Marginal cost (MC) 
 
The marginal cost (MC) is defined as the “directly related cost” which is the additional cost 
that each user imposes on the infrastructure provider as a result of operating the 
infrastructure. When considering the external costs, the addition of marginal cost and 
external cost are social marginal costs. The external costs are those costs that each user 
generates by the use of the infrastructure such as air pollution caused by diesel emissions, 
the annoyance of the noise emissions of a passing train, accidents, congestion, etc. 
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The provisions on charging in Directive 2001/14/EC reflects in its recommendations that 
short run marginal cost pricing is mandatory, although the Directive do not use the phrase 
“marginal cost” but the expression “directly related cost”. Charging for external costs is left 
to the discretion of the Member States. 
 
Charging MC consists on the fact that users are solely charged the marginal cost of the use 
of the infrastructure that they impose and the government contribution covers the 
difference between these operating incomes and the full financial costs experienced by the 
Infrastructure Manager (IM). Consequently, this approach requires full and reliable 
government funding and, in case that the government cannot make up the gap between 
MC and FC, then the following approaches must be chosen. 
 
In principle, the MC approach, if implemented correctly, will result in the most efficient 
use of the infrastructure but it puts the most pressure on the government. In addition, it 
requires an accurate calculation of the marginal costs and, nowadays, there is neither an 
agreed method for measuring these costs nor adequate data in a common format for 
quantifying them. Finally, if external costs are taken into account, it is also necessary to 
determine them and this calculation should be carried out by the government. 
 
Marginal cost plus mark-ups (MC+) 
 
This approach is based on the same principles as the MC approach but applies a mark-up 
to marginal costs in order to reduce the necessary government contribution. It is important 
to determine the objectives and impacts of the mark-ups as well as the way of allocate 
them. 
 
There are several ways of allocating the mark-ups among the different users but the most 
efficient way consists on considering the demand’s elasticities for different segments of the 
market. This principle of allocation is considered by the Ramsey’s-pricing.  
 
The aim of Ramsey-pricing is to maximize social welfare under the constraint of deficit 
coverage. It applies the inverse elasticity rule, which determines that the mark-up (as a 
percentage) on the marginal costs is reciprocally proportional to the price elasticity of the 
operator’s demand. According to this principle, the mark-up is determined in an efficient 
way and it must be ensured that the charge is not higher than the price that the market can 
bear. On the other hand, the theoretical Ramsey-pricing is very difficult to implement given 
that operators are usually averse to reveal their willingness to pay so demand curves are not 
easy to estimate and, in consequence, the elasticities are difficult to be determined. 
 
Full cost minus government support (FC-) 
 
This approach consists on the determination of the infrastructure charge from the 
knowledge of two variables: full financial costs and the government support, so the access 
charge will be the difference between these two variables. 
 
Although the marginal cost is not used in the determination of the charge, is important for 
the infrastructure manager to know the MC and the usage elasticities of the operators in 
order to prevent irrationally low charges and to recover costs in the most efficient way.  
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From the characteristics of this approach, it can be deduced that if the costs experienced by 
the infrastructure manager increase, the level of charges will increase proportionally. As a 
result, there are no incentives for cost-reduction while the approaches MC and MC+ are 
“bottom-up” and they do give incentives to the infrastructure manager to reduce its costs. 
 
Full cost (FC) 
 
This approach is based on charging the full costs experienced by the infrastructure manager 
to the railway undertakings without receiving any government contribution. This is not 
very extended but it should be accepted that it could be an appropriate approach where rail 
transport is the dominant use of the network and its market position is strong (as for rail 
freight in the Baltic States). 
 
Finally, it is remarkable that each pricing principle is determined by specific characteristics 
and there is not a “best approach”. Therefore, the adequate approach for each country will 
depend on the specific circumstances of each country (i.e. the case of the Baltic States 
where the FC approach could be appropriate for freight traffic while in other countries it is 
not).  
 
 
3.2.2. Types of tariffs 
 
In general, charging schemes are differentiated by using either simple or two-part tariffs. 
On the one hand, a simple tariff consists on a charge that varies directly with the use of the 
network and usually is expressed per gross tonne-kilometre or train-kilometre. On the 
other hand, a two-part tariff consists on a variable component, which varies with volume, 
and a fixed component. This variable part is frequently expressed per train-path or train 
path-kilometre. 
 
According to ECMT (2005a), the simple tariff charging schemes are easier to implement 
and, consequently, are more appropriate for less complex networks where the mix of uses 
is not important and the network capacity is not approached by traffic. Probably, these 
charging schemes are more efficient in allocating direct marginal costs but distort the 
allocation of fixed costs. 
 
Two-part tariff schemes are considered more efficient for networks with complex and mix 
uses given that these schemes are more likely to reflect the long term costs of the 
incremental capacity conditions of a particular user. Generally, the difference is that the 
variable part tends to be related to the actual wear and tear of the infrastructure and the 
fixed part is usually related to the planned use of capacity. 
 
However, two-part tariffs can reduce competition between operators in the same market 
depending on the level of the fixed component of the charge since is probable that the 
access charge would be insignificant for operators running a high volume of traffic but so 
high for other smaller operators that they cannot bear it. Moreover, this kind of tariff can 
be a great disincentive to international operators facing this fixed charge in more than one 
country. 
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3.2.3. Charging components 
 
Every charging scheme is composed by different elements, according to Directive 
2001/14/EC. Each of these elements tries to reflect a different type of cost among all the 
incurred costs due to a train running. The significant concepts that compose the charge in 
order to recover these incurred costs are: basic charge related to the wear and tear of the 
infrastructure, the mark-ups levied depending on the charging principle, the performance 
regime considered in the charging scheme in order to give incentives, the environmental 
charges, the congestion and scarcity charges and, finally, the applicable discounts. 
 
Basic charge 
 
The basic charge is the component of the charge that takes into account the infrastructure 
costs and, in particular, the wear and tear of the infrastructure, i.e. the costs directly related 
to the use of the infrastructure, in order to provide adequate incentives to trains running in 
the network. 
 
This charge is usually intended to recover marginal costs due to operation, maintenance or 
renewal or a given percentage of total infrastructure costs. There are a great variety of 
charging schemes with a different definition of the wear and tear charge. It tends to depend 
on the type of service, the type of line, the type of network, the vehicle or train 
characteristics, vehicle variables like speed and weight,... 
 
As mentioned, the basic charge is related to the deterioration of the infrastructure 
produced by the running of a train and, in consequence, it should be a variable tariff 
expressed per gross tonne-kilometre or per train path-kilometre. 
 
Mark-ups 
 
Those practices based on a MC+ pricing principle levy mark-ups in order to obtain full 
recovery of the costs. As mentioned in Directive 2001/14/EC, the invoicing of these 
mark-ups must be on the basis of efficient, transparent and non-discriminatory principles 
and only in the case the market can bear them. 
 
In the theory, the most efficient way of determining the mark-up is on the basis of the 
Ramsey principle but this is extremely difficult to implement and, in consequence, the most 
part of charging schemes determine the mark-up in order to recover a specific cost (i.e. 
investment costs) or a given percentage of the total costs according to other criteria. The 
mark-up is then applied according to the type of service, the type of line, the time band, .... 
 
Reservation charges 
 
Reservation charges are those charges that are levied anyway, either the capacity requested 
is used or not. There are two types: reservation charges levied before the use of the 
infrastructure and cancellation charges levied only in case of misuse of capacity. 
 
According to Directive 2001/14/EC, reservation charges should recover the administrative 
costs due to the allocation procedure. Actually, reservation charges are expressed in a wide 
range of forms, some are levied per train-path and others per train-km and some are 
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intended to recover the administrative costs while others intend to recover part of the 
infrastructure costs. 
 
Cancellation charges are only levied in case of failure to use requested capacity. The level of 
this charge is levied according to different variables such as the anteriority of the 
cancellation to the circulation date, the percentage of volume of traffic requested which is 
misused, the time period, the number of train-paths, ... 
 
Congestion charges and Scarcity charges 
 
In accordance with Directive 2001/14/EC, the charging and capacity allocation schemes must take 
account of the effects of increasing saturation of infrastructure capacity and ultimately the scarcity 
of capacity. 
 
It is important to distinguish between scarcity and congestion: congestion arises from delays caused 
by trains running close to each other while scarcity costs arise where the presence of a train 
prevents another train from operating, or requires it to take an inferior path. It may not generally be 
appropriate to charge a particular train for both scarcity and congestion, since if a particular train 
can only be run by displacing another train from the system, it will not be causing additional 
congestion. According to Nach Cris and Johnson Daniel (2005), when capacity is optimally 
adjusted to demand, the scarcity price is exactly equal to the incremental cost of additional capacity 
 
Performance regimes 
 
According to Directive 2001/14/EC, a performance regime is a charging scheme whose 
aim is encouraging railway undertakings and infrastructure managers to minimise 
disruption and improve the performance of the railway network. This performance scheme 
may include penalties for actions which disrupt the operation of the network, 
compensation for undertakings which suffer from disruption and bonuses that reward 
better than planned performance. 
 
In 2000, a first step towards a European Performance Regime (EPR) was initiated by UIC 
(Union International des Chemins de Fer) with the EPR project. This project was started 
with the first phase EPR I which was aimed at establishing a common understanding of the 
targets to be reached, i.e. improvement of punctuality and “minutes of delay” as the basis 
of disruptions. Given that this first phase did not outlined a model for practical 
implementation, a second phase EPR II was carried out. It was focused on analysing the 
feasibility of the performance scheme by monitoring a random selection of trains of which 
operational data was available. Finally, a simplified model, taking into account the results of 
EPR I and EPR II, was developed and tested in reality on a certain corridor.  
 
According to UIC, the main principles in which the EPR is based are: 
• Based on delay minutes 
• Corridor based approach 
• Applied on the whole train path 
• Monitoring is made per train 
• Use of Europtirail IT tool 
• Penalties are limited to a warning function 
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• Implementation Handbook describes the processes 
 
The ultimate UIC’s objective is to start the full commercial application on international 
traffic in January 2009. 
  
Environmental charges / Subsidies 
 
According to Directive 2001/14/EC, the infrastructure charge may be modified to take 
account of the cost of the environmental effects caused by the operation of the train and 
such modification shall be differentiated according to the magnitude of the effect caused. 
As well, the Directive establishes that Member States may put in place a time-limited 
compensation scheme for the use of the railway infrastructure for the demonstrably unpaid 
environmental, accident and infrastructure costs of competing transport modes in so far as 
these costs exceed the equivalent costs of rail. 
 
The different subsidies considered on the current practices are related to the improvement 
of environmental conditions and to the global compensation for other modes unpaid 
environmental effects. On the other hand, the environmental charges levied by certain 
charging schemes are aimed at recovering air pollution costs and accident costs. 
 
Discounts 
 
According to Directive 2001/14/EC, infrastructure managers may introduce schemes 
available to all users of the infrastructure, for specific traffic flows, granting time limited 
discounts to encourage the development of new rail services, or discounts encouraging the 
use of considerably underutilised lines. Moreover, discounts shall be limited to the actual 
saving of the administrative cost to the infrastructure manager. 
 
 
Since the given description of the main charging parameters it is possible to perform a 
synthetic analysis of the current charging schemes although is necessary a previous step 
consisting on the selection of a sample of significant countries that represent the diversity 
of the existing practices. 
 
3.3. Determination of significant countries 
In order to carry out an assessment of the current charging schemes in the following 
chapters, it has been necessary to choose some significant countries. With this purpose, 
Table 1 has been elaborated, where the diverse charging practices used by the different 
countries have been characterized according to the year in which vertical disintegration 
occurred, the pricing principle considered and the type of charge applied. 
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Table 1 – List of charging practices used by the different countries 
Charges Country 
code 
Country IM 
Year of 
vertical 
disintegration
Pricing 
principle Simple Two-part
AT Austria ÖBB 2004 MC+ √  
BE Belgium Infrabel 2004 FC- √  
BG Bulgaria NRIC 2002 MC+  √ 
CH Switzerland SBB 1999 MC+ √  
CZ Czech Republic SZDC 2003 MC+ √  
DE Germany DB Netz 1994 FC- √  
DK Denmark Banedanmark  1997 MC+ √  
EE Estonia EVR 1999 FC  √ 
EI Ireland IE - - - - 
EL Greece EDISY 2005 MC+ √  
ES Spain ADIF 2005 MC+  √ 
FI Finland RHK 1995 MC+ √  
FR France RFF 1997 MC+  √ 
HU Hungary VPE 2003 FC  √ 
IT Italy RFI 2001 FC (1)  √ 
LT Lithuania LG 1996 MC and FC (2)  √ 
LU Luxembourg CFL - MC √  
LV Latvia LDZ 1996 FC √  
NL Netherlands ProRail 1990 MC √  
PL Poland PLK 2000 FC- √  
PT Portugal REFER 1997 MC √  
RO Romania CFR 1998 FC  √ 
SE Sweden BV 1988 MC+ √  
SI Slovenia AZP 2003 FC √  
SK Slovakia ZSR 2002 MC+ √  
UK United Kingdom 
Network 
Rail 1994 
MC and 
MC+(3) √
(4) √(5) 
Remarks: 
(1) Only for traffic management 
(2) MC for passenger services and FC for freight services 
(3) MC for freight services and MC+ for passenger services 
(4) Simple charge applies to all operators except franchised passenger train operators 
(5) Two-part charge applies to franchised passenger train operators 
Source: Own from data of ECMT (2005a) 
 
During the process of choosing the significant countries, the following criteria have been 
taken into account: 
• Those countries that have been pioneers of the vertical disintegration 
process and on the establishment of charging schemes should be chosen. 
According to Table 1, the countries that led with this process the soonest 
and that currently provide public information are Germany, Denmark, 
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Finland, France, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and 
United Kingdom. 
• In those regions where the charging schemes are very similar (such as 
Nordic countries, Eastern countries ...), the most complete charging scheme 
has been chosen for each region. 
• Finally, it has been taken into account the fact that all the possible 
combinations between charging principles and types of charges should be 
chosen in order to have a totally representative sample. 
 
As a result, the significant countries considered are compiled in Table 2: 
 
Table 2 – List of the significant countries selected 
Country code Country Infrastructure manager 
AT Austria ÖBB 
DE Germany DB Netz 
EE Estonia EVR 
EL Greece EDISY 
ES Spain ADIF 
FR France RFF 
IT Italy RFI 
NL Netherlands ProRail 
PL Poland PLK 
PT Portugal REFER 
SE Sweden BV 
UK United Kingdom Network Rail 
Source: Own 
 
 
 
3.4. Charging schemes’ description per countries 
This chapter is aimed at describing the current situation of the railways in each country as 
well as describing the different charging schemes applied by them. It is remarkable that 
every charging scheme is characterized by a basic charging principle which determines the 
cost allocation through the charges for the use of the infrastructure. However, this 
information is not always clearly detailed. 
 
The following description of the charging schemes applied by the countries considered is 
composed of:  
• General overview of the current situation of the railways 
• Brief description of the national legal framework concerning charging 
• Description of the user charge applied in each country 
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3.4.1. Austria (AT) – ÖBB-Infrastruktur Betrieb AG 
 
General overview 
 
ÖBB-Holding AG, the holding company responsible for aligning the strategies of the 
Group companies, was established on 31 March 2004. By mid-2004 were established 
several companies forming part of the ÖBB Group, among which ÖBB-Infrastruktur 
Betrieb AG should be stand out. 
 
On 1 January 2005, the previous ÖBB Company was replaced by the ÖBB Group of 
companies and its workforce, assets and tasks were transferred to its corporate companies. 
Eisenbahn-Hochleistungsstrecken AG (HL-AG) and the financing function of 
Schieneninfrastrukturfinanzierungs GmbH (SCHIG) were merged with ÖBB-Infrastruktur 
Bau AG as absorbing company and the Federal Republic's shares in Brenner Eisenbahn 
GmbH, a subsidiary of ÖBB Infrastruktur Bau AG, were contributed to ÖBB-
Infrastruktur Bau AG.  
 
This organisation can be seen in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 – Organization of the ÖBB Holding AG 
 
Source: ECMT. Workshop in Geneva, October 2004 
 
According to ÖBB’s web page, the new Group structure allows the individual corporate 
companies and the Group as a whole to better meet market and customer needs in an ever 
increasing competitive environment thus increasing their competitivity and earning power. 
Last but not least, the new structure also aims at reducing the need for monetary 
contributions from the State.  
 
The regulation of the market has been allocated to Schienen-Control GmbH, a regulatory 
body under the Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology.  
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National legal framework concerning charging 
 
Austria implemented the First Railway Package through the Schienenverkehrsmarkt-
Regulierungsgesetz from 1999, the Bundesbahnstrukturgesetz from 2003 and the 
amendment in 2004 of “Eisenbahngesetz 1957”. 
 
User charge 
 
Charging principles 
 
The Austrian charging scheme is based on MC+ approach, composed by short run 
marginal costs plus mark-ups in order to increase cost recovery. The short run marginal 
cost only include the costs due to track maintenance and the mark-ups levied are intended 
to cover costs of renewals, investment costs and external costs. 
 
Calculation procedure 
 
According to ECMT (2005a), short run marginal costs are estimated through an 
econometric model taking into account only maintenance costs and taken as a function of 
gross tonne-kilometre. In 2004, 27% of total infrastructure expenditure (including loans 
and grants) were covered by charges. 
 
Charging structure 
 
The Track Access Product Catalogue divides the charge for the use of the railway 
infrastructure in several components: Train movement, Stop in stations, Shunting, Stabling 
and Use of other facilities.  
 
The charge for the Standard Package Train Movement (construction of Train Path and 
Train Movement) is intended to levy the train kilometres covered by a train with a specific 
total gross weight in tons per line category, modulated by a factor depending on the market 
segment and by a factor depending on the traction unit category. As well, this charge is 
increased by a performance regime based element. The charges considered are: 
• Usage charge: it is composed by a “charge in the amount of the directly 
incurred costs”, which is levied per gross ton kilometres, and a “line-related 
usage charge”, which is a basic price per kilometre depending on the line 
category. 
• Quality and line-related mark-ups and mark-downs: it is composed by “wear 
on tracks by traction units” depending on the traction unit category and a 
“performance regime” which is a unit rate per delay minute in scheduled 
stopping stations. 
• Traffic-type related usage charges: it is composed by a factor levied per 
train-km varying with the type of service.  
 
The infrastructure charge for the Stop in stations depends on the number of stops and the 
category station. This charge is only applied to passenger services. 
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As mentioned, it is also charged the Shunting and Stabling of rolling stock. As well, ÖBB 
provides other services such as the operation of extraordinary trains or monitoring 
hazardous goods transports. 
 
The charging elements considered, classified according to Directive 2001/14/EC, are: 
 
? Performance regimes: 
 
According to the ÖBB Track Access Product Catalogue 2006, for high-quality passenger 
trains, the Standard Package prices will be increased in the event of late arrival in the 
scheduled stopping stations, including departure and train terminal stations, if the delay per 
stopping station exceeds a threshold of five minutes.  
 
The delay in minutes per station exceeding the fixed threshold will be allocated to the party 
causing it (the railway undertaking or the infrastructure manager) and multiplied by the 
factor given in the Product Catalogue (3 €/delay minute). Reasons for delay are coded 
pursuant to UIC Leaflet 450-2. 
 
Charging level 
 
The level of charges for the Standard Package Train Movement depends on several 
variables, such as the line category, the traction unit category, the time band,... The range of 
values for the components of the charge for the Standard Package Train Movement can be 
seen in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 – Range of values for the Standard Package Train Movement in Austria 
Charge for the Standard Package Train Movement 
Service Type of service 
Train movement Minimum access package 
 
Charging formula 
SPTM + QM + TtUC + Tmout 
SPTM = (GBtkm * a) + (Tain-kmlc * b) 
QM = (Train-kmtuc * c) + (Train-kmbn * d) + (CM * e) 
 
Price components 
Variables 
considered 
 Charging values 
Usage charge Standard Package Train Movement (SPTM) 
Charge in the amount of the directly 
incurred costs (a)  0,001 €/gross ton-km 
Total gross ton kilometres (GBtkm)   
Line-related usage charges - basic 
price per train kilometre (b) Line category 0,90 - 2,73 €/train-km 
Total train kilometres (Tain-kmlc)   
Quality and line-related mark-ups and markdowns on the basic price per train kilometre under the 
Standard Package Train Movement (QM) 
Wear on tracks by traction units 
affecting charges (c) 
Traction unit 
category -0,04 - 0,01 €/train-km 
Train kilometres traction unit 
category (Train-kmtuc)   
Mark-ups for time and local capacity 
bottlenecks (Mark-up for bottleneck) 
Line section 
Time band 1,00 €/train-km in bottleneck 
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(d) 
Train kilometres in bottlenecks 
(Train-kmbn)   
Performance regime dependent 
charges (e) 
Delay 
Stop at station 3,00 €/minute 
Delay per minute in scheduled 
stopping station (DM)   
Traffic-type related usage charges under 
the Standard Package Train Movement 
(TtUC) 
Type of traffic -0,66 - 0,29 €/train-km 
Prices charged for train movements 
outside line opening times (TMout) 
Station category 
Line section 
The charges are calculated by the 
Track Access unit (Netzugang) on 
an individual basis and quoted as 
part of the train path offer 
Source: Own from Track Access Product Catalogue 2006 
 
As well, it has been carried the calculation of an average charge. According to ÖBB’s 2005 
Annual Report, the total income for the use of the infrastructure reached 358,9 million 
euros. In accordance with EUROSTAT, the volume of traffic in 2005 in Austria was 
143.917.000 train-kilometres. In conclusion, the average charge is 2,49 €/train-km. In 
Figure 5, it is shown the average charge in Austria compared with the rest of countries. 
 
Figure 5 – Average charge in Austria 
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          Source: Own from data of EUROSTAT and ÖBB’s 2005 Annual Report 
 
As it can be seen in the diagram above, the level of the average charge in Austria is 
practically in the average of the level in the rest of countries, given that the average of 
average charge of all the countries is 2,63 €/train-km. 
 
 
3.4.2. Germany (DE) – Deutsche Bahn Netz AG (DB Netz) 
 
General overview 
 
According to its web page, in 1994, Deutsche Bahn AG was founded, being the first 
successful conclusion of the serious discussions on rail reform relating to the privatisation 
and merger of the Bundesbahn and Reichsbahn that have been conducted since 1989. The 
second phase of the rail reform arrived in 1999, when the former business sectors of long-
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distance, local and freight transport, plus track infrastructure and the passenger stations 
business sector that was not planned by statute, were set up as joint-stock companies. 
 
Then, Deutsche Bahn, in accordance with the terms of company law, is currently run as a 
multi-level group of companies by Deutsche Bahn AG as the holding company. The share 
capital of the new companies is held by DB AG, whose shares are owned by the Federal 
Government. 
 
National legal framework concerning charging 
 
Germany transposed Directive 2001/14/EC in June 2005 through the General Railway Act 
(AEG) and the Railway Infrastructure Usage Regulation (EIBV). Actually, Germany has 
not only completely fulfilled the EU legal conditions but also has published additional 
federal legislation. Figure 6 summarizes the German legal framework concerning charging. 
 
Figure 6 – National legal framework concerning charging in Germany 
 
   Source: ECMT. Workshop in Rome, July 2004 
 
 
User charge 
 
Charging principles 
 
The first Train Path System was introduced in 1994 by DB Netz AG as a two-part tariff 
and intended to recover full costs. This system has evolved during the years and in 2001 it 
was reverted into a single differentiated charge per train kilometre. 
 
According to DB Netz AG, the current train path pricing system (TPS) must meet various 
market conditions. On the one hand, it must reflect the operational cost structure, i.e. the 
operating and investment expenditure associated with the various available services. On the 
other hand, TPs must be in line with the current demand, so the factors depending on 
demand that determine the price should include the price elasticity of the individual user 
groups. 
 
As well, the TPS must also meet the DB Netz AG’s strategic corporate goals, which 
include achieving a balanced operating income and a continuous improvement in costs and 
operational efficiency. 
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According to ECMT (2005a), the basic approach taken to charging is to allocate total cost 
(excluding those investment and renewal costs borne directly by Government) to market 
segments and then to price at average costs. Thus, the approach is clearly FC-. According 
to Railimplement (2005), it is estimated that public investment funds cover 45-50% of total 
costs. 
 
Calculation procedure 
 
The calculation of the charge is made on the basis of an average price for the whole of the 
network and the charge is intended to recover the maintenance and management costs.  
 
Charging structure 
 
As it can be seen in Figure 7, the single-stage Train Path Pricing System contains three 
modular pricing components: user dependent component, service-dependent component 
and other components. 
 
Figure 7 – Train Path Pricing System TPS2006 
 
    Source: DB Netz AG’s Train Path Pricing System, 2006 
 
The user-dependent component depends on the route category and a train path product 
factor. The variety of train path products available makes it possible to adapt the train path 
pricing system to meet the individual needs of the market, given that this is usually difficult 
to be reflected in a basic price which tends to be more cost-based. 
 
The product factor varies according to train path products, i.e. groups of identical services. 
As it is shown in Figure 8, the level of the product factor is determined according to the 
quality and the willingness to pay. 
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Figure 8 – Determination of the level of the product factor 
 
  Source: ECMT. Workshop in Rome, July 2004 
 
The service-dependent component is composed by additive and multiplicative factors. The 
multiplicative factor is an utilisation factor applied on particularly busy routes with 
alternative route sections and its main objective is to provide incentives to improve 
efficiency. The additive factor is aimed at providing incentives to reduce disturbances. 
Then, delay minutes and their causes are continually recorded for the railway undertaking 
and DB Netz AG. At the end of each month, the delay minutes collected by both parties 
are offset against each other and valued. 
 
Finally, other components are considered in the Train Path Pricing System. These 
components are: 
• Regional factors: these factors are applied on routes that do not yet have a 
viable cost/revenue structure. They differ locally depending on the regional 
network concerned and they are only applied to local passenger services. 
• Payload component: is a weight-based component intended to reflect the 
additional costs caused by the use of heavy trains, due to the increase in 
wear and capacity utilisation. It is applied for train weights of 3.000 tonnes 
and above and is levied per gross tonne-km. 
• Fee for preparing an offer: this component is intended to reflect the costs 
for processing the applications for train paths allocation. Then a fee per 
train path is levied in case that the railway undertaking does not accept a 
train path offer. This fee cannot exceed the equivalent of access charge for 
train paths that are not accepted. 
• Cancellation fee: in case of withdrawal of one or more train running days on 
a train path a cancellation fee is levied. It is composed by a minimum 
cancellation fee which corresponds to the amount of the fee required for 
preparing the offer and a percentage based cancellation fee depending on 
when the cancellation was made and the standard train path price. The 
cancellation fee cannot exceed the access charge for the cancelled train path.  
 
The charging elements considered, classified according to Directive 2001/14/EC, are: 
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? Reservation charges: 
 
As a reservation charge, the Train Path Pricing System of DB Netz AG includes the “fee 
for preparing an offer” and the “cancellation fee”. 
 
? Congestion and scarcity charges: 
 
The utilisation factor applied to the base price can be considered a congestion charge given 
that is only levied in very busy routes, for which alternatives actually exist. 
 
? Performance regimes: 
 
The additive factor considered in the service-dependent component is a clear performance 
regime intended to reduce disruptions. It consists on a compulsory delay minutes 
accountancy system based on control points in every section. The “delay minutes” 
accounted are allocated to DB Netz or to the railway undertakings according to specific 
responsibility rules and levied monthly through a unitary charge (0,10 €/ key delay minute). 
There is a delay allowance of 1 minute per section. 
 
Charging level 
 
The train path price depends on several variables such as the route category, the service 
offered, the region or the gross weight of the hauled load. Table 4 shows a range of values 
for each component of the total charge. 
 
Table 4 – Range of values for the Train path price in Germany 
Train path pricing 
Service Type of service 
Train path Minimum access package 
 
Charging formula 
BP x SI x PF x RF + LC 
 
Price components Variables considered  Charging values 
Basic price (BP) Route category 1,55 – 7,90 €/train-km 
System of incentives to raise 
efficiency (SI) Traffic 1 or 1,2 
Product factor (PF) Train path product 0,65 – 1,80 (passenger traffic) 0,50 – 1,65 (freight traffic) 
Regional factors (RF) Region (only for local passenger rail traffic) 1,05 – 2,45 
Load constituent (LC) Gross weight of the hauled load 0,90 €/train-km 
Source: Own from Network Statement 2007 
 
A part from the dispersion of values given in Table 4, it can be calculated the average 
charge. According to Annual Report, the revenues from track access charges in 2005 
amounted to a total of 3.649 million euros. As well, from EUROSTAT it has obtained that 
the volume of traffic in 2005 was 986.686.000 train-kilometres. As a result, the average 
charge is 3,70 €/train-km. Figure 9 shows the average charge in Germany compared to the 
rest of countries. 
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Figure 9 – Average charge in Germany 
Average charges
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          Source: Own from data of EUROSTAT and DB Netz’s 2005 Annual Report 
 
It is to be noticed that the charges in Germany are relatively lower given that their charging 
philosophy is FC- and the level of the average charge is near to the average of the average 
charge of all the countries, which corresponds to 2,63 €/train-km.  
 
 
3.4.3. Estonia (EE) – AS Eesti Raudte (EVR)  
 
General overview 
 
The state-owned company Eesti Raudtee was founded on 1 January 1992, with the main 
task of managing the Estonian railways. In August 1997, the state-owned company was 
transformed into a public limited company and was further transformed pursuant to the 
privatisation scheme approved by the Government. 
 
In 1999 the Government introduced a significant change in the privatisation plans of Eesti 
Raudtee namely deciding to surrender the signing of concession and instead sell 66% of 
majority shares. Then, in April 2000, the Estonian Privatisation Agency announced the 
privatisation of 66% of the shares of Eesti Raudtee by way of international tender with 
preliminary negotiations. 
 
On 2 March 2001, the General Director of the Estonian Privatisation Agency invited the 
Baltic Rail Services (BRS) to sign the agreement on the privatisation of 66% of AS Eesti 
Raudtee shares and the privatisation and shareholder agreement. Therefore, since 2001, 
66% of EVR is privately owned by BRS and the remaining 34% belongs to the Estonian 
State. EVR is the first vertically integrated, privately owned and managed railway in 
Europe. 
 
As it is shown in Figure 10, the railways in Estonia are composed by two public 
infrastructure owners namely Eesti Raudtee and Ederlaudtee Infrastruktuuri. 
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Figure 10 – Railways organisation in Estonia 
 
Source: ECMT. Workshop in Paris, February 2005 
 
According to the Railways Act, there is an independent body, the Railway Inspectorate, 
who allocates capacity in order to ensure a non-discriminated access to public railways. 
 
National legal framework concerning charging 
 
Directive 2001/14/EC was transposed by the Estonian parliament in March 2004 through 
the New Railways Act. Article 59 of this Railways Act defines the contract for the use of 
the railway infrastructure and user fees. 
 
According to the Network Statement 2007, the bases and procedures for calculation of 
railway infrastructure access fee shall be imperatively determined by the methodology for 
the use of railway infrastructure approved by the regulation No. 144nof the Minister of 
Economic Affairs and Communications in June 2004. 
 
User charge 
 
Charging principles 
 
According to ECMT (2005a), the basic approach taken to charging in Estonia is based on 
average cost principles. In calculating average costs the total costs of borrowing, the total 
maintenance and management costs, the total costs of renewals and the total investment 
costs are included. Thus, the approach is FC. 
 
Calculation procedure 
 
According to the Network Statement 2007, fees for the use of the infrastructure in the part 
of basic and extra services consist of the costs for grant of use of railway infrastructure and 
a reasonable business profit. The objective of the railway infrastructure access fee shall be 
to guarantee safety, stable development and efficient management of railway infrastructure. 
 
According to Ott Koppel (2005), the infrastructure access charge is calculated as the sum 
of the current direct costs (interpreted as short-term variable costs) and indirect costs of 
the infrastructure management and proportional part of integrated company’s common 
costs (depreciation of infrastructure costs and return on infrastructure assets defined as the 
product of the residual value of fixed assets and the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC)). This calculation procedure can be seen in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11 – General method for calculating the infrastructure charges in Estonia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Own from data of Ott Koppel (2005) 
 
As it is shown in Figure 11, the total costs are divided into two parts, assuming that 30% of 
them are fixed and 70% variable. According to the Network Statement 2005, fixed costs 
are costs that do not vary depending on the volume of provided service while variable costs 
are those which depend on the volume of service provided. Therefore, given that the 
infrastructure access fee is a two-part tariff (a fixed part plus a variable part depending on 
volume of traffic), it can be deduced that each part of the costs are directly related to each 
part of the access charge. 
 
Charging structure 
 
As mentioned, the access charge applied in Estonia is a two-part tariff: 
• The fix part of the charge is based on the requested train-kilometres and is 
paid whether the capacity allocated is used or not. This charge is not applied 
to international and local passenger trains. 
• The variable part of the charge is based on the actual gross tonne-
kilometres. 
 
According to the Estonian Railway Inspectorate’s web page, on the basis of the 
methodology in force and the accountancy data of the railway infrastructure manager, the 
Railway Inspectorate determines prognosis for the usage fee. Then the Railway 
Inspectorate shall monthly determine specific access fees on the basis of the data presented 
by EVR regarding the volume of actually transported goods on a monthly basis.  
 
In consequence, Eesti Raudtee shall charge the railway undertakings on the basis of the 
prognosis for the usage fee and railway undertakings shall pay in full such invoices. In case 
that monthly specified access fee exceeds the access fee paid by the rail transport 
undertaking then AS Eesti Raudtee shall issue a supplementary invoice every month to the 
rail transport undertaking. If, on the contrary, the monthly specified access fee is lower 
than the access fee paid by the rail transport undertaking then AS Eesti Raudtee shall 
perform settlement of accounts with rail transport undertakings according to the procedure 
provided by the railway infrastructure user contract. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Current direct and indirect costs of infrastructure management and 
proportional part of integrated company’s common costs 
+
Depreciation of infrastructure assets
+
Return on infrastructure assets (WACC multiplied by residual value of fixed 
=
Total infrastructure costs: 30% fixed and 70% variable 
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The charging elements considered, classified according to Directive 2001/14/EC, are: 
 
? Reservation charges: 
 
Although it is not explicitly mentioned in the Network Statement 2007, the fixed part of 
the access fee is a reservation charge given that it is paid whether the allocated train paths 
are used or not. 
 
? Congestion and scarcity charges: 
 
Network Statement 2007 defines, in case of railway infrastructure depletion, an additional 
access fee resulting from an auction procedure is invoiced. The bid made by each railway 
undertaking should include a separate access fee bid for each part of the requested capacity. 
The Committee for Capacity Allocation allocates the capacity to the maker of the highest 
bid for each part of the requested capacity and then, if the capacity on offer enables it, to 
the maker of the second highest bid for each part of the requested capacity and so on. This 
is clearly a scarcity charge given that is a charge which is only applied in case of scarcity of 
capacity. 
 
Charging level 
 
The Railway infrastructure access fee is composed by a part related to fixed costs and a part 
related to variable costs. A unit rate for each of these components is shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 – Unit rates for the Railway infrastructure access fee in Estonia 
Railway infrastructure access fee 
Service Type of service 
Access Minimum access package 
 
Charging formula 
--- 
 
Price components Variables considered  Charging values 
Part related to fixed costs Type of service 
International and local 
passenger trains: 0 EEK/train-
km 
Other services:74.9 EEK/train-
km 
Part related to variable costs  0.06 EEK/gross tonne-km 
Source: Own from Network Statement 2007 
 
A part from the unit rates applied in the Estonian charging scheme, it has been calculated 
the average charge. From EUROSTAT, it has been obtained a volume of traffic 
corresponding to year 2005 of 8.901.000 train-kilometres. However, the EVR’s web page 
only provides its Annual Report until year 2003. As an approximation, it has been 
considered that the income from infrastructure charges in 2005 was 50 million euros, given 
that according to Ott Koppel (2005) “While setting the infrastructure access fee for the 
2005-2006 timetable period, the Railway Inspectorate used the cost base of less than 50 
million euros”. As a result, the average charge is 5,62 €/train-km. 
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The following diagram shows this average charge in comparison with the level of the 
average charges of the rest of countries. 
 
Figure 12 – Average charge in Estonia 
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          Source: Own from data of EUROSTAT and Ott Koppel (2005) 
 
As it can be seen in the diagram above the level of the average charge in Estonia is the 
highest one. This is due to the fact that Estonia follows a full cost recovery approach and, 
in consequence, all its costs must be covered by the infrastructure charges. 
 
It should be noticed that in the Estonian case, the difference among the charge paid by the 
freight services and by the international and local passenger services is very high. This is 
due to the fact that the international and local passenger trains do not pay the fix part of 
the charge. 
 
 
3.4.4. Greece (EL) – Ethnikos Diacheiristis Sidirodromikis Ypodomis 
(EDISY) 
 
General overview 
 
In 2005, two subsidiary companies of OSE were set up: EDISY S.A. as infrastructure 
manager and TRENOSE S.A. as railway undertaking. 
 
According to OSE’s web page, EDISY exercises exclusively the administration and the 
exploitation of the National Railway Infrastructure, assuming the following tasks: 
• Responsible for its maintenance 
• The care of its improvements and expansions assuming responsibility for 
the management of the associated investments 
• Evaluates, establishes and collects rates from the railway companies which 
use the infrastructure. 
• Responsible for the capacity allocation 
 
According to the 2007 Network Statement, in an initial phase, the regulatory body is 
planned to be a specific service of the Ministry of Transports and Communications. 
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National legal framework concerning charging 
 
On 7 March 2005, under Presidential Decree 41/2005, Greece implemented the EU 
Directives into national Legislation. Chapter VI of the Presidential Decree sets the legal 
framework for the charging of the use of railway infrastructure and related services. 
 
User charge 
 
Charging principles 
 
According to Article 13 of the Presidential Decree 41/2005, the infrastructure manager is 
responsible for setting the rules and criteria for determining the fee for the use of the 
National Railway Infrastructure although the Minister of Transport and Communications 
shall approve them. The calculation of the fee owed by each railway undertaking and the 
collection of this fee shall be performed by the infrastructure manager. 
 
In accordance with Article 14 of the Presidential Decree, the accounts of the infrastructure 
manager shall at least balance income from infrastructure charges, surpluses from other 
commercial activities and State funding on the one hand, and infrastructure expenditure on 
the other. Thus, the approach is MC+. 
 
Calculation procedure 
 
According to the 2007 Network Statement, in order to calculate the charge for the use of 
railway infrastructure, account is taken of the base prices for the cost of track maintenance 
and traffic management, which derive from the division of the total cost for the respective 
service by the total number of train-kilometres. 
 
Charging structure 
 
The basic fee for the use of the infrastructure is composed by the basic prices 
corresponding to the track maintenance and to the traffic management services: 
• The basic price corresponding to the traffic management depends on a peak 
period coefficient that varies with the time band and the line station and on 
a capacity occupation coefficient that takes account of every service’s effect 
on the line’s capacity by dividing the running time and the ideal running 
time in a line section. 
• The basic price corresponding to the track maintenance depends on 
coefficient for the track quality provided in each line section and on a 
coefficient for the line’s burdening by the train which depends on the speed 
range, the axial load range and on the number of axles. 
 
The special charge is composed by a charge for the consumption of electric power for 
traction and a charge for the special/dangerous consignments.  
 
The charging elements considered, classified according to Directive 2001/14/EC, are: 
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? Congestion and scarcity charges: 
 
The basic price corresponding to the traffic management depends on two coefficients, the 
first relating to time deviations and the second relating to time bands and sections. 
Although it is not explicitly mentioned in the 2007 Network Statement, this charge should 
be related to the allocation of congestion costs.  
 
Charging level 
 
The basic fee depends on several factors. A range of values for each factor is given in Table 
6. 
 
Table 6 – Range of values for the Basic fee in Greece 
Basic fee 
Service Type of service 
Basic fee for the use of the infrastructure (C) Minimum access package 
 
Charging formula 
C = P * D where 
P = Ptm + Plm with  Ptm = BPtm * L1 * L2  
                                        Plm = BPlm * Kq * Ktrain 
 
Price components Variables considered  Charging values 
Unit price 
(BPtm)  0,65 €/km 
Running time Capacity 
occupation 
coefficient (L1) 
Ideal 
running 
time 
Line section 
category 
>= 1 
Time period 
Traffic 
management 
(Ptm) 
Peak period 
coefficient (L2) Line stations 
0,7 - 1,2 
Unit price 
(BPlm)  0,4 €/km 
Coefficient for 
the track quality 
provided (Kq) 
Line section category 0,53 - 0,90 
Speed range Train 
category Axle load range 
Line's 
maintenance 
(Plm) Coefficient for 
the line's 
burdening by 
the train 
(Ktrain) 
Number of axles 
1,00 - 9,61 
Distance (D)   
Source: Own from Network Statement 2007 
 
As it has been done for the rest of countries, in Greece it has not been possible to calculate 
the average charge given that there is no available data on the incomes of EDISY. 
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3.4.5. Spain (ES) – Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias 
(ADIF)  
 
General overview 
 
ADIF (Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias) is a state-owned company since the 
publishment of Law 39/2003 on 17 November 2003 of the Railway Sector, which came 
into force on the 1st of January of 2005. ADIF arose from the combination of the former 
infrastructure manager for high speed lines (GIF) and the infrastructure management 
department of RENFE. 
 
National legal framework concerning charging 
 
The implementation in Spain of the First Railway Package went through Law 39/2003 of 
17 November 2003 of the Railway Sector. 
 
As well, other laws and Royal Decrees completed this implementation of the EU 
Directives: Royal Decree 2387/2004, Royal Decree 2395/2004, Royal Decree 2396/2004 
and ORDEN FOM/897/2005. 
 
According to Railimplement it is not expected that passenger services will be liberalised 
until 2010, given that currently only freight services have been liberalised. 
 
User charge 
 
Charging principles 
 
The charging structure is defined in order to reflect the costs incurred by the infrastructure 
manager. The approach considered in Spain is MC+.  
 
According to Erail (2005), the setting and collection of infrastructure charges is ADIF’s 
responsibility.  However, the Ministerio de Fomento is the responsible for the 
establishment of the level and structure of the track access charges. These prices are stated 
as public prices and therefore can only be modified by a legislative procedure. On the other 
side, ADIF fixes the charges related to additional and ancillary services.  
 
Calculation procedure 
 
Law 39/2003 defines the basic charging structure so as to reflect the costs incurred by the 
infrastructure manager. In fact, the law introduces different parameters (level of traffic, 
time period, type of line, type of service, distance covered, type of contract, and type of 
homologation) as a way to proxy marginal costs.  
 
Charging structure 
 
The charge for the minimum access package is composed by an access charge, a capacity 
reservation charge, circulation charge and a traffic charge. 
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• The Access Charge (Modality A) is a unit rate depending level of traffic 
estimated by the operator at the start of each Working Timetable. 
• The Capacity Reservation Charge (Modality B) depends on the number of 
kilometres requested considering the type of line, the type of service and the 
time band. It is levied per train-km. 
• The Circulation Charge (Modality C) depends on the actual kilometres 
considering the type of line and the type of service. It is levied per train-km. 
• The Traffic Charge (Modality D) is only applied to passenger railway 
services offering a maximum speed greater than 260 km. It depends on the 
time band and is levied according to the capacity of the vehicles.  
 
ADIF also establish a charge for the track access to services facilities and supply of 
services. In addition, the law states a security tax for the railway transport of passengers.  
 
The charging elements considered, classified according to Directive 2001/14/EC, are: 
 
? Mark-ups: 
 
Although it is not explicitly mentioned in 2006 Network Statement, the Traffic Charge can 
be considered a mark-up since it is allocated to high speed services depending on their 
capacity (i.e. seats-km) and time band. According to 2006 Network Statement, the Traffic 
Charge value is established according to the service commercial value measured through 
the offered capacity. This can be considered a proxy to RU’s willingness to pay (and 
indirectly to demand elasticity), and so, it could be interpreted as a way of applying a mark-
up according to Ramsey’s principle. 
 
? Reservation charges: 
 
The Capacity Reservation Charge is clearly a reservation charge given that it is levied per 
kilometres requested. As well, the Access charge is considered a reservation charge given 
that is paid just once at the start of Working Timetable and is levied according to the 
estimated level of traffic. 
 
Charging level 
 
The Minimum Access Package is composed by an Access Charge, a Capacity Reservation 
Charge, a Running Charge and a Traffic Charge. Table 7 shows a range of values for each 
of these components of the charge. 
 
Table 7 – Range of values for the Minimum Access Package in Spain 
Minimum Access Package 
Service Type of service 
Access (Modality A) Minimum access package 
 
Charging formula 
--- 
 
Price components Variables considered  Charging values 
Access charge  Level of traffic 60.000 - 1.410.000 €/year 
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Service Type of service 
Capacity reservation (Modality B) Minimum service package 
 
Charging formula 
--- 
 
Price components Variables considered  Charging values 
Peak hour   0.06-3.40 €/train-km 
Normal hour 0.05-2.20 €/train-km Capacity reservation charge  
Time period 
Type of line 
Type of service Off- peak hour 0.05-0.07 €/train-km 
 
Service Type of service 
Running (Modality C) Minimum access package 
 
Charging formula 
--- 
 
Price components Variables considered  Charging values 
Running charge  Type of line Type of service 0,06 - 2,00 €/train-km used 
 
Service Type of service 
Traffic (Modality D) Minimum access package 
 
Charging formula 
--- 
 
Price components Variables considered  Charging values 
Traffic charge  Type of line Time period 0,65 - 1,25 €/100 seats-km 
Source: Own from Network Statement 2006 
 
The level of the average charge has been calculated from data of the ADIF’s Annual 
Report 2005 and the “Anuario del Ministerio de Fomento”. From the first source, it has 
obtained that the income from the charges for the use of the infrastructure amounted in 
2005 to 68 million euros. From the second source, it has been obtained that the total 
volume of traffic in 2005 was 127.700.000 train-kilometres. Then, as a result, the average 
charge is 0,40 €/train-km. The following diagram shows the comparison of the level of the 
average charge among all the countries considered. 
 
Figure 13 – Average charge in Spain 
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          Source: Own from data of “Anuario 2005” and ADIF’s 2005 Annual Report  
 
Charging for the railway infrastructure use during the last five years in Europe: 
state of the art and opportunities for revitalising the railways 
 
 
37 
 
 
As it can be seen in the diagram above, the level of the average charge in Spain is extremely 
low. This is due to the fact that in Spain the railways receive a great amount of State 
subsidies. 
 
As well, the Annual Report 2005 provides data on the income due to each component of 
the charge (Access Charge, Capacity reservation charge, Running charge and Traffic 
charge) it has been possible to represent the share of each component in the total charge. 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the share of each component of the charge in relative and 
absolute terms. 
 
Figure 14 – Relative share of each component of the track access charge in Spain 
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      Source: Own from ADIF’s 2005 Annual Report 
 
Figure 15 – Value of each component of the average charge in Spain 
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Concerning the type of service, the level of charges varies in a relevant way with this 
variable. In this case, there is an important difference between the average access charge 
for high speed services and for conventional passenger services or freight. Then, in order 
to calculate the charge for each type of services, there has been adopted some hypothesis:  
• Normal time band for all the services 
• Type of service V1 for high speed, M for freight and V2 for conventional 
trains 
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• Type of line A.2 for high speed and C for freight and conventional 
• Level of traffic N3.B for all the categories (given that the volume of traffic 
is 180 millions train·km/year) 
 
The absolute level of the average charge for each type of service and for each component 
of the charge is shown in Figure 16:  
 
Figure 16 – Average charge by type of service in Spain 
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            Source: Own from data of 2006 Network Statement 
 
Figure 17 shows the relative level of the average charge for each type of service and for 
each component of the charge: 
 
Figure 17 – Relative average charge by type of service in Spain 
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    Source: Own from data of 2006 Network Statement 
 
As it can be seen on the comparison of relative values among types of services, the access 
charge has low importance in every type of service although, in freight services, it reaches 
its maximum. The capacity reservation charge is moderated for high speed and freight but 
it is extremely high for conventional services. Finally, it should be noticed that only the 
high speed services have to pay the traffic charge. 
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Actually, although the average access charge (€/train·km) is higher for high speed trains 
than for freight trains, the total amount (€) paid by these two service yearly is very similar. 
This is reflected in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18 – Share of the total amount of charges paid by each business unit in Spain 
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Source: Own from Renfe’s 2005 Annual Report 
 
 
3.4.6. France (FR) – Réseau Ferré de France (RFF)  
 
General overview 
 
The creation of Réseau Ferré de France took place in 1997 due to the publishment of law 
97-135 in the aim of renewing France’s rail transport service. On this date, RFF became the 
owner and manager of France’s rail infrastructures, which had previously been managed by 
SNCF. In exchange, the RFF took over the SNCF’s rail-related debts. 
 
In 2003, RFF was put in charge of the capacity allocation, organising rail traffic on the 
French network. 
 
National legal framework concerning charging 
 
The implementation of the First Railway Package into national law in France went through 
Decree nº 2003-194 on the use of the railway national network. 
 
User charge 
 
Charging principles 
 
According to ECMT (2005a), RFF follows a MC+ charging philosophy (marginal cost with 
mark-ups), and the reserve ratio of RFF’s infrastructure charges amounts to 63%. The 
access charges are aimed at recovering maintenance, operation and renewals costs. In 2005, 
RFF’s subsidies comprised subsidies for the infrastructure management costs, investments, 
debt repayment and investments for the renewal of the infrastructure. 
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Calculation procedure 
 
According to Erail (2005), the exact prices of charges are fixed in the order (“arrêté”) of 4 
August 2003 by the Ministry on a proposal of the RFF. Prices are fixed on a yearly base. 
The larges payment is for path reservation. The tariffs are mainly determined on the basis 
of financial considerations (there is strong pressure to increase these tariffs to alleviate 
RFF’s poor financial position) and are not based on a detailed methodology to determine 
the marginal cost of the infrastructure. 
 
Charging structure 
 
The charging scheme applied in France consists of the following elements: 
• The Access charge depends on the type of line which is defined by a 
grouping of the network into four categories of elementary sections 
(suburban lines, main intercity lines, high-speed lines, and other lines) and 
twelve sub-categories of elementary sections corresponding to the traffic 
characteristics. It is paid by all railway undertakings making a request and is 
levied per train-kilometre. 
• The Reservation charge is paid by all railway undertakings which have been 
granted a path by RFF. It is composed by a path reservation charge and a 
station stop reservation charge. The path reservation charge depends on the 
time band, the line category and the type of train and it is levied per path-
km. Freight trains and light running traffic benefit from a reducing 
coefficient. The reservation charge for station stop is only levied to 
passenger trains. It depends on the time band and on the station category 
and it is charged for departure and each stop. 
• The Running charge is levied for the actual kilometres and depends on the 
type of service. It is levied per train·kilometre. 
 
The charging elements considered, classified according to Directive 2001/14/EC, are: 
 
? Reservation charges:  
 
The Access charge can be considered a reservation charge given that is levied to all railway 
undertakings which make a request of capacity. As well, both the path reservation charge 
and the station stop reservation charge for passenger services are considered reservation 
charges. 
 
? Performance regimes: 
 
There is a performance scheme put in place by RFF in order to optimise the performance 
of the rail network and offer a high-quality service to railway undertakings. It consists on a 
specific rate applied to the rate for the reservation of freight paths of which the total length 
is at least 300 km and of which the mean speed is greater than or equal to 70 km/h, not 
counting stops requested by the railway undertaking. 
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Charging level 
 
The charge for the Minimum Access Package is composed by an Access charge, a Charge 
for Reservation of capacity and a Running charge. Table 8 shows a range of values for each 
component of the Minimum Access Package. 
 
Table 8 – Range of values for the Minimum Access Package in France 
Minimum Access Package 
Service Type of service 
Minimum services Minimum access package 
 
Charging formula 
DA + DR + DC 
DR = DRS + DRAG 
 
Price components Variables considered  Charging values 
Access charge (DA) Route category Type of traffic 0,000 - 1,030 €/train-km 
Charge for reservation of 
capacity (DR)   
Off-peak 
hour 
0,000 - 1,850 
€/train-km 
Normal hour 0,005 - 11,103 
€/train-km 
Peak hour 0,005 - 14,500 
€/train-km 
Path reservation charge 
(DRS) 
Type of period 
Route category 
Type of traffic 
Coefficient of modulation 
Coefficient 
of 
modulation 
0,6 or 1 
Off- peak 
hour 
0,000 €/train 
departure 
Normal hour
   
 5,500 - 8,000 
€/train 
departure 
Reservation charge for 
stations stops of passenger 
trains (DRAG) 
Type of period 
Route category 
Peak hour    10,000  - 
25,000 €/train 
departure 
Running charge (DC) Type of train 0,400 - 1,200 €/train-km 
Source: Own from Network Statement 2007 
 
It is also possible to calculate the level of the average charge from data provided by the 
Annual Report 2005 and EUROSTAT. According to the Annual Report 2005, the total 
infrastructure fees levied during the year amounted to 2.182,4 million euros. In accordance 
to EUROSTAT, the total train-kilometres run in the French network in 2005 rose to 
505.799.000 train-km. Then, the average charge is 4,31 €/train-km. Figure 19 shows the 
comparison of the level of the average charge among all the countries considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Charging for the railway infrastructure use during the last five years in Europe: 
state of the art and opportunities for revitalising the railways 
 
 
42 
 
Figure 19 – Average charge in France 
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          Source: Own from data of EUROSTAT and RFF’s 2005 Annual Report 
 
As it can be seen in the diagram above, the level of charges in France is high given that the 
approach considered is MC+ and the level is higher than other countries whose approach 
is FC (i.e. Poland). 
 
As well, the Annual Report 2005 provides data on the income due to each component of 
the charge (Access fees, Route reservation fees, Fees for reservation of stops in railway 
stations and Traffic fees) it has been possible to represent the share of each component in 
the total charge. Figure 20 and Figure 21 show the share of each component of the charge 
in relative and absolute terms. 
 
Figure 20 – Value of each component of the average charge in France 
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Figure 21 – Relative share of each component of the track access charge in France  
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3.4.7. Italy (IT) – Rete Ferroviaria Italiana (RFI) 
 
General overview 
 
RFI was constituted in 1 July 2001, as a conclusion of the reorganization of Gruppo 
Ferrovie dello Stato initiated, in order to fulfil the Community Directive, while separating 
the infrastructure management and the operation, which was assumed by TRENITALIA in 
1 June 2000. RFI is a daughter company of the Holding FS. 
 
National legal framework concerning charging 
 
In 1998, Italy initiated the rail liberalisation by implementing Directive 91/440 through 
Presidential Decree nº 277/1998. Afterwards, the First Railway Package was implemented 
through Legislative Decree nº 188 of 8 July 2003. This Decree covers all the main aspects 
of the three Directives touching on the licensing, the safety aspects and the more detailed 
conditions set out in 2001/14/EC relating to charging, services and performance regimes. 
 
User charge 
 
Charging principles 
 
The basic approach taken to charging in Italy is described by RFI as being based on full 
cost recovery for the running costs while the maintenance costs are paid by the State 
through the Contrato di Programma. This approach is shown in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22 – Recovery of infrastructure management costs 
 
    Source: ECMT. Workshop in Rome, July 2004 
 
The charging framework that has been adopted has attempted to disaggregate the costs of 
operating, maintaining and renewing the network not only according to the wear and tear 
caused by the different types of rolling stock and their characteristics but also according to 
three different types of railway infrastructure (the fundamental network, the 
complementary network, and the key nodes around major conurbations). 
 
Calculation procedure 
 
The process of setting the access charges is carried by the infrastructure manager and the 
CIPE (“Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica”), as it can be seen 
in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23 – Determination of the charging system in Italy 
 
    Source: ECMT. Workshop in Rome, July 2004 
 
The main factors determining the average level of charges are compiled in Table 9. As well, 
it shows the cost categories that charges are designed to cover: 
 
Table 9 – Cost categories considered by RFI 
Costs covered by charges Wholly Partly No 
Traffic management X   
Maintenance   X 
Renewals   X 
Investments   X 
IM’s salaries and pensions  X  
Accidents   X 
Pollution   X 
 Source: Own from ECMT. Workshop in Rome, July 2004 
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Those cost categories that are not covered or partly covered by charges are paid by the 
State budget. 
 
Charging structure 
 
The type of charge applied by RFI is a two-part tariff consisting on a fixed access charge 
and a variable charge. The fixed access charge is the 40 % of the RFI’s revenues and, the 
variable charge, is the remainder 60%. The charge value is determined according to the 
type of infrastructure: node, the trunk line net and the secondary line net. This structure is 
shown in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24 – Structure of the charging scheme in Italy 
 
    Source: ECMT. Workshop in Rome, July 2004 
 
The parameters considered in the calculation of charge for the Minimum Access Package 
are the following ones: 
• The quality of the railway infrastructure, related to the maximum speed and 
the technical layout of the line. 
• The congestion of the piece of the network charged. 
• The wear and tear of the rail and the electric wire, related to the weight of 
the rolling stock used. 
• The speed of the train, as well as the deviation of the speed in relation to 
the optimal commercial speed. 
• The power consumption. 
 
The charge for each train path includes: 
• Fixed part per section/node related to the access cost for each section or 
node varying with the quality of the railway infrastructure. 
• Variable part per kilometre/minute, related to the cost of use of the 
infrastructure depending on the actual kilometres travelled and the minutes 
staying inside a node. It varies with the type of line and, within it, depends 
on the relative density, speed and deterioration (calculated from vehicle 
variables like speed and weight). 
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This charging scheme is reflected in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25 – Variables considered in the charging scheme 
 
           Source: ECMT. Workshop in Rome, July 2004 
 
The charging elements considered, classified according to Directive 2001/14/EC, are: 
 
? Reservation charges: 
 
The reservation is set at the minimum value between the charge to access the section and 
the 50% of the whole track access charge. 
 
The fixed part of the charge can also be considered as a reservation charge as it is levied in 
order to access to a section or a node. 
 
? Performance regimes: 
 
The Performance Regime applied in Italy consists on a delay minutes accountancy system. 
The delays are measured at destination stations. It is based on allowed delay threshold 
which depends on the type of service: 5 minutes for regional passenger trains, 15 minutes 
for mid-long distance passenger trains and 30 minutes for freight trains. There is allocation 
of responsibilities between the infrastructure manager and the railway undertaking. The 
charge for disruption is cap to a maximum of 20% of the total usage charge or of 1,5% of 
the total yearly usage charge. 
 
? Discounts: 
 
The discount applied in Italy is due to the backwardness of the infrastructure. It is 
composed by two parts: the first part of the discount is applied to network segments where 
no conditions stand for a single agent driving and it considers different unitary rates 
depending on the type of line and the time band; the second part corresponds to the total 
volume of traffic in train-kilometres during a year depending on the type of traffic (short 
distance passenger, long distance passenger, freight) and it cannot exceed the 80% of the 
total usage charge of the year. 
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Charging level 
 
The charge for each train path is composed by a part related to the access, a part related to 
the use of the infrastructure and a part related to the consumption of power. A range of 
values for each component of the charge is given in Table 10. 
 
Table 10 – Range of values for the Basic charge in Italy 
Basic charge 
Service Type of service 
Access Minimum access package 
 
Charging formula 
Rsection/node + Rkm/min + Rpower consumption 
 
Price components Variables considered  Charging values 
Type of section in the main 
network 49,06 - 64,56 €/section 
Type of section in the 
complementary network 23,24 – 46,48 €/section 
Access to the infrastructure 
(Rsection/node) 
Type of node  51,65 €/node 
Velocity deviation 
Time period 
Type of section 
Interval 
Use of the infrastructure 
(Rkm/min) 
Use of main station 
 
Distance run with electric 
traction Power consumption (Rpower consumption) Time band 
0,332 €/km 
Source: Own from Network Statement 2007 
 
A part from the range of values shown in the table above, it has been calculated the average 
charge. According to the RFI’s Annual Report 2005, the total income from the levy of tolls 
amounted to 647,142 million euros. As well, according to EUROSTAT, it is known that 
the total volume of traffic in 2005 rose to 373.334.000 train-kilometres. As a result, the 
average charge is 1,73 €/train-km. In Figure 26 it can be seen the level of the average 
charge in Italy compared to the rest of the countries. 
 
Figure 26 – Average charge in Italy 
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          Source: Own 
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As it is shown in the diagram, the average charge in Italy is low in comparison with the rest 
of countries. This result could be expected given that the State pays a high share of the 
total costs, as it can be seen in Table 9. 
 
 
3.4.8. Netherlands (NL) – ProRail  
 
General overview 
 
In 1995, three NS divisions became responsible for the management of the Dutch railway 
network:  Railinfrabeheer, responsible for maintenance and construction, Railned, 
allocating capacity and Railverkeersleiding, that monitored daily traffic, provided travelling 
information and dealt with recovery after disruptions. Although they worked by the order 
of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, these divisions 
remained part of the NS Holding until 2002. 
 
In 2002, the separation of management and exploitation became effective through a new 
Railways Act. Since 1 January 2003, the three divisions of NS are united in ProRail. 
 
The Inspection Service of Transport (IVW) is responsible for the safety and the Office of 
Transport Regulation of the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) is the national 
competition authority and the regulatory body, including appeals for infrastructure charges.  
 
National legal framework concerning charging 
 
The implementation of the First Railway Package went through the Railways Act 2005 
(Spoorwegwet 2005), in particular Articles 62 and 63 implement Directive 2001/14/EC. 
 
User charge 
 
Charging principles 
 
The approach taken to charging in the Netherlands is MC. The Dutch Ministry of 
Transport reported that charges will, from year 2005, cover traffic management and 
maintenance costs in full. The costs of renewal, investment, salaries, accidents, air pollution 
or noise are not covered by charges. 
 
Calculation procedure 
 
According to Network Statement 2007, tariffs for the use of the railway infrastructure are 
based on the variable operating costs of the train service. The point of departure in 
determining these variable costs is the train service at the current transport volume plus or 
less 5%. No additional market surcharges are applied to increase the coverage of costs on 
the part of Prorail. 
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Charging structure 
 
The Basic Access Package applied by ProRail is composed by a tariff per train-kilometre 
and a tariff per ton-kilometre. The first one allocates marginal operation costs and the 
second one, marginal maintenance costs. Both tariffs are applied to all services. 
 
As well, there is a charge for access to facilities invoicing use of the contact line, use of 
refuelling systems, passenger access and transfer facilities at stations and stabling and 
shunting of rail vehicles. Finally, ProRail also offers additional and ancillary services. 
 
The charging elements considered, classified according to Directive 2001/14/EC, are: 
 
? Discounts: 
 
To promote use of the Port Railway Line, ProRail is therefore to grant a discount on the 
ton-kilometre charge applicable on the Combined Network on the access and exit routes of 
the Port Railway Line. Then, the discount is applied for the portion of the train weight over 
and above 750 tons. 
 
Charging level 
 
The Basic Access Package is composed by a tariff per train·kilometre and a tariff per 
ton·kilometre. In Table 11 are shown the unit rates applied for each part of the charge. 
 
Table 11 – Unit rates applied in the Basic Access Package in the Netherlands 
Basic Access Package 
Service Type of service 
Basic access package (BAP) Minimum access package 
 
Charging formula 
BAP = TTr + Tto 
 
Price components Variables considered  Charging values 
Tariff per train-kilometre (TTr)  0,5059 €/train-km 
Tariff per ton-kilometre (TTo)  0,001715 €/ton-km 
Source: Own from Network Statement 2007 
 
As for the other countries, it has been calculated the average charge resulting from the 
quotient between the total income from charges and the total volume of traffic in 2005. 
From the 2005 Annual Report, it is known that the total revenue from the user charge 
corresponds to 125 million euros and, according to EUROSTAT, in 2005 the total traffic 
was 125.250.000 train-kilometres. As a result, the average charge is 1,00 €/train-km. The 
level of the average charge in the Netherlands compared among the rest of countries is 
reflected in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27 – Average charge in the Netherlands 
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          Source: Own from data of EUROSTAT and ProRail’s 2005 Annual Report 
 
The level of the charge is one of the lowest. This result makes sense as the approach taken 
to charging in the Netherlands is MC. 
 
 
3.4.9. Poland (PL) – Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. (PLK)  
 
General overview 
 
In 2001, the state-owned company PKP was transferred into a capital holding company 
namely PKP Group. In June 2003, the Railway Transport Office was created and PKP 
PLK was designated as infrastructure manager, jointly owned by PKP S.A. and the Ministry 
of Finance. 
 
National legal framework concerning charging:  
 
In March 2003, with the Act on Railway Transport, Poland implemented the First Railway 
Package of Directives. According to Railimplement, this Act had some variations that 
introduce some disconformities with European Directives. 
 
As well, the legal framework for charging is established by the Decree of Minister of 
Infrastructure of 7 April 2004 on conditions concerning access and use of railway 
infrastructure.  
 
User charge 
 
Charging principles 
 
According to Erail, Infrastructure manager (PLK) is the responsible for the setting of 
charges with the supervision of the Railway Transport Office (RTO). The President of the 
RTO is responsible for the approval and coordination of charges for the use of granted 
train routes in respect of compatibility with rules of setting charges (Art. 13 of the Law on 
Railway Transport). Furthermore must handle the complaints of railway operators related 
to the charges for the use of railway infrastructure. 
 
Charging for the railway infrastructure use during the last five years in Europe: 
state of the art and opportunities for revitalising the railways 
 
 
51 
 
 
The general aim of the charging system is to cover the total and justified infrastructure 
manager’s costs connected with the process of making infrastructure available to the users. 
However, according to the Act of 28 March 2003 certain costs as investments are financed 
from the national budget. Thus, the charging philosophy adopted by PKP is FC-. 
 
The relation between the incomes and costs incurred by PKP PLK can be seen at Figure 
28. 
 
Figure 28 – Incomes and costs incurred by PKP PLK 
         Source: Infrastructure Manager’s 2005 Annual Report 
 
Calculation procedure 
 
According to ECMT (2005a), the unit rates are calculated on the basis of maintenance 
costs, traffic operation costs and cost of administration in connection with providing 
access, investment expenditures on managed lines and additional costs. Unit rates of basic 
charges for using infrastructure are determined for individual line sections and depend on 
historical costs and on the level of operating performance on each section.  
 
Charging structure 
 
The basic charge applied in the Polish charging scheme is composed by a realisation charge 
for the use of the railway lines and by a reservation charge, which is part of the realisation 
part. The basic charge is calculated as a total of products of unit rates assigned to individual 
sections of railway lines and the length of these sections. 
 
The unit rates specified for train parameters (weight and speed) are defined by timetable 
for qualified passenger trains (average technical vehicle speed) and for other trains (gross 
weight of a train).  
 
PKP can apply average rates in the whole network for those railway undertakings that have 
ordered train paths on at least 60% of railway lines managed by PKP or that will utilise (on 
a daily average) at least 70% of all trains paths prepared for them in the Annual Timetable. 
 
As well, PKP sets additional charges for the additional services such as hazardous 
transports, extra information about the train route, preparation of a Timetable Study, ...  
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The charging elements considered, classified according to Directive 2001/14/EC, are: 
 
? Reservation charges: 
 
The reservation charge included in the basic charge is agreed with each RU within the track 
access agreement. 
 
? Performance regimes: 
 
There is a performance regime regulated in the contracts signed between PKP PLK and 
some of the railway undertakings. 
 
? Discounts: 
 
On separate request of RU, justified by increase of performance volume resulting from 
transferring goods from other modes of transport into railways, PLK has a right to give 
discount (for certain period of time). Discount level cannot be higher than 50% of fixed 
part of average unit rates given in the price list. 
 
As well, on separate request of railway undertaking PLK has a right to give discount (for a 
certain period of time) to exceptional trains (not included in Annual Timetable) serving 
celebrations concerning national and religious holidays or promoting railway industry. The 
level of discount is 60% of unit rates. 
 
Charging level 
 
The Basic charge depends on several variables such as the type of train, the maximum 
speed of the section,… A range of values and an average value are given in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 – Range of values for the Basic charge in Poland 
Basic charge 
Service Type of service 
Basic charge Minimum access package 
 
Charging formula 
UR x L 
 
Price components Variables considered  Charging values 
Specific values 4,61 - 16,84 zl/train-km 
Qualified 
passenger 
trains Average 9,26 zl/train-km
Specific values 3,69 - 15,01 zl/train-km 
Other 
passenger 
trains Average 6,80 zl/train-km
Specific values 2,08 - 6,04 zl/train-km Rail buses 
Average 2,62 zl/train-km
Unit rate assigned to 
individual sections of 
railway line (UR) 
Type of train 
 
Maximum speed of the 
section 
 
Average technical 
vehicle speed (for 
qualified passenger 
trains) 
 
Gross weight of a train 
Freight 
trains Specific values 
11,26 - 53,86 
zl/train-km 
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 Average 20,61 zl/train-km 
Specific values 2,99 - 9,96 zl/train-km Locomotives
Average 4,38 zl/train-km
Specific values 6,07 - 16,47 zl/train-km Combined 
block trains Average 10,59 zl/train-km 
Specific values 2,71 - 10,85 zl/train-km 
 (for other trains) 
"Pociagi 
sluzbowe " Average 4,62 zl/train-km
Length of the section 
(L)   
Source: Own from Network Statement 2007 
 
A part from the range of values provided in the table above, it has calculated the average 
charge, by dividing the total revenue from charges by the total train-kilometres. According 
to the Annual Report, the total income from access charges amounted, in 2005, to 2.501,8 
million PLN which corresponds to 655,9 million euros. As well, in accordance with 
EUROSTAT, the total volume of traffic in the Polish railways in 2005 rose to 207.173.000 
train-kilometres. Then, the average charge resulting is 3,17 €/train-km. Figure 29 shows the 
average charge resulting in Poland compared to the average charge resulting in the rest of 
countries. 
 
Figure 29 – Average charge in Poland 
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          Source: Own from data of EUROSTAT and PKP PLK’s 2005 Annual Report 
 
The level of the average charge exposed in the diagram above is near to the average of the 
average charges (2,63 €/train-km). This means that the level of the charge is not extremely 
high given that the charging scheme applied by PLK is intended to recover full costs less 
subsidies. 
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3.4.10. Portugal (PT) – Rede Ferroviaria Nacional (REFER)  
 
General overview 
 
In accordance with the government Decree nº 104/97, REFER, Rede Ferroviária 
Nacional, E.P, was legally incorporated on 29 April 1997 and is responsible for managing 
the infrastructure of the Portuguese Railway System. 
 
In compliance with the criteria of independence from Rail Transportation management 
companies, REFER reports to the Instituto Nacional do Transporte Ferroviário (INTF), 
the state railway regulator. In partnership with the existing railways operators, CP and 
Fertagus, the regulator defines access rights, grants access licences to operators, approves 
access charges and regulates railway activities taking into account development, safety, 
quality and environment.  
 
REFER’s mission is to manage the rail network in terms of construction, conservation, 
maintenance, management of property assets and capacity management in order to provide 
the market with a competitive, efficient, safe and environmentally sound transport 
infrastructure. 
 
National legal framework concerning charging 
 
The implementation of the First Railway Package went through Decree-Law 270/2003 
approved the 28th October 2003 which defines the conditions for the rendering of rail-
related services and for the management of the railway infrastructure. 
 
User charge 
 
Charging principles 
 
Tariffs are calculated in order to partly cover transport service provision costs. The 
parameters used relate to the maintenance of the infrastructure, the type of traffic 
(freight/passenger/empty), the type of route (electrified/non-electrified) and the line used. 
The charges partly cover management costs and maintenance costs but do not cover 
renewals, investments, accident costs, ... Thus, the approach taken to charging in Portugal 
is MC. 
 
Calculation procedure 
 
Tariffs for the use of essential services are calculated for 9 different homogenous groups by 
dividing the costs that are directly related to each essential service by the useable capacities 
in every part of the network where the services are offered. 
 
The procedure followed to the establishment of the prices consists of: 
• The infrastructure manager publishes the prices in the Network Statement 
two years in advance, based on provisional data for those costs. It should 
provide additional specific data to the rail regulator supporting the set of 
prices published. 
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• The regulator analyses the information which supports the prices according 
to the methodology, the principles established by Decree-Law 270/2003 
and the data supporting the prices and its evaluation through time. 
• The operators may disagree with the prices and ask the regulator to 
interfere. 
• The regulator may issue a recommendation or an instruction pointing 
changes on the published prices. 
• Finally, the infrastructure manager has to look over for the corrections 
pointed by the regulator and publish them again in the Network Statement. 
 
Charging structure 
 
According to the 2006 Network Statement, the infrastructure manager offers as essential 
services all those needed for the effective access to infrastructure. The basic tariff for the 
essential services depends on the type of service, the type of traction and the line or 
section. Tariffs for the use of essential services are intended to recover marginal operation, 
maintenance and renewal costs and are allocated to train·km according to the type of line 
and the type of service. 
 
As well, additional and ancillary services are provided at the price based on the costs 
incurred on the basis of the actual level of use. 
 
The charging elements considered, classified according to Directive 2001/14/EC, are: 
 
? Reservation charges: 
 
There is a tariff for unused requested capacity which varies from 10% to 100% of the 
applicable tariff depending on the anteriority of the cancellation in relation to the date of 
the requested capacity. 
 
? Performance regimes: 
 
The performance regime aims at reducing disturbances to a minimum and to promote 
efficiency in the services, allowing for a better operating performance. Railways 
undertakings are free to accept it or not. 
 
This performance regime consists on a delay minutes accountancy system based on control 
points at destination stations (only considering arrival times). It establishes certain 
performance standards depending on the type of service: 3 minutes for suburban passenger 
trains, 5 minutes for medium and long distance passenger trains and 30 minutes for freight 
trains. It is remarkable that in case the train is partially or totally cancelled, or there is a 
failure service at a station, the delay time is calculated as being the difference between the 
original arrival time at the destination and the best alternative for the final customer. For 
each train, the maximum penalty is 20% of the tariffs for essential services. 
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Charging level 
 
The Basic tariff depends on the type of route, the type of traffic and the line. In Table 13 a 
range of values for this charge are shown for different types of lines and traffic. 
 
Table 13 – Range of values for the Train Path Charge in Portugal 
Train Path Pricing 
Service Type of service 
Essential train services Minimum access package 
 
Charging formula 
--- 
 
Price components Variables considered  Charging values 
Basic tariffs 
Type of route 
Type of traffic 
Line 
Suburban lines:  
Passengers and empty trains: 
1,30 - 2,31 €/train-km 
Freight trains: 
1,31 - 2,37 €/train-km 
Non suburban lines 
Passengers and empty trains: 
1,68 - 2,82 €/train-km 
Freight trains: 
1,75 - 2,87 €/train-km 
Source: Own from Network Statement 2006 
 
It has been calculated the average charge by dividing the total revenue from charges and 
the total volume in traffic in 2005. According to REFER’s 2005 Annual Report, the 
revenues from the user’s charge amounted to 57,8 million euros. In addition, from 
EUROSTAT, it is known that the volume of traffic in 2005 was 37.675.000 train-
kilometres. Then, the resulting average charge is 1,53 €/train-km. In Figure 30, it is shown 
the level of the average charge for each country, standing out the average charge 
corresponding to Portugal. 
 
Figure 30 – Average charge in Portugal 
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          Source: Own from data of EUROSTAT and REFER’s 2005 Annual Report 
 
As it can be seen, the level of the average charge in Portugal is relatively high, especially if 
considering that the approach taken to charging is MC. 
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3.4.11. Sweden (SE) – Banverket (BV)  
 
General overview 
 
In 1988, Sweden managed the separation between operation and infrastructure 
management, being the first country in the world. Then, the Transports Politics Law 
designed Banverket as the infrastructure manager and Statens Järnvägar (SJ), became a 
public railway operator. 
 
Järnvägsstyrelsen is the railway regulator and was established on 1 July 2004 according to 
Directive 2000/14/EC. It is in charge of the supervision of infrastructure charges and the 
capacity allocation procedure.  
 
National legal framework concerning charging 
 
The First Railway Package was implemented in Sweden through the Järnvägslag (Railway 
act, 2004:519) of 1 July 2004 on the levying of charges. 
 
User charge 
 
Charging principles 
 
According to ECMT (2005a), the cost recovery target for infrastructure charges is 5% of 
total costs. Charges are based on a distributed average of short run marginal maintenance 
costs plus a mark-up to recover the Öresund Bridge costs that is applied to passenger trains 
across the whole network. Freight trains pay a specific toll for use of the bridge. 
 
Charges are intended to partly cover traffic management costs and maintenance costs with 
the remainder being covered with the State budget. Costs not covered by charges are 
renewals, investments and other costs. 
 
Thus, the approach taken to charging in Sweden is MC+, although the fact that renewal 
costs are not covered by charges means that probably charges are below marginal costs. 
 
Calculation procedure 
 
As mentioned, charges are intended to recover maintenance costs and part of management 
costs. The marginal costs are estimated through an econometric model. The calculated 
marginal costs are then compared with average costs to establish cost recovery rates from 
the model.  
 
Charging structure 
 
The current Swedish charging scheme is composed Marginal-cost based charge, and a 
Special charge, including a train path charge and other special charge for passenger traffic. 
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The Marginal-cost-based charges corresponds to the cost incurred as a directly 
consequence of the movement of rail vehicles. It includes a track charge, and accident 
charge and emission charge: 
• The Track charge reflects those costs of maintaining the railway 
infrastructure to which an additional train movement gives rise. It varies 
with the number of gross tonne-kilometres. According to the Network 
Statement 2007, the level of the charge has been determined by studies of 
the change in Banverket’s costs for maintenance when traffic volumes 
change. 
• The Accident charge reflects the socio-economic costs of accidents 
involving injury to which an additional train movement gives rise. It varies 
with the number of train-kilometres. According to the Network Statement 
2007, the level of the charge has been determined by studies of the change 
of the socio-economic costs associated with accidents when traffic volumes 
change. 
• The Emission charge reflects the socio-economic costs in terms of 
environmental and health effects to which an additional train movement 
gives rise. It varies with the number of litres of diesel fuel and varies with 
the type of traction unit. 
 
The special charge Train path charge consists on a charge for a contribution to covering 
the fixed costs of the infrastructure. It is applied to freight traffic passing over the Öresund 
Link. As well, there is another special charge only for passenger services which is levied per 
gross tonne-kilometre. 
 
Banverket offers also establishes charges for the track access to service facilities, the 
ancillary services, known as Extra services, and Additional services, for instance the supply 
of traction motor current.  
 
The charging elements considered, classified according to Directive 2001/14/EC, are: 
 
? Mark-ups: 
 
The part of the train path charge levied to freight traffic crossing the Öresund Link should 
be considered a mark-up given that is charged per train crossing and that it is stated at a 
high value.  
 
As well, the special charge levied to passenger services per gross tonne-kilometre is also 
considered a mark-up. 
 
? Environmental charges: 
 
Both the Emission charge and the Accident charge are environmental charges given that 
are intended to recover the socio-economic costs of environmental and health effects and 
of accidents. 
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Charging level 
 
The Minimum Access Package charged by Banverket is composed by a Train path charge, 
a Special charge for passenger traffic and a Marginal-cost based charge incurred by the 
operation of the traffic. The unit rates levied for each component are compiled in Table 14. 
 
Table 14 – Unit rates applied in the Minimum Access Package in Sweden 
Minimum Access Package 
Service Type of service 
Minimum access package (MAP) Minimum access package 
 
Charging formula 
MAP = TPC + OSC + MCB where 
MCB = TC+AC+EC+DPL+DMU 
 
Price components Variables considered  Charging values 
Train path charges (TPC) Type of service 
0,25 SEK/gross tonne-km 
23,25 SEK/gross tonne-km 
for freight traffic over the 
Öresund Link 
Other special charge for passenger 
traffic (OSC)  0,0078 SEK/gross tonne-km 
Track charge (TC)  0,0029 SEK/gross tonne-km 
Accident charge 
(AC)  0,65 SEK/train-km 
Emission charge 
(EC)  --- 
Trains hauled by 
diesel-powered 
locomotives (DPL) 
 0,39 SEK/litre of diesel fuel 
Marginal-cost-
based charges 
incurred by the 
operation of 
the traffic 
(MCB) 
DMU power cars 
(DMU)  0,22 SEK/litre of diesel fuel 
Source: Own from Network Statement 2007 
 
As for the rest of countries, it has been calculated the average charge. According to 2005 
Annual Report, the income due to the track charges available to Banverket amounted to 
479,2 million SEK, which corresponds to 52,8 million euros. From EUROSTAT, it is 
recognized that the volume of traffic in 2005 was 127.411.000 train-kilometres. As a result, 
the average charge is 0,41 €/train-km. Figure 31 shows the level of the average charge 
calculated for Sweden in comparison with the average charges calculated for the rest of 
countries. 
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Figure 31 – Average charge in Sweden 
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          Source: Own from data of EUROSTAT and Banverket’s 2005 Annual Report 
 
It is logical that the average charge in Sweden is as low as it can be seen in Figure 31, given 
that only the short-run marginal costs are charged plus a mark-up in order to recover the 
investment costs of the Öresund Link. 
 
 
3.4.12. United Kingdom (UK) – Network Rail 
 
General overview 
 
In the United Kingdom, during the mid-nineties, the rail system was completely broken up 
into approximately a hundred of companies and privatised. Then, Railtrack PLC became 
the owner and operator of the national railway network.  
 
The fatal accidents at Southall in 1997 and Ladbroke Grove in 1999 called into question 
the effect that the fragmentation of the railway network had on both safety and 
maintenance procedures. It was the Hatfield crash on October 17, 2000 that proved to be 
the defining moment in Railtrack's collapse. 
 
In March 2002, Network Rail was created specifically to acquire Railtrack. It is a British 
“not for dividend” private company limited by guarantee, whose principal asset is Network 
Rail Infrastructure Limited, a company limited by shares. Network Rail owns the national 
rail network infrastructure and it is subject to regulation by the independent Office of Rail 
Regulation (ORR). 
 
The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) was established on 5 July 2004 under the Railways 
and Transport Safety Act 2003. ORR is an independent statutory body led by a Board. 
ORR sets the contractual and financial framework within which Network Rail operates the 
network. 
  
National legal framework concerning charging 
 
The privatisation of the rail sector was carried during the mid-nineties, so it was ten years 
before the publishment of the First Railway Package. 
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The legal framework for charging in the United Kingdom is established by the Statutory 
Instrument 2005, nº 3049. As well, it is important to mention the Railways Act 1993 and 
the Transport Act 2000, which amended the Railways Act 1993. 
 
User charge 
 
Charging principles 
 
The Office of Rail Regulation has a statutory duty to ensure that Network Rail has an 
adequate income to meet all its costs including a return on capital in case it operates 
efficiently. ORR, through the Access Charges Review, establishes the revenues and the 
associated financial framework required for Network Rail in order to operate, maintain and 
renew its infrastructure. Thus, the structure and the amount of charging elements are fixed 
by the ORR.  
 
Given that the charges must cover whatever costs that are not met directly by government 
grant, the charging principle may be labelled as full cost recovery. However, the variable 
element of the tariff is based on short run marginal costs and the fixed element is only 
applied to passenger franchisees. Thus the charging principle must be labelled as marginal 
cost pricing. 
 
According to ECMT (2005a), Network Rail follows a MC charging philosophy for freight 
and a MC+ charging philosophy for passengers. The amount of access charges is such that 
Network Rail’s income from such charges together with surpluses from other commercial 
activities and any public funds shall at least balance with infrastructure expenditure.  
 
Calculation procedure 
 
The current charging scheme applied by Network Rail is composed by a fixed charge and 
by a variable charge. The variable charge consists on a Track variable usage charge, a 
Capacity charge, a Traction electricity charge and an Electrification access charge. Each of 
these charges is calculated through a specific procedure. 
 
Since 2001, in Britain is used a usage charge model to derive variable costs. This is a top-
down model which estimates total renewals and maintenance expenditure multiplied by a 
percentage variability which depends on the infrastructure type (i.e. track, signalling, etc.). 
Then, variable costs are allocated to vehicles on the network using basic operating (vehicle) 
characteristics (i.e. speed, axle load, unstrung mass, suspension type). Thus, the usage 
charges are not disaggregated in geographic areas or asset types but there is type of vehicle 
disaggregation. 
 
The capacity charge covers the marginal congestion cost (revenue effect on operators). 
These marginal costs have been calculated for more than 2700 route sections and 13 time 
bands. Then, service groups, i.e. groups of similar unitary costs, have been defined. Finally, 
costs are allocated for every service group according to mileage. 
 
The traction electricity charge consists on the electricity supply tariffs and is recovered per 
kWh consumed. 
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The electrification asset usage charge covers the marginal wear and tear costs on 
electrification assets. The variability of electrification costs is established by a top-down 
approach and, then, these costs are allocated per kWh consumed. 
 
A large proportion of Network Rail’s costs are fixed. The Fixed charge is a mark-up to 
ensure Network Rail recovers all its costs. Fixed charges are calculated by allocating costs 
to routes and then dividing them between franchised train operators on the basis of vehicle 
miles operated. 
 
Then, the allocation of fixed costs is based implicitly on the railway undertaking’s ability to 
pay, through the franchising process. On the other hand, freight and open access operators 
only pay the marginal costs of operation. 
 
This Fixed charge is calculated by the ORR for a five-year period following a standard 
“building block” methodology (see  
Figure 32). This methodology calculates the total amount of money that Network Rail 
should receive, as the sum of allowed expenditure on operation and maintenance of the 
network, the allowed return and amortisation of the regulatory asset base (RAB), less 
projected income from other sources. The charge is calculated by allocating the total 
amount that Network Rail should recover to routes and then dividing it among franchised 
passenger train operators on the basis of vehicle miles operated.  
 
Figure 32 – Fixed track access charges. United Kingdom 
 
          Source: ORR (2003). 
 
As a final step in the calculations, the Regulator checks that the level of access charges he is 
proposing does not make it excessively difficult for Network Rail to finance its relevant 
activities.  
 
Charging structure 
 
Currently, the charging structure is composed by fixed track access charges (applied to 
franchised passenger train operators), variable usage charges (applied to all train operators), 
and supplementary access charges (which directly or indirectly can affect all train 
operators). Therefore, the tariff applied to franchised train operators is a two-part tariff 
while the tariff applied to non – franchised train operators and to freight operators is a 
linear tariff. This charging structure depending on the type of operator is reflected in Table 
15. 
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Table 15 – Charging structure applied in Great Britain depending on the type of operator 
 
Franchised 
passenger 
operators 
Non – franchised 
passenger operators
Freight operators
Variable charge √ √ √ 
Fixed charge √ - - 
Access charge 
supplements √ √ √ 
Source: Own from SEETO 4rth Working group on Railways and Intermodal transport 
 
The fixed track access charges constitute a mark-up to ensure Network Rail recovers all its 
costs. 
 
Variable usage charges, which allow Network Rail to recover costs which vary with the 
volume of traffic and to provide appropriate incentives, are composed by: 
• The Track variable usage charge reflects the wear and tear to track and non-
track asset associated with the volume and type of traffic (assuming current 
network capability). It is expressed in pence per vehicle mile. Different 
values are established for different type of vehicles, but it is independent 
from the area or region. 
• The Capacity charge is intended to reflect the performance regime 
(Schedule 8) costs of congestion. An average capacity charge rate for each 
service group for franchised passenger train operators is calculated. For 
passenger train operators other than franchised passenger train operators, is 
taken into account the time of day and whether running is weekday or 
weekend. For freight train operators the charge is similar to the passenger 
charge, i.e. it is billed on an average rate per service group. Freight train 
operators receive a 10% discount for the capacity charge amount payable, to 
reflect the greater flexibility, in pathing their services. 
• The Traction electricity charge covers the cost of electricity procurement 
and supply (Network rail purchases traction electricity on behalf of all train 
operators). 
• The Electrification asset usage charge covers the incremental wear and tear 
costs on electrification assets. Different values are established for different 
geographical areas, season and time of day bands. 
 
The supplementary access charges are composed by a performance regime and a 
possessions regime. The first one constitutes an incentive to Network Rail and train 
operators to improve efficiency. The second one is aimed at incentivising Network Rail to 
improve engineering access efficiency and to make appropriate trade-off between 
engineering efficiency and passenger and freight disruption from possessions. 
 
The charging elements considered, classified according to Directive 2001/14/EC, are: 
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? Mark-ups: 
 
Fixed charges applied to franchised passenger operators are a mark-up aimed at recovering 
the future estimated revenue needs of the infrastructure manager.  
 
? Congestion and scarcity charges: 
 
The Capacity charge reflects marginal congestion costs calculated for different sections and 
time bands. 
 
? Performance regimes: 
 
The GB rail industry operates a performance incentive scheme, details of which are 
incorporated into the Track Access Agreement (Schedule 8 of the model form) of each 
train operator. In most cases, a standard template arrangement applies, though bespoke 
arrangements are also possible. 
 
Schedule 8 sets out a framework by which penalties are paid by either party if train 
performance fails to meet set contractual targets, and bonuses are paid if these targets are 
exceeded. Schedule 8 incentivises Network Rail to improve train performance by 
minimising lateness and cancellations. It is a liquidated sums regime, and compensates train 
operators for the marginal effect on future revenues of changes in performance caused by 
Network Rail. While franchised passenger train operators are also incentivised to improve 
performance generally through their franchise agreement, under Schedule 8 of the Track 
Access Agreement (TAA), train operators pay directly for delays they cause their own 
trains. They do not pay directly for the impact of one train operator’s performance on 
others’ (namely ‘TOC on TOC delay’). This is attributed to Network Rail, but payments by 
train operators are established at levels such that, over time and on a national basis, 
Network Rail can expect to be compensated for the effect of TOC on TOC delay.  
 
? Discounts: 
 
As mentioned in the Capacity charge description, freight train operators receive a 10% 
discount for the capacity charge amount payable, to reflect the greater flexibility, in pathing 
their services. 
 
Charging level 
 
The Track Access Charge depends on several variables such as the type of traffic or the 
type of vehicle. Then, a range of values for this charge is shown in Table 16. 
 
Table 16 – Range of values for the Minimum Access Charge in the United Kingdom 
Track access charge 
Service Type of service 
Track access Minimum access package 
 
Charging formula 
--- 
 
Price components Variables considered  Charging values
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Type of traffic 
Type of vehicle Variable Usage Charge Vehicle class 
2,82 - 69,35 p/veh-
mile 
Service group for franchised passenger trains and 
freight trains 
Section for passenger train operator other than 
franchised passenger train operator 
Direction for passenger train operator other than 
franchised passenger train operator 
Capacity Charge 
Time band during one week for passenger train 
operator other than franchised passenger train operator 
0,0003 – 2,6349 
£/veh-mile 
Fixed Track Access 
Charge Train operator --- 
Source: Own from Network Statement 2008 
 
A part from the range of values shown in the table above, it has been calculated the average 
charge. According to the 2005 Annual Report, the total operation income amounted to 
1.610 million £, which corresponds to 2.379,6 million euros. As well, according to 
EUROSTAT, it is known that the total volume of traffic in 2005 rose up to 519.378.000 
train-kilometres. As a result, the average charge is 4,58 €/train-km. In Figure 33 it can be 
seen the level of the average charge in the United Kingdom compared to the rest of the 
countries. 
 
Figure 33 – Average charge in the United Kingdom 
Average charges
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             Source: Own from data of EUROSTAT and Network Rail’s 2005 Annual Report 
 
As it can be seen, the level of the average charge resulting in the United Kingdom is one of 
the highest compared with the rest of countries. This seems coherent given that the 
majority of charges are paid by the franchised operators which pay the fixed and the 
variable charge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Charging for the railway infrastructure use during the last five years in Europe: 
state of the art and opportunities for revitalising the railways 
 
 
66 
 
3.5. Summary of charging practices 
 
The description of the national charging schemes has been summarised per countries by 
identifying the basic charge applied and the different components of the charge classified 
according to Directive 2001/14/EC. These charging components are: Basic charge, Mark-
ups, Reservation charges, Congestion charges, Scarcity charges, Performance regimes, 
Environmental charges and Discounts. 
 
Those practices applied in the different national charging schemes are summarised from 
Table 17 to Table 28, in order to smooth the process of assessment that will be carried in 
chapter 5. 
 
Table 17 – Summary of charging components applied in Austria 
Charging 
component 
Description 
Usage charge composed by a “charge in the amount of the directly 
incurred costs”, which is levied per gross ton kilometres, and a “line-
related usage charge”, which is a basic price per kilometre depending on 
the line category. 
Quality and line-related mark-ups and mark-downs composed by “wear 
on tracks by traction units” depending on the traction unit category. 
Basic 
charge 
Traffic-type related usage charges composed by a factor levied per train-
km varying with the type of service. 
Performance 
regime 
For high-quality passenger trains, the Standard Package prices will be 
increased in the event of late arrival in the scheduled stopping stations, 
including departure and train terminal stations, if the delay per stopping 
station exceeds a threshold of five minutes. The delay in minutes per 
station exceeding the fixed threshold will be allocated to the party causing 
it (the railway undertaking or the infrastructure manager) and multiplied 
by the factor given in the Product Catalogue (3 €/delay minute). Reasons 
for delay are coded pursuant to UIC Leaflet 450-2. 
Source: Own from data of ÖBB’s Track Access Product Catalogue 
 
 
Table 18 – Summary of charging components applied in Germany 
Charging 
component 
Description 
The user-dependent component depends on the route category and a 
train path product factor. 
Basic 
charge 
Payload component which is a weight-based component intended to 
reflect the additional costs caused by the use of heavy trains, due to the 
increase in wear and capacity utilisation. It is applied for train weights of 
3.000 tonnes and above and is levied per gross tonne-km 
Reservation 
charge Fee for preparing an offer which is intended to reflect the costs for 
processing the applications for train paths allocation. Then a fee per train 
path is levied in case that the railway undertaking does not accept a train 
path offer. This fee cannot exceed the equivalent of access charge for 
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train paths that are not accepted. 
Cancellation fee which is levied in case of withdrawal of one or more 
train running days on a train path a cancellation fee is levied. It is 
composed by a minimum cancellation fee which corresponds to the 
amount of the fee required for preparing the offer and a percentage based 
cancellation fee depending on when the cancellation was made and the 
standard train path price. The cancellation fee cannot exceed the access 
charge for the cancelled train path.  
Congestion 
charge 
The utilisation factor multiplied to the service-dependent component is 
applied on particularly busy routes with alternative route sections and its 
main objective is to provide incentives to improve efficiency. 
Performance 
regime 
The additive factor considered in the service-dependent component is a 
clear performance regime intended to reduce disruptions. It consists on a 
compulsory delay minutes accountancy system based on control points in 
every section. The “delay minutes” accounted are allocated to DB Netz 
or to the railway undertakings according to specific responsibility rules 
and levied monthly through a unitary charge (0,10 €/ key delay minute). 
There is a delay allowance of 1 minute per section. 
Source: Own from data of DB Netz’s Network Statement 
 
 
Table 19 – Summary of charging components applied in Estonia 
Charging 
component 
Description 
Basic 
charge 
Variable part of the charge  based on the actual gross tonne-kilometres 
Reservation 
charge 
Fix part of the charge is based on the requested train-kilometres and is 
paid whether the capacity allocated is used or not. This charge is not 
applied to international and local passenger trains. 
Scarcity 
charge 
In case of railway infrastructure depletion, an additional access fee 
resulting from an auction procedure is invoiced. The bid made by each 
railway undertaking should include a separate access fee bid for each part 
of the requested capacity. The Committee for Capacity Allocation allocates 
the capacity to the maker of the highest bid for each part of the requested 
capacity and then, if the capacity on offer enables it, to the maker of the 
second highest bid for each part of the requested capacity and so on. 
Source: Own from data of EVR’s Network Statement 
 
 
Table 20 – Summary of charging components applied in Greece 
Charging 
component 
Description 
Basic 
charge 
Basic price corresponding to the track maintenance which depends on 
coefficient for the track quality provided in each line section and on a 
coefficient for the line’s burdening by the train which depends on the 
speed range, the axial load range and on the number of axles. 
Congestion 
charge 
Basic price corresponding to the traffic management which depends on a 
peak period coefficient that varies with the time band and the line station 
and on a capacity occupation coefficient that takes account of every 
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service’s effect on the line’s capacity by dividing the running time and the 
ideal running time in a line section. 
Source: Own from data of EDISYs Network Statement 
 
 
Table 21 – Summary of charging components applied in Spain 
Charging 
component 
Description 
Basic 
charge 
Circulation Charge which depends on the actual kilometres considering the 
type of line and the type of service. It is levied per train-km. 
Mark-up 
Traffic Charge is only applied to passenger railway services offering a 
maximum speed greater than 260 km. It depends on the time band and is 
levied according to the capacity of the vehicles. Its value is established 
according to the service commercial value measured through the offered 
capacity. This can be considered a proxy to RU’s willingness to pay. 
Capacity Reservation Charge which depends on the number of kilometres 
requested considering the type of line, the type of service and the time 
band. It is levied per train-km. Reservation 
charges 
Access charge depending on the level of traffic estimated by the operator 
at the start of each Working Timetable. 
Source: Own from data of ADIF’s Network Statement 
 
 
Table 22 – Summary of charging components applied in France 
Charging 
component 
Description 
Basic 
charge 
Running charge levied for the actual kilometres and depending on the 
type of service. It is levied per train·kilometre. 
Access charge depending on the type of line which is defined by a 
grouping of the network into four categories of elementary sections 
(suburban lines, main intercity lines, high-speed lines, and other lines) and 
twelve sub-categories of elementary sections corresponding to the traffic 
characteristics. It is paid by all railway undertakings making a request and 
is levied per train-kilometre. 
Path reservation charge paid by all railway undertakings which have been 
granted a path by RFF depending on the time band, the line category and 
the type of train. It is levied per path-km. Freight trains and light running 
traffic benefit from a reducing coefficient. 
Reservation 
charges 
The reservation charge for station stop is only levied to passenger trains. 
It depends on the time band and on the station category and it is charged 
for departure and each stop. 
Performance 
regime 
Performance scheme put in place by RFF in order to optimise the 
performance of the rail network and offer a high-quality service to railway 
undertakings. It consists on a specific rate applied to the rate for the 
reservation of freight paths of which the total length is at least 300 km 
and of which the mean speed is greater than or equal to 70 km/h, not 
counting stops requested by the railway undertaking. 
Source: Own from data of RFF’s Network Statement 
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Table 23 – Summary of charging components applied in Italy 
Charging 
component 
Description 
Basic 
charge 
Variable part per kilometre/minute, related to the cost of use of the 
infrastructure depending on the actual kilometres travelled and the 
minutes staying inside a node. It varies with the type of line and, within it, 
depends on the relative density, speed and deterioration (calculated from 
vehicle variables like speed and weight). 
Fixed part per section/node related to the access cost for each section or 
node varying with the quality of the railway infrastructure. Reservation 
charges The reservation is set at the minimum value between the charge to access 
the section and the 50% of the whole track access charge. 
Performance 
regime 
The Performance Regime applied in Italy consists on a delay minutes 
accountancy system. The delays are measured at destination stations. It is 
based on allowed delay threshold which depends on the type of service: 5 
minutes for regional passenger trains, 15 minutes for mid-long distance 
passenger trains and 30 minutes for freight trains. There is allocation of 
responsibilities between the infrastructure manager and the railway 
undertaking. The charge for disruption is cap to a maximum of 20% of 
the total usage charge or of 1,5% of the total yearly usage charge. 
Discount applied to network segments where no conditions stand for a 
single agent driving and it considers different unitary rates depending on 
the type of line and the time band. 
Discount Discount to the total volume of traffic in train-kilometres during a year 
depending on the type of traffic (short distance passenger, long distance 
passenger, freight) and it cannot exceed the 80% of the total usage charge 
of the year. 
Source: Own from data of RFI’s Network Statement 
 
 
Table 24 – Summary of charging components applied in the Netherlands 
Charging 
component 
Description 
Tariff per train-kilometre allocating marginal operational costs applied to all 
services. Basic 
charges Tariff per ton-kilometre allocating marginal maintenance costs applied to 
all services. 
Discount 
To promote use of the Port Railway Line, ProRail is therefore to grant a 
discount on the ton-kilometre charge applicable on the Combined Network 
on the access and exit routes of the Port Railway Line. Then, the discount 
is applied for the portion of the train weight over and above 750 tons 
Source: Own from data of ProRail’s Network Statement 
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Table 25 – Summary of charging components applied in Poland 
Charging 
component 
Description 
Basic 
charge 
Basic charge calculated on the basis of unit rates specified for train 
parameters (weight and speed) are defined by timetable for qualified 
passenger trains (average technical vehicle speed) and for other trains 
(gross weight of a train). 
Reservation 
charge 
The reservation charge included in the basic charge is agreed with each 
RU within the track access agreement. 
Performance 
regime 
There is a performance regime regulated in the contracts signed between 
PKP PLK and some of the railway undertakings. 
Justified by increase of performance volume resulting from transferring 
goods from other modes of transport into railways, PLK has a right to 
give discount (for certain period of time). Discount level cannot be higher 
than 50% of fixed part of average unit rates given in the price list. 
Discounts 
Discount (for a certain period of time) to exceptional trains (not included 
in Annual Timetable) serving celebrations concerning national and 
religious holidays or promoting railway industry. The level of discount is 
60% of unit rates. 
Source: Own from data of PKP PLK’s Network Statement 
 
 
Table 26 – Summary of charging components applied in Portugal 
Charging 
component 
Description 
Basic 
charge 
Basic tariff for the essential services depends on the type of service, the 
type of traction and the line or section. Tariffs for the use of essential 
services are intended to recover marginal operation, maintenance and 
renewal costs and are allocated to train·km according to the type of line 
and the type of service. 
Reservation 
charge 
There is a tariff for unused requested capacity which varies from 10% to 
100% of the applicable tariff depending on the anteriority of the 
cancellation in relation to the date of the requested capacity. 
Performance 
regime 
Railways undertakings are free to accept or not the performance regime. 
This performance regime consists on a delay minutes accountancy system 
based on control points at destination stations (only considering arrival 
times). It establishes certain performance standards depending on the 
type of service: 3 minutes for suburban passenger trains, 5 minutes for 
medium and long distance passenger trains and 30 minutes for freight 
trains. It is remarkable that in case the train is partially or totally cancelled, 
or there is a failure service at a station, the delay time is calculated as 
being the difference between the original arrival time at the destination 
and the best alternative for the final customer. For each train, the 
maximum penalty is 20% of the tariffs for essential services. 
Source: Own from data of REFER’s Network Statement 
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Table 27 – Summary of charging components applied in Sweden 
Charging 
component 
Description 
Basic charge 
Track charge reflects those costs of maintaining the railway 
infrastructure to which an additional train movement gives rise. It 
varies with the number of gross tonne-kilometres. 
Special train path charge levied to freight traffic crossing the Öresund 
Link is charged per train crossing. Mark-ups 
Special charge levied to passenger services per gross tonne-kilometre 
The Emission charge reflects the socio-economic costs in terms of 
environmental and health effects to which an additional train 
movement gives rise. It varies with the number of litres of diesel fuel 
and varies with the type of traction unit. 
Environmental 
charges 
The Accident charge reflects the socio-economic costs of accidents 
involving injury to which an additional train movement gives rise. It 
varies with the number of train-kilometres. According to the Network 
Statement 2007, the level of the charge has been determined by studies 
of the change of the socio-economic costs associated with accidents 
when traffic volumes change. 
Source: Own from data of Banverket’s Network Statement 
 
 
Table 28 – Summary of charging components applied in the United Kingdom 
Charging 
component 
Description 
Track variable usage charge reflects the wear and tear to track and non-
track asset associated with the volume and type of traffic (assuming 
current network capability). It is expressed in pence per vehicle mile. 
Different values are established for different type of vehicles, but it is 
independent from the area or region. 
Basic 
charges 
Electrification asset usage charge covers the incremental wear and tear 
costs on electrification assets. Different values are established for 
different geographical areas, season and time of day bands. 
Mark-up 
Fixed charges applied to franchised passenger operators are a mark-up 
aimed at recovering the future estimated revenue needs of the IM. The 
allocation of fixed costs is based implicitly on the railway undertaking’s 
ability to pay, through the franchising process 
Congestion 
charge 
An average capacity charge rate for each service group for franchised 
passenger train operators is calculated. For passenger train operators 
other than franchised passenger train operators, is taken into account the 
time of day and whether running is weekday or weekend. For freight train 
operators the charge is similar to the passenger charge, i.e. it is billed on 
an average rate per service group. This charge is intended to reflect 
marginal congestion costs calculated for different sections and time 
bands. 
Performance 
regime 
Schedule 8 sets out a framework by which penalties are paid by either 
party if train performance fails to meet set contractual targets, and 
bonuses are paid if these targets are exceeded. Schedule 8 incentivises 
Network Rail to improve train performance by minimising lateness and 
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cancellations. It is a liquidated sums regime, and compensates train 
operators for the marginal effect on future revenues of changes in 
performance caused by Network Rail. While franchised passenger train 
operators are also incentivised to improve performance generally through 
their franchise agreement, under Schedule 8 of the Track Access 
Agreement (TAA), train operators pay directly for delays they cause their 
own trains. They do not pay directly for the impact of one train 
operator’s performance on others’ (namely “TOC on TOC delay”). This 
is attributed to Network Rail, but payments by train operators are 
established at levels such that, over time and on a national basis, Network 
Rail can expect to be compensated for the effect of TOC on TOC delay. 
Discount 
Freight train operators receive a 10% discount for the capacity charge 
amount payable, to reflect the greater flexibility, in pathing their services 
Source: Own from data of Network Rail’s Network Statement 
 
It is to be noticed that only one country applies scarcity charges or, at least, they do not 
express it in their Network Statement. This is probably due to the fact that if an 
infrastructure manager applies a charge explicitly allocating scarcity costs, it is obliged to 
invest in new infrastructure in a certain period of time. 
 
It is also remarkable that the only country applying environmental charges is Sweden. The 
other charging schemes do not consider any element related to external costs. 
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4. Assessment methodology 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter is aimed at the definition of the methodology which will be considered in 
order to assess the national charging schemes defined in chapter 3. This assessment will be 
carried out from two different points of view: assessment according to legislative 
framework and assessment according to economic principles. 
 
The assessment according to legislative framework is based on Directive 2001/14/EC on 
the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of 
railway infrastructure and safety certification. This assessment consists on determining the 
degree of compliance of each national charging scheme defined in chapter 3 with the 
legislative framework established by Directive 2001/14/EC. Therefore, the main objectives 
and conditions which are set by this directive will be identified while defining the 
evaluation criteria. 
 
The assessment according to economic principles is aimed at valuating important aspects 
which are not considered in the current legal framework. It is focused on highlighting 
strengths and weaknesses of the national charging schemes so this assessment relies in a 
SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats). 
 
 
4.2. Assessment criteria according to legislative framework 
 
The assessment according to legislative framework is based on the part of Directive 
2001/14/EC related to the levy of charges for the use of railway infrastructure. This 
directive is composed of two main parts: the first one consists on the definition of the 
objectives to which the implementation of the Directive should lead and the second one 
corresponds to the establishment of the necessary conditions that will facilitate the reach of 
those objectives. 
 
The assessment is carried on the national charging schemes summarised in section 3.5. In 
order to determine the evaluation criteria, it has been necessary to select the most relevant 
objectives and conditions. 
 
 
4.2.1. Identification of objectives 
 
Directive 2001/14/EC is based on a wide variety of objectives but there are several main 
objectives which remarkable and on which the Directive is specially focused: 
• Non-discriminatory access 
• Fairness 
• Cost-relatedness 
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• Incentives to operational efficiency 
• Incentives to cost efficiency 
 
 
Non-discriminatory access 
 
The Directive establishes the objective of providing a non-discriminatory access to the 
network through the objective (11): “The charging and capacity allocating schemes should 
permit equal and non-discriminatory access for all undertakings and attempt as far as 
possible to meet the needs of all users and traffic types in a fair and non-discriminatory 
manner”. 
 
Charging practices will be positively assessed according to the non-discriminatory access if 
they are applied in the same way to all railways undertakings. 
  
Fairness 
 
The provision of fairness in the railway network is treated in the whole Directive but, 
specially, in objective (16): “Charging and capacity allocation schemes should allow for fair 
competition in the provision of railways services”. 
 
This statement has been interpreted as charging schemes must be applied to each service in 
a coherent way. This “coherent” depends on the concrete case considered, so if it is being 
assessed a basic charge the coherent way of taking into account the wear and tear of the 
infrastructure is considering the vehicle-related variables or the type of service. As well, if a 
mark-up is being assessed, it will be positively assessed if the demand’s ability to pay is 
considered. 
 
Cost-relatedness 
 
In relation to the establishment of charges, the Directive expresses a clear objective of 
relating them to costs. This is reflected in objective (36): “To enable the establishment of 
appropriate and fair levels of infrastructure charges, infrastructure managers need to record 
and establish the valuation of their assets and develop a clear understanding of cost factors 
in the operation of the infrastructure”. 
 
According to this statement, the national charging schemes will be positively assessed if 
they establish a coherent relation between charges and costs. Again, this “coherent” 
depends on the case considered so a basic charge will be cost-related if it is set at the cost 
that is directly incurred as a result of operating a train service (as states objective (38)), a 
reservation charge will be cost-related if it is related to the cost due to the allocation of 
capacity (as states objective (44)) and discounts will be cost-related if they are set in order 
to recover the actual administrative cost savings experienced by the infrastructure manager 
(as states objective (42)). 
 
Incentives to operational efficiency 
 
Another main objective mentioned by Directive 2001/14/EC is the provision of incentives 
to improve the operational efficiency to the two parts, the infrastructure manager and the 
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railway undertaking. This concept is clearly expressed in objective (12): “Within the 
framework set out by Member States charging and capacity allocation schemes should 
encourage railway infrastructure managers to optimise use of their infrastructure”. 
 
In the process of assessment it will be considered an incentive to operational efficiency 
every incentive which main aim is the increase of the existing capacity. In relation to the 
performance regimes, the Directive reserves a specific objective, number (15), which states: 
“It is desirable for railway undertakings and the infrastructure manager to be provided with 
incentives to minimise disruption and improve performance of the network”. Then the 
performance regimes applied by the different countries, will be positively assessed with 
respect to the objective of providing incentives to operational efficiency if its main aim is 
to increase capacity and if the incentives are provided to the two parts, the railway 
undertaking and the infrastructure manager.  
 
Incentives to cost efficiency 
 
Finally, it is established in the Directive the objective of providing the infrastructure 
manager with incentives to cost efficiency. This is stated in objective (40): “A railway 
infrastructure is a natural monopoly. It is therefore necessary to provide infrastructure 
managers with incentives to reduce costs and manage their infrastructure efficiently”. 
 
According to this statement, the cost efficiency has been considered as the fact that the 
charging schemes take into account the costs caused by the running of a train and their 
tendency to reduce this cost.  
 
 
4.2.2. Identification of conditions 
 
When identifying the main conditions established by Directive 2001/14/EC, there are 
some global conditions applicable to the whole charging scheme and, afterwards, each 
article is focused in a particular charging component. 
 
In relation to the conditions applicable to the whole charging scheme there are two 
remarkable statements: article 4 (4) and article 4 (5). The first one is related to the objective 
of fairness given that says “(...) infrastructure managers shall ensure that the charging 
scheme in use is based on the same principles over the whole network”. The second one is 
similar to the non-discriminatory objective as it states “Infrastructure managers shall ensure 
that the application of the charging scheme results in equivalent and non-discriminatory 
charges for the different railway undertakings that perform services of equivalent nature in 
a similar part of the market and that charges actually applied comply with the rules laid 
down in the network statement”. 
 
When focusing on the different charging components, the Directive establishes the 
following conditions in relation to: 
• Basic charges: the charges shall be set at the cost that is directly incurred as 
a result of operating the train services (article 7 (3)). 
• Mark-ups: In order to obtain full recovery of the costs incurred by the 
infrastructure manager it may, if the market can bear this, levied mark-ups 
on the basis of efficient, transparent and non-discriminatory principles. As 
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well, the level of charges must not exclude the use of the infrastructure by 
market segment which can pay at least the cost that is directly incurred as a 
result of operating the railway service, plus a rate of return which the market 
can bear (article 8 (1)). 
• Discounts: They shall be limited to the actual saving of the administrative 
cost to the infrastructure manager (article 9 (2)).As well, the discounts may 
be available to all users, for specified traffic flows, limited in time, shall 
encourage the development of new rail services or the use of considerably 
underutilised lines (article 9 (3)). 
• Environmental charges: The infrastructure charge may be modified to take 
account of the cost of the environmental effects caused by the operation of 
the train. Such modification shall be differentiated according to the 
magnitude of the effect caused (article 7 (5)). 
• Performance regimes: They shall encourage railway undertakings and the 
infrastructure manager to minimise disruption and improve the 
performance of the railway network. This may include penalties for actions 
which disrupt the operation of the network, compensation for undertakings 
which suffer from disruption and bonuses that reward better than planned 
performance. As well, the basic principles for the performance scheme shall 
apply throughout the network (article 11). 
• Reservation charges: It may be levied an appropriate charge for the capacity 
that is requested but not used. This charge shall provide incentives for 
efficient use of capacity (article 12). 
 
 
4.3. Assessment criteria according to economic principles 
4.3.1. Basis for charging 
 
According to World Bank (2005), the basis for charging is a compromise among competing goals, 
including: 
• Provide incentives to make optimal use of existing capacity, 
• Provide incentives to demand/supply optimal level of capacity, 
• Encourage competition, 
• Encourage international movement of goods and people, 
• Provide infrastructure manager with predictable and adequate revenue, 
• Straightforward to administer, 
• Prevent discrimination between users, 
• ... 
 
Currently, the majority of the European have liberalised their railway markets. However, 
each country has lead with the implementation of the European railway legislation in a 
different way, depending on their actual circumstances. In consequence, a wide variety of 
charging schemes have been adopted by the European countries. 
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The methodology used to identify the positive and negative aspects related to the national 
charging schemes defined in section 3.4 consists on a SWOT analysis. This type of analysis 
is focused on determining the internal (Strengths and Weaknesses) and external 
(Opportunities and Threats) issues that distinguish each charging practice.  
 
 
4.3.2. Main aspects 
 
Although the SWOT analysis has not been subject to specific criteria, there are some main aspects 
on which it has been especially focused. These main aspects are: 
• Cost-relatedness 
• Incentivisation 
• Fairness 
• Competition 
• Transparency 
• Complexity / Simplicity 
 
 
Cost-relatedness 
 
The main role of a charging scheme consists on recovering the costs incurred by the 
infrastructure manager and, if possible, to obtain a certain profit. After that, it is important 
to assess the aspects of charging schemes concerning the costs that have been taken into 
account, the way in which these costs have been calculated, the way in which these costs 
are reflected through charges, ...  
 
In general, if a charge is not levied according to detailed cost drivers is subject to produce 
cross-subsidization between different services or if it is fixed at a high level it would be 
likely to reduce the market shares of the railways. In consequence, every charging scheme 
should consider variables reflecting cost causation to guarantee a correct relation between 
costs and charges, i.e. the basic charge which is related to the wear and tear of the 
infrastructure it should depend on the rolling stock, infrastructure, type of service, ...   
 
Incentivisation 
 
Infrastructure charging schemes are instruments to encourage efficient use and 
development of rail infrastructure and for efficient conduct of the diverse agents. The 
incentives provided by charging schemes are seen from two points of view: incentives to 
cost efficiency and incentives to operational efficiency. 
 
The incentives to cost efficiency are those incentives that provide a charging scheme in 
order to reduce the costs of maintenance or renewal of the railway infrastructure incurred 
by the infrastructure manager due to the running of the train.  
 
The incentives to operational efficiency are considered as those incentives that intend to 
optimise the use of the existing capacity or to increase it. This incentives can be provided 
by applying reservation charges or performance regimes or, as well, by considering 
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variables such as time band and type of service together in order to group services with the 
same characteristics in specific times of the day. 
 
Fairness 
 
A fair charging practice is important to the opening of the network to more railway 
undertakings and to avoid excluding valuable services from the market. 
 
A charging practice will be fair or unfair depending on the variables considered in each 
case. Then, charging practices might be interested in differentiating charges according to 
the type of service and the type of line so as to reflect different operating conditions and 
cost causation patterns.  
 
Competition 
 
The encouragement of competition is a way to explore further the capabilities further the 
capabilities of the railway for the benefit of society and it can also arises from the fact that 
different countries deal with pricing problems in different ways. 
 
A common accepted methodology for calculating user charges on European railway 
infrastructure is potentially an important tool for the facilitation of cross-border operations. 
 
Transparency 
 
Transparency and non-discrimination in procedures for the allocation of infrastructure 
capacity and for the charging of infrastructure use are pre-requisites for increasing railway 
traffic and for enhancing the efficiency of rail transport. Then, for instance, those charges 
with a low relation to specific costs or those practices which are determined through a 
negotiation between the railway undertaking and the infrastructure manager will be subject 
to a lack of transparency. 
 
Complexity / Simplicity 
 
The complexity of a charging scheme has advantages and disadvantages. If a charging 
scheme is very complex, on the one hand, it will provide clearer signals to the market and 
this market will be better modulated but, on the other hand, it will suppose an increase of 
the administrative costs to the infrastructure manager derived from its calculation 
procedure and it will be difficult to the railway undertaking to implement planning 
strategies. 
 
As well, the complexity of charging schemes will specially harm the international services, 
which will have to handle with the heterogeneity of charging schemes across its entire 
journey. 
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5. National charging schemes’ assessment 
5.1. Introduction 
The assessment of the national charging schemes defined in chapter 3 has been carried at 
two levels: assessment according to legislative framework and assessment according to 
economic principles. This assessment has been realized on the basis of the methodology 
defined in chapter 4. 
 
The assessment according to legislative framework is based on the main objectives and 
conditions selected from Directive 2001/14/EC. This assessment consists on determining 
the degree of compliance of each national charging scheme defined in chapter 3 with the 
legislative framework established by the Directive.  
 
The assessment according to economic principles is intended to valuate important aspects 
which are not considered in the current legal framework. It is focused on highlighting 
strengths and weaknesses of the national charging schemes and, then, this assessment relies 
in a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats). 
 
 
5.2. Assessment according to legislative framework 
5.2.1. Assessment of each national charging scheme 
 
Austria 
 
The charging scheme applied in Austria has been synthesized in Basic charge and a 
Performance regime. These components of the charge have been described in chapter 3 
and Figure 34 reflects a remainder schema. 
 
Figure 34 – Synthesis of the charging scheme applied by Austria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: Own from data of ÖBB’s Track Access Product Catalogue 
 
All the charges considered in the Austrian charging scheme are non-discriminatory, given 
that none of them are defined according to the railway undertaking. As well, the three basic 
charges are cost-related given that they are intended to recover marginal maintenance costs. 
 
        Charge in the amount of the directly incurred costs 
    Usage charge 
        Line-related usage charge 
Basic charge    
    Wear on tracks by traction units 
 
    Traffic-type related usage charge 
 
Performance regime 
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In relation to fairness, none of the practices fulfil this objective given that they do not take 
into account the different effects caused by the different services. 
 
The only charge that provides incentives to cost efficiency is the traffic-related usage 
charge that varies with the traction unit category and this means that the different damage 
caused by each type of traction unit is considered. 
 
The performance regime fulfils the objective of providing incentives to operational 
efficiency because is intended to reduce disruptions caused by the delay in stations. The 
incentives are provided to both parties given that is a procedure of allocating 
responsibilities and this accomplish part of the condition established by Directive 
2001/14/EC for the performance regimes. However, this condition is not fully 
accomplished because it considers penalties for disruptions but it does not consider either 
compensations for the undertakings which suffer from those disruptions nor bonuses for 
better than planned performance. 
 
Germany 
 
The German charging scheme has been reduced to a Basic charge, a Reservation charge, a 
Congestion charge and a Performance regime. These components of the charge have been 
described in chapter 3 and Figure 35 reflects a reminder schema. 
 
Figure 35 – Synthesis of the charging scheme applied by Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own from data of DB Netz’s Network Statement 
 
All the components of the charging scheme applied in Germany are non-discriminatory 
because they are not differentiated according to the railway undertaking as well as fair, 
given that all the charges consider the type of service when calculating the final access 
charge. 
 
In particular, the payload component provides incentives to cost efficiency since it is 
intended to reflect the additional costs caused by the use of heavy trains due to the increase 
in wear and capacity utilisation. 
 
On the contrary, none of the basic charges are cost-related so they are not intended to 
charge the cost directly incurred as a result of the running of a train, they are calculated in 
         
    User dependent component 
Basic charge    
    Payload component 
 
      Fee for preparing an offer 
Reservation charge     
      Cancellation fee 
 
Congestion charge  Utilisation factor 
 
 
Performance regime 
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order to recover total costs. However, the fee for preparing an offer is cost-related since it 
is intended to reflect the costs for processing the applications for train paths allocation. 
 
Concerning the operational efficiency, the two reservation charges, the congestion charge 
and the performance regime provide incentives to improve the operational efficiency. The 
reservation charges provide incentives to optimise the use of the capacity requested but, in 
addition, the cancellation fee provides higher incentives because it depends on the 
anticipation of the cancellation with respect to the running date. The utilisation factor 
which is considered a congestion charge is only levied on particularly busy routes and its 
main aim is to provide incentives to improve efficiency. Finally, the performance regime is 
characterised for providing incentives to reduce disruption to the railway undertaking and 
to the infrastructure manager. 
 
In relation to the structure of the performance regime, the condition established by 
Directive 2001/14/EC is not fully accomplished because it considers penalties for 
disruptions but it does not consider either compensations for the undertakings which 
suffer from those disruptions nor bonuses for better than planned performance. 
 
Estonia 
 
The charging scheme applied in Estonia has been simplified in a Basic charge plus a 
Reservation charge and a Congestion charge. These components of the charge have been 
described in chapter 3 and Figure 36 reflects a reminder schema. 
 
Figure 36 – Synthesis of the charging scheme applied by Estonia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own from data of EVR’s Network Statement 
 
All the charges applied in Estonia are non-discriminatory since their definition is not 
dependent on the railway undertaking considered. 
 
On the contrary, all the charges considered are unfair given that they are not differentiated 
according to the type of service and, then, they are not taking into consideration the 
different effects caused by the different users. 
 
As well,  neither the basic charge nor the reservation charge are cost-related given that the 
basic charge is not allocating marginal costs and the reservation charge is not related to the 
costs due to the allocation of capacity. 
 
The reservation charge provides incentives to operational efficiency given that it is levied 
whether the capacity allocated is used or not and, in consequence, railway undertakings will 
be incentivised to optimise the capacity requested.  
       
Basic charge  Variable charge 
    
 
Reservation charge  Fixed charge  
       
 
Scarcity charge  Auction procedure  
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In relation to the scarcity charge, it should be mentioned that the auction procedure utilised 
to allocate capacity will probably optimise the use of the existing capacity given that it takes 
into account the ability to pay of the railway undertakings and that the capacity allocated 
will exactly match with the available capacity. 
 
Greece 
 
The charging scheme applied in Greece has been synthesized in a Basic charge plus a 
Congestion charge. These components of the charge have been described in chapter 3 and 
Figure 37 reflects a reminder schema. 
 
Figure 37 – Synthesis of the charging scheme applied by Greece 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Own from data of EDISY’s Network Statement 
 
The two components considered in the Greek charging scheme fulfil the objectives of non-
discriminatory access and fairness throughout the railway network. They are non-
discriminatory because they are not defined taking into account each railway undertaking. 
In relation to fairness, the basic charge is fair given that it depends on a coefficient for the 
line’s burdening which varies with vehicle-related variables such as the speed range, the 
axial load and the number of axles. The basic tariff corresponding to traffic management 
takes into account the service’s effect on capacity and, in consequence, is fair. 
 
Both charges are cost-relatedness since they are intended to recover marginal costs. 
 
On the one hand, the basic price corresponding to the track maintenance provides 
incentives to cost efficiency since the consideration of the speed range, the axial load and 
the number of axles in order to reflect the line’s burdening is a clear differentiation of the 
effect caused by the different users on the railway infrastructure. 
 
On the other hand, the basic price corresponding to the traffic management provides 
incentives to operational efficiency given that is calculated on the basis of the ideal running 
time in each section. Then railway undertakings will be incentivised to accomplish this ideal 
running time so as to pay less. 
 
Spain 
 
The charging scheme applied in Spain has been synthesized in a Basic charge plus a Mark-
up and a Reservation charge. These components of the charge have been described in 
chapter 3 and Figure 38 reflects a reminder schema. 
 
 
 
 
       
Basic charge  Basic price corresponding to track maintenance 
    
 
Congestion charge  Basic price corresponding to traffic management
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Figure 38 – Synthesis of the charging scheme applied by Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own from data of ADIF’s Network Statement 
 
All the charges applied in Spain are non-discriminatory since their definition is not 
dependent on the railway undertaking considered. 
 
In relation to fairness, the circulation charge is fair since it varies with the type of line and 
the type of service and so it is possible that it is intended to take into account the different 
effects caused by the different services. The traffic charge it could be also assessed 
positively according to the fairness objective because it is levied according to the capacity 
offered by the railway undertaking (i.e. €/100 seats-km) and this can be interpreted as it is 
taking into account the willingness to pay of each service. However, there is a risk of 
unfairness because it is only levied to passenger services. 
 
According to the objective of cost-relatedness, none of the charges fulfil this objective 
given that the circulation charge is not explicitly related to marginal costs and the 
reservation charges are not intended to recover the costs due to the allocation procedure. 
 
The only component of the charge providing incentives is the capacity reservation charge 
which provides incentives to operational efficiency since it is levied per kilometres 
requested and varies with the type of line, the type of service and the time band. Thus, this 
charge will lead to an efficient allocation of capacity as well as an efficient use of the 
capacity requested. 
 
The mark-up levied through the Traffic charge may accomplish the condition established 
by Directive 2001/14/EC on the not exclusion of market segments which can pay at least 
the cost that is directly incurred given that its value is established according to the service 
commercial value which is measured through the offered capacity and that is not applied to 
freight service whose ability to pay is lower. 
 
France 
 
The charging scheme applied in France has been simplified in a Basic charge, a Reservation 
charge and a Performance regime. These components of the charge have been described in 
chapter 3 and Figure 39 reflects a reminder schema. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Basic charge  Circulation charge 
 
Mark-up  Traffic charge 
 
Access charge 
Reservation charge   
Capacity reservation charge  
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Figure 39 – Synthesis of the charging scheme applied by France 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Own from data of RFF’s Network Statement 
 
All the charges applied in France are non-discriminatory since their definition is not 
dependent on the railway undertaking considered. 
 
The basic charge varies with the type of service and, in consequence, fulfils the fairness 
objective established by Directive 2001/14/EC.  
 
The charges considered are not cost-related given that the Running charge is not explicitly 
recovering marginal costs and that the reservation charges are not intended to recover the 
administrative costs due to the allocation of capacity. 
 
Concerning incentives to operational efficiency, only the reservation charges are intended 
to provide them since they are defined in order to optimise the capacity allocated. The 
access charge will ensure that railway undertakings only make those requests that they are 
sure will use and the path reservation charge depends on the time band, on the line 
category and on the type of train so the traffic will be modulated through this component. 
 
It is to be noticed that the performance regime considered in France does not fulfil either 
the objective focused on the incentives to operational efficiency or the condition 
established by Directive 2001/14/EC for performance regimes. The incentives to 
operational efficiency are only provided to the freight operator and not for the 
infrastructure manager, which is the main characteristic of a performance regime. As well, 
it does not consider penalties for disruptions nor compensations for undertakings which 
suffer from disruption nor bonuses for better than planned performance. 
 
Italy 
 
The charging scheme applied in Italy has been synthesized in a Basic charge, a Reservation 
charge, a Performance regime and a Discount. These components of the charge have been 
described in chapter 3 and Figure 40 reflects a reminder schema. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
  Basic charge    Running charge 
 
         Access charge 
 
Reservation charge Path reservation charge 
   
Reservation charge for station stop 
 
Performance regime 
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Figure 40 – Synthesis of the charging scheme applied by Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Own from data of RFI’s Network Statement 
 
All the charges applied in Italy are non-discriminatory since their definition is not 
dependent on the railway undertaking considered. 
 
The charges considered are not cost-related given that the basic charges are not intended to 
recover marginal costs and the reservation charges are not related to the costs incurred due 
to the capacity allocation procedure. 
 
On the contrary, the variable part of the basic charge is fair and provides incentives to cost 
efficiency as it is established according to the type of line and, within it, depends on the 
relative density, speed and deterioration.  
 
In relation to the discounts applied, they do not fulfil the conditions established by 
Directive 2001/14/EC since there is no relation between the discount and the actual saving 
of the administrative costs to the infrastructure manager. As well, they are not limited in 
time and are not intended to encourage the development of new rail services. 
 
Considering the incentives to operational efficiency, the reservation charges and the 
performance regime provide them. The reservation charges provide incentives to the 
railway undertakings in order to optimise the capacity requested. The performance regime 
provides incentives to operational efficiency to the railway undertakings and to the 
infrastructure manager, since it is based on a delay minutes accountancy system which 
allocates responsibilities. Then, this performance regime fulfils part of the condition 
established in article 11 of Directive 2001/14/EC, but the part part which requires 
compensations for undertakings which suffer from disruption and bonuses for better than 
planned performance is not fulfilled. 
 
Netherlands 
 
The charging scheme applied in the Netherlands has been simplified in a Basic charge and 
a Discount. These components of the charge have been described in chapter 3 and Figure 
41 reflects a reminder schema. 
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Figure 41 – Synthesis of the charging scheme applied by the Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Own from data of ProRail’s Network Statement 
 
All the charges applied in the Netherlands are non-discriminatory since their definition is 
not dependent on the railway undertaking considered. 
 
The two tariffs considered as basic charges do not fulfil the objective of fairness since they 
do not take into consideration the effects caused by the different services operating the 
network. On the contrary, they are cost-related given that the tariff per train-km allocates 
marginal operation costs and the tariff per ton-km allocates marginal maintenance costs. 
 
In relation to the discount applied, it accomplish the part of the condition established in 
Directive 2001/14/EC where is said that discounts shall encourage the use of considerably 
underutilised lines. This discount provides incentives to operational efficiency since it is 
levied per ton-kilometre for the portion of the train weight over and above 750 tons and so 
the operators will tend to load more their trains and, then, less capacity will be consumed. 
 
Poland 
 
The charging scheme applied in Poland has been simplified in a Basic charge, a Reservation 
charge, a Performance regime and a Discount. These components of the charge have been 
described in chapter 3 and Figure 42 reflects a reminder schema. 
 
Figure 42 – Synthesis of the charging scheme applied by Poland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Own from data of PKP PLK’s Network Statement 
 
The reservation charge and the performance regime applied in Poland are assessed as 
discriminatory given that they are determined through an agreement between each railway 
undertaking and the infrastructure manager and this can lead to a different treatment for 
different operators. However, the rest of charges are considered as non-discriminatory. 
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Discounts 
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The basic charge is not cost-related because it is not intended to recover marginal costs. 
On the contrary, this charge is assessed as fair because varies with the type of service and it 
provides incentives to cost efficiency since its units rates are specified for train parameters 
such as weight and speed. 
 
The reservation charge and the performance regime cannot be assessed according to the 
rest of objectives and conditions established by Directive 2001/14/EC due to its lack of 
definition. 
 
In relation to discounts, both discounts fulfil the condition of being time limited as is 
expressed in its definition. However, they are not cost-related because there is no relation 
to the actual administrative cost savings or it is not explicitated and they do not provide 
incentives to a most efficient use of the network because there is no relation between their 
definition and the operational efficiency. 
 
Portugal 
 
The charging scheme applied in Portugal has been synthesized in a Basic charge, a 
Reservation charge and a Performance regime. These components of the charge have been 
described in chapter 3 and Figure 43 reflects a reminder schema. 
 
Figure 43 – Synthesis of the charging scheme applied by Poland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Own from data of REFER’s Network Statement 
 
All the charges applied in Portugal are non-discriminatory since their definition is not 
dependent on the railway undertaking considered. 
 
The basic tariff for essential services fulfils the majority of the objectives established by the 
Directive. It is fair since it takes into consideration the type of service, it is cost-related 
because is intended to recover marginal operation, maintenance and renewal costs and, 
finally, it provides incentives to cost efficiency takes into account the effect caused by the 
different categories of traction units. 
 
The reservation charge provide high incentives to operational efficiency since its levied for 
the requested but not used capacity and, in addition, it takes into consideration the 
anteriority of the cancellation with respect to the date of the requested capacity. This 
charge will incentivise the railway undertakings to use the capacity requested but, in case of 
cancellation, they are incentivised to cancel the path as early as possible and, in 
consequence, the infrastructure manager will have a certain margin to reallocate the 
cancelled path. 
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The performance regime provides incentives to operational efficiency to the railway 
undertakings and to the infrastructure manager, since it is based on a delay minutes 
accountancy system which allocates responsibilities. Then, this performance regime fulfils 
part of the condition established in article 11 of Directive 2001/14/EC, but the part part 
which requires compensations for undertakings which suffer from disruption and bonuses 
for better than planned performance is not fulfilled. 
 
Sweden 
 
The charging scheme applied in Sweden has been synthesized in a Basic charge, a Mark-up 
and Environmental charges. These components of the charge have been described in 
chapter 3 and Figure 44 reflects a reminder schema. 
 
Figure 44 – Synthesis of the charging scheme applied by Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Source: Own from data of Banverket’s Network Statement 
 
All the charges applied in Sweden are non-discriminatory since their definition is not 
dependent on the railway undertaking considered. 
 
When assessing the basic charge, this is a cost-related charge as far as it allocates marginal 
maintenance costs. On the contrary, it is not fair because it does not consider the different 
effects caused by the different types of services operating in the railway network. As well, it 
does not provide incentives to cost efficiency since it does not vary with vehicle-related 
variables which reflect the damage caused to the infrastructure. 
 
In relation to mark-ups, both mark-ups considered are not cost related so they are intended 
to recover part of the infrastructure costs and their value is not stated by considering the 
ability to pay of the service affected (or at least this relation is not specified by the 
Banverket’s Network Statement). 
 
The environmental charges are cost-related since they are levied according to the 
magnitude of the effect caused by the train movement, so the accident charge is levied per 
train-kilometre and the emission charge is levied per litre of diesel fuel, which is directly 
related to the amount of emission.  
 
It is remarkable that this charging scheme does not provide either incentives to operational 
efficiency or incentives to cost efficiency. 
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United Kingdom 
 
The charging scheme applied in the United Kingdom has been simplified in a Basic charge, 
a Mark-up, a Congestion charge, a Performance regime and a Discount. These components 
of the charge have been described in chapter 3 and Figure 45 reflects a reminder schema. 
 
Figure 45 – Synthesis of the charging scheme applied by the United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Own from data of Network Rail’s Network Statement 
 
All the charges applied in the United Kingdom are non-discriminatory since their definition 
is not dependent on the railway undertaking considered. 
 
The basic charges considered in the charging scheme applied in the United Kingdom, 
should be assessed as fair, because take into consideration the type of service, as cost-
related, since they recover the marginal costs of wear and tear on the infrastructure, and as 
charges providing incentives to cost efficiency, given that variables differentiating the type 
of service are taken into account. 
 
Mark-ups are recovered through a fixed charge which is only levied to franchised passenger 
train operators. This charge is fair because through the franchising process it is possibly 
explorated the demand’s willingness to pay. 
 
In relation to the congestion charge, it is cost-related since it reflects the marginal 
congestion costs of different sections and time bands.  
 
Concerning the performance regime, it provides incentives to operational efficiency to the 
railway undertakings and to the infrastructure manager. This performance regime fulfils the 
condition established by Directive 2001/14/EC which say that it may be included 
compensations for undertakings which suffer from disruption but it does not consider the 
provision of bonuses that reward better than planned performance. 
 
When assessing the discount applied to freight train operators it can be said that it is 
fulfilled the condition of limiting the discount to the actual saving of the administrative 
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cost to the infrastructure manager, given the discount is applied to freight train operators in 
order to reflect the greater flexibility in pathing their services. 
 
 
5.2.2. Conclusions of the assessment 
 
After considering the degree of compliance of each charge applied by each national 
charging scheme according to the main objectives and conditions established by Directive 
2001/14/EC, it can be concluded that, in general, the practices considered fulfil the spirit 
and the legal requirements of the Directive. However, this assertion must be  explained. 
 
In general, each main objectives considered by the Directive are reached through the 
application of a different charging component so the incentives to operational efficiency 
are usually provided by reservation charges or by performance regimes or the incentives to 
cost efficiency are provided by those basic charges considering vehicle-related variables. As 
it is possible to deduce from the previous section, the charging practices vary on a wide 
range: there are some practices very strictly defined and others extremely general, some 
countries apply very few charging components (a basic charge and one or two charging 
components) and others have decomposed its charging scheme in five or more charging 
components, ... 
 
Then, those charging schemes composed by several charges which are defined through 
different variables and in a coherent way, will tend to fulfil the objectives and conditions 
established in the Directive. On the other hand, for those charging schemes which are 
extremely simple (i.e. considering only one charging component) it will be more difficult to 
attain all the objectives although the conditions can be fulfilled anyway. 
 
As a general overview, the incentives to operational efficiency to both parties, railway 
undertakings and the infrastructure manager, are only provided by performance regimes. 
These performance regimes tend to accomplish the objectives of the Directive (except in 
France where incentives are only provided to freight operators) but the condition of 
considering compensations for undertakings which suffer from disruption is only fulfilled 
by the United Kingdom, as the rest of countries applying performance regimes are limited 
to the application of penalties for disruptions. 
 
In relation to the non-discriminatory objective, only the practices that consist of 
agreements between the railway undertakings and the infrastructure managers, which is the 
case of Poland, have been negatively assessed given its lack of definition. These kinds of 
practices are the only ones that have been assessed as discriminatory, given their nature. 
 
Finally, the assessment of the cost-relatedness of charges has been a difficult issue to lead 
with. This is due to the fact that although some countries take a marginal cost approach to 
charging, there is not available information on which costs are intended to recover each 
charge considered. In consequence, it is possible that many charges are cost-related but that 
it has not been possible to affirm it due to the lack of information given by the 
infrastructure managers. 
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5.3. SWOT analysis 
The evaluation output consists of a table for every national charging scheme in which its 
strengths (S), weaknesses (W), opportunities (O) and threats (T) are gathered as short 
statements. 
 
In general, there is an opportunity and a threat related to each strength or weakness, 
respectively. This is due to the fact that in case a charging scheme is characterised by a 
specific strength, this strength will probably be likely to lead to a better situation and, then, 
it appears an opportunity. The same happens for the weaknesses and threats. However, this 
does not occur in all the cases. 
 
 
5.3.1. SWOT analysis for each national charging scheme 
 
 
Austria 
 
The components of the charging scheme considered in the assessment are explained in 
section 3. However, the charges taken into account are listed below in order to facilitate the 
comprehension of the SWOT analysis. 
• Usage charge composed by a “charge in the amount of the directly incurred 
costs” and a “line-related usage charge” (Basic charge) 
• Quality and line-related mark-ups and mark-downs composed by a “wear 
on tracks by traction unit” (Basic charge) 
• Traffic-type related usage charge (Basic charge) 
• Performance regime  
 
 
Table 29 – SWOT Analysis for the charging scheme applied in Austria 
Strengths Opportunities 
? Basic charges based on detailed cost 
knowledge 
? Basic charges established at a low level 
 
? Traffic-type related usage charge 
depending on the type of service 
? Performance regime based on real 
deviations 
? Performance regime consisting on a 
delay minutes accountancy system 
? Performance regime allocating 
responsibilities 
? Simple application of the basic charges 
and the performance regime (unit 
rates) 
 
? Sending of consistent economic 
signals to the railway undertakings 1 
? Improvement of the market shares for 
railways 2 
? Balanced distribution of the services 
in the railway network 3 
? Incentives to accomplish planned 
performance 4 
? Incentives to the infrastructure 
manager to improve the operational 
efficiency 5 
? Incentives to railway undertakings to 
the efficient use of capacity allocated 6 
? Implementation of planning strategies 
7 
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Weaknesses Threats 
? Low recovery rate by the basic charges
? Independence of part of the basic 
charges from the type of service 
? Independence of the basic charges 
from the type of infrastructure  
? Complex calculation procedure of the 
basic charge 
? Performance regime only applied to 
high-quality passenger services 
? Performance regime based on a delay 
threshold 
? Performance regime not considering 
compensations to railway 
undertakings which suffer from 
disruptions 
 
? High dependence from State subsidies 
? Possible cross-subsidization among 
different services 8 
? Low incentives to cost efficiency 
 
? Increase of the administrative costs to 
the infrastructure manager 
? Risk of unfairness 
 
? Possible incentive to disruption (for 
those services performing below the 
threshold)9 
? Unfairness between railway 
undertakings10 
Remarks: 
1 Since the basic charge is based on a detailed knowledge of costs, the railway undertakings will receive clear and 
consistent signals on what are they paying for, and probably, they will be paying for the cost the produce. 
2 If the railways are charged at a low level, transport will tend to use the rail transport mode and its market shares will 
increase. 
3 If the charges depend on the type of service, this will lead to a balanced distribution in the network and in time of 
these services. 
4 The fact that the performance regime is based on the deviation experienced by an operator with respect to the 
planned performance provides incentives to accomplish the timetable established when the request was made. 
5, 6 The fact that the performance regime allocates the delay to the party causing it, provides incentives to operational 
efficiency to the infrastructure manager and to efficient use of the infrastructure to the railway undertakings. 
7 The simple application of the charge will facilitate the comprehension from railway undertakings and will ease their 
planification activity. 
8 The fact that the charge applies in the same way to all services can lead to cross-subsidization, given that is logical to 
think that some services will incur in higher cost than others although all services pay the same amount. 
9 When the performance regime considers a certain delay allowance it is possible to be incentivising the operator to 
produce a disruption just equal to the one that is permitted without being penalised. 
10 Those railway undertakings which suffer from the disruptions caused by others should be compensated because it 
leads to unfairness (e.g. if the disruption is caused by the infrastructure manager, the railway undertaking suffering the 
disruption is compensated but the secondary delays caused by the same disruptions are not compensated). 
 
Source: Own from data of ÖBB’s Track Access Product Catalogue 
 
 
Germany 
 
The components of the charging scheme considered in the assessment are explained in 
section 3. However, the charges taken into account are listed below in order to facilitate the 
comprehension of the SWOT analysis. 
• User-dependent component, including a product factor (Basic charge) 
• Payload component (Basic charge) 
• Fee for preparing an offer (Reservation charge) 
• Cancellation fee (Reservation charge) 
• Utilisation factor (Congestion charge) 
• Performance Regime 
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Table 30 – SWOT Analysis for the charging scheme applied in Germany 
Strengths Opportunities 
? User-dependent component varying 
with the type of service and the type 
of route 
? Product factor considers the demand’s 
willingness to pay 
? Product factor depending on the 
quality in terms of time and routing 
? Payload component levied to heavy 
trains reflecting the increase in wear 
and capacity utilisation 
? Fee for preparing an offer intended to 
reflect costs for processing the 
applications 
? Fee for preparing an offer only levied 
if the offer is not accepted 
 
? Cancellation fee only levied in case of 
“failure to use” capacity 
 
? Percentage based 
? Consideration of the anticipation of 
the cancellation with respect to the 
running date 
? Utilisation factor applied in busy 
routes 
? Performance regime based on real 
deviations 
? Performance regime consisting on a 
delay minutes accountancy system 
? Performance regime allocating 
responsibilities 
? Performance regime applied to all 
services 
? Simple application of the performance 
regime (unit rates) 
 
? Balanced distribution of the services 
in the railway network 
? Avoiding exclusion of valuable 
services from the market 1 
? Possible optimisation of the capacity 
allocation procedure 2 
? Incentives to cost efficiency 
? Incentives to operational efficiency 
 
? Cost-relatedness 
 
 
? Stability of the capacity allocation 
procedure 
 
? Incentives to efficient use of the 
capacity allocated 
? No exclusion of valuable services 
? Proportionality of the tariff 
? Incentive to early notification 
? More possibilities to reallocation of 
capacity 
? Incentives to improve efficiency 
? Incentives to accomplish planned 
performance  
? Incentives to the infrastructure 
manager to improve the operational 
efficiency  
? Incentives to railway undertakings to 
the efficient use of capacity allocated  
? Fairness 
? Implementation of planning strategies 
Weaknesses Threats 
? Low relation of the basic charges to 
specific infrastructure costs 
? Complex application 
 
? Fee for preparing an offer intended to 
reflect costs for processing the 
applications but only levied if the 
offer is not accepted 
? Cancellation fee independent of any 
? Lack of transparency 3 
 
? Sending of unclear signals to the 
railway undertakings 
? Incorrect cost allocation 4 
 
 
 
? Not consideration of cost causation 
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variable such as type of service or 
time band 
? Levied per train-path 
 
? Utilisation factor not dependent of the 
type of service and the time band 
? Performance regime based on a delay 
threshold 
? Performance regime not considering 
compensations to railway 
undertakings which suffer from 
disruptions 
 
 
 
? Risk of unfairness (each kilometre is 
not invoiced at the same price) 
? Inconsistent cost allocation 5 
 
? Possible incentive to disruption (for 
those services performing below the 
threshold) 
? Unfairness between railway 
undertakings 
 
Remarks: 
1 The consideration of the demand’s willingness to pay when setting the value of the charge guarantees that no 
valuable services will be excluded from the market. 
2 The fact that the product factor applied to different services depends on the route and the time band, clearly implies 
that the capacity will be allocated in an optimal way. 
3 The lack of transparency is due to the fact that the charges are not explicitly related to the allocation of specific 
infrastructure costs incurred by the running of a train 
4 The fact that the fee for preparing an offer reflects the costs for processing the applications but that are only levied if 
the offer is rejected supposes an incorrect cost allocation because the infrastructure manager incurs in the costs for 
preparing the offers whether the railways undertakings accept them or not. 
5 The utilisation factor should consider the type of service and the time band because these are elements which 
suppose a great variation of the costs and, then, the congestion costs are not consistently allocated.  
 
Source: Own from data of DB Netz’s Network Statement 
 
 
Estonia 
 
The components of the charging scheme considered in the assessment are explained in 
section 3. However, the charges taken into account are listed below in order to facilitate the 
comprehension of the SWOT analysis. 
• Variable charge (Basic charge) 
• Fixed charge (Reservation charge) 
• Scarcity charge 
 
Table 31 – SWOT Analysis for the charging scheme applied in Estonia 
Strengths Opportunities 
? Variable charge recovering a high rate 
? Fixed charge set at a high value 
 
? Fixed charge levied per train-km 
 
? Simple application of the fixed and 
variable charges 
? Scarcity charge calculated through an 
auction procedure 
Consideration of the demand’s 
willingness to pay 
? Low dependence from State subsidies 
? High incentives to efficient use of 
capacity 
? Fairness (each kilometre is invoiced at 
the same price) 
? Implementation of planning strategies 
 
? Optimisation of the capacity allocation 
procedure 
? Maximization of revenue 1 
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Weaknesses Threats 
? Low relation of the variable charge to 
specific infrastructure costs 
? Independence of the charges from the 
type of service 
? Independence of the variable charge 
from the type of infrastructure  
? High level of the fixed charge 
? Fixed charge independent of any 
variable such as the type of service or 
the time band 
? Not consideration of the anticipation 
of the request with respect to the 
running date 
? Auction procedure to set the scarcity 
charge 
 
? Lack of transparency 
 
? Possible cross-subsidization among 
different services 
? Low incentives to cost efficiency 
 
? Risk of exclusion of valuable services 
? Not consideration of cost-causation 
 
 
? Less stability of the capacity allocation 
process 
 
? Possible exclusion of socially valuable 
services 2 
? Increase of the administrative costs to 
the infrastructure manager 
 
Remarks: 
1 When allocating scarce capacity through an auction procedure, the main variable is the demand’s willingness to pay 
and, given that the capacity is allocated to the maker of the highest bid, the revenue will be maximum. 
2  If capacity is allocated through an auction procedure, it is possible that socially valuable services, whose ability to pay 
is lower than others’, are excluded from the market. 
 
Source: Own from data of EDISYs Network Statement 
 
 
Greece 
 
The components of the charging scheme considered in the assessment are explained in 
section 3. However, the charges taken into account are listed below in order to facilitate the 
comprehension of the SWOT analysis. 
• Basic price corresponding to the track maintenance (Basic charge) 
• Basic price corresponding to the traffic management (Congestion charge) 
 
Table 32 – SWOT Analysis for the charging scheme applied in Greece 
Strengths Opportunities 
? Basic charge levied according to 
vehicle-related variables 
? Basic charge depending on the type of 
service 
? Congestion charge based on 
deviations from ideal running time 
? Defined per section 
 
? Relation to specific infrastructure 
costs 
 
? Incentives to cost efficiency 
 
? Incentives to a balanced distribution 
of services 
? Incentives to accomplish ideal 
performance 
? Incentives to the most efficient 
services to use the congested sections 
? Transparency 
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Weaknesses Threats 
? Complex application 
 
? Congestion charge independent of the 
type of service 
 
? Sending of unclear signals to the 
railway undertakings 
? Inconsistent cost allocation 
Source: Own from data of EDISY’s Network Statement 
 
 
Spain 
 
The components of the charging scheme considered in the assessment are explained in 
section 3. However, the charges taken into account are listed below in order to facilitate the 
comprehension of the SWOT analysis. 
• Circulation charge (Basic charge) 
• Traffic charge (Mark-up) 
• Access charge (Reservation charge) 
• Capacity reservation charge (Reservation charge) 
 
Table 33 – SWOT Analysis for the charging scheme applied in Spain 
Strengths Opportunities 
? Circulation charge depending on the 
type of service and the type of line 
? Traffic charge allocated to high value 
services 
? Traffic charge set according to the 
demand’s willingness to pay measured 
through the capacity offered (€/100 
seats-km) 
? Traffic charge depending on the time 
band 
? Access charge applied to all services 
? Access charge depending on the 
foreseen volume of traffic 
? Capacity reservation charge set at a 
high level 
? Capacity reservation charge depending 
on the route category and the type of 
service 
? Capacity reservation charge depending 
on the time band 
? Capacity reservation charge levied per 
path-kilometre 
? Simple application 
 
? Incentives to a balanced distribution 
of services 
? Increase of the recovery rate 
 
? Avoiding exclusion of valuable 
services from the market 
 
 
? Management of demand through time 
 
? Fairness 
? Possible consideration of the 
demand's ability to pay 
? High incentives to efficient use of 
capacity allocated 
? Consideration of cost-causation 
 
? Relation to scarcity costs 1 
 
? Fairness (each kilometre is invoiced at 
the same price) 
? Implementation of planning strategies 
Weaknesses Threats 
? Low relation to specific infrastructure ? Lack of transparency 
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costs 
? Traffic charge not depending on 
vehicle-related variables 
? Access charge depends on ranges of 
volume of traffic 
? High level of the capacity reservation 
charge 
? Capacity reservation charge not 
considering the anticipation of the 
request with respect to the running 
date 
 
 
? Low incentives to cost efficiency 
 
? Unfairness (each kilometre is not 
invoiced at the same price) 
? Risk of exclusion of valuable services 
 
? Less stability of the capacity allocation 
procedure 
Remarks: 
1 The fact that the reservation charge is set depending on the time band can be seen as a way of considering scarcity 
costs. 
 
Source: Own from data of ADIF’s Network Statement  
 
 
France 
 
The components of the charging scheme considered in the assessment are explained in 
section 3. However, the charges taken into account are listed below in order to facilitate the 
comprehension of the SWOT analysis. 
• Running charge (Basic charge) 
• Access charge (Reservation charge) 
• Path reservation charge (Reservation charge) 
• Reservation charge per station stop (Reservation charge) 
• Performance regime 
 
Table 34 – SWOT Analysis for the charging scheme applied in France 
Strengths Opportunities 
? Running charge depending on the 
type of service 
? Access charge applied to all services 
? Access charge levied for making a 
request per train-km 
? Path reservation charge set at a high 
level 
 
? Path reservation charge depending on 
the route category and the type of 
service 
? Path reservation charge depending on 
the time band 
? Path reservation charge levied per 
path-kilometre 
? Reservation charge per station stop 
? Incentives to a balanced distribution 
of services 
? Fairness 
? Stability of the capacity allocation 
procedure 1 
? High incentives to efficient use of 
capacity allocated 
? Consideration of cost-causation 
 
? Relation to scarcity costs 
 
? Fairness (each kilometre is invoiced at 
the same price) 
? Incentives to optimal use of the 
passenger stations 
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depending on the time band and the 
station category 
? Performance regime focused on most 
disrupting services 
? Performance regime based on a 
condition on operational performance 
? Simple application 
? Improvement of the efficiency in the 
critical part of the market 2 
? Incentives to operational efficiency to 
freight operators 
? Implementation of planning strategies 
 
Weaknesses Threats 
? Low relation to specific infrastructure 
costs 
? Running charge not depending on 
vehicle-related variables 
? Access charge not depending on the 
type of service 
? High level of the path reservation 
charge 
? Path reservation charge not 
considering the anticipation of the 
request with respect to the running 
date 
? Reservation charge per station stop 
only levied to passenger services 
? Performance regime only applied to 
freight services 3 
 
 
? Performance regime based on fix 
operational standards 
 
 
 
? Performance regime not considering 
compensations to railway 
undertakings which suffer from 
disruptions 
 
? Lack of transparency 
 
? Low incentives to cost efficiency 
 
? Not consideration of cost-causation 
 
? Risk of exclusion of valuable services 
? Less stability of the capacity allocation 
procedure 
 
? Unbalanced distribution of services 
 
? Possible unfairness between railway 
undertakings 
? No incentives to the infrastructure 
manager’s operational efficiency 
? Low incentives to improve operational 
efficiency 
? Inconsistent valuation of disruptions 
? Possible incentive to disruption 
?  No incentives to overperformance 
? Unfairness between railway 
undertakings 
 
Remarks: 
1 The levying of an access charge will lead to a stability of the capacity allocation procedure given that operators will 
not make a request unless they are sure that they will accept the offer. 
2 The application of a performance regime focused on the most disrupting services implies that the improvement of 
the operational efficiency will be higher than if it was applied to another market segments. However, the improvement 
of the operational efficiency would be maximum if the performance regime was applied to all the services. 
3 The fact that the performance regime is based on operational fixed standards implies that there are low incentives to 
operational efficiency since when the compensation is reached there are no incentives to continue improving 
performance and, so, to overperformance. As well, the disruptions are inconsistently valuated so only performances 
below fixed operational standards are penalised. Indeed, it is possible that some services performing over the 
operational standard will be incentivized to disrupt.  
 
Source: Own from data of RFF’s Network Statement 
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Italy 
 
The components of the charging scheme considered in the assessment are explained in 
section 3. However, the charges taken into account are listed below in order to facilitate the 
comprehension of the SWOT analysis. 
• Variable charge (Basic charge) 
• Fixed charge (Reservation charge) 
• Reservation charge 
• Performance regime 
• Discount for infrastructure backwardness 
• Discount to the total volume of traffic 
 
Table 35 – SWOT Analysis for the charging scheme applied in Italy 
Strengths Opportunities 
? Variable charge depending on the type 
of service and the type of line 
? Variable charge according to vehicle-
related variables 
? Variable charge considering the 
relative density 
? Fixed charge related to the access of 
each section or node 
? Reservation charge capped to a 
maximum charge 
? Performance regime based on real 
circulations 
? Performance regime based a delay 
minutes accountancy system 
? Performance regime allocating 
responsibilities 
? Performance regime applied to all 
services 
? Performance regime capped to a 
maximum charge 
? Discount related to infrastructure 
backwardness 
? Discount capped 
 
? Incentives to a balanced distribution 
of services 
? Incentives to cost efficiency 
 
? Incentives to operational efficiency 
 
? Stability of the capacity allocation 
procedure 
?  Avoiding exclusion of valuable 
services 
 
? Incentives to accomplish planned 
performance 
? Incentives to the infrastructure 
manager to improve the operational 
efficiency 
? Incentives to railway undertakings to 
the efficient use of capacity allocated 
? Fairness 
? Avoiding exclusion of valuable 
services 
 
? Possible allocation of savings on 
maintenance costs 
? Stability of the charging system 
Weaknesses Threats 
? Traffic management costs allocated 
according to deterioration through the 
variable charge 
? Reservation charge not related to 
capacity allocation costs 
? Reservation charge not considering 
? Distorted incentives to cost efficiency 
1 
 
 
? Lack of transparency 
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the anticipation of the request with 
respect to the running date 
? Performance regime based on a delay 
threshold 
? Delay threshold depending the type of 
service 
? Performance regime not considering 
compensations to railway 
undertakings which suffer from 
disruptions 
? Discount applied in sections with 
infrastructure backwardness 
? Discount depending on the type of 
traffic 
 
? Complex application 
? Less stability of the capacity allocation 
procedure 
 
? Possible incentive to disruption (for 
those services performing below the 
threshold) 
? Inconsistent valuation of disruptions 2 
 
? Unfairness between railway 
undertakings 
 
 
? No incentives to improve the state of 
the infrastructure 
? Risk of unfairness between railway 
undertakings 
? Sending of unclear signals to the 
railway undertakings 
 
Source: Own from data of RFI’s Network Statement 
 
 
Netherlands 
 
The components of the charging scheme considered in the assessment are explained in 
section 3. However, the charges taken into account are listed below in order to facilitate the 
comprehension of the SWOT analysis. 
• Tariff per train-kilometre (Basic charge) 
• Tariff per ton-kilometre (Basic charge) 
• Discount 
 
Table 36 – SWOT Analysis for the charging scheme applied in the Netherlands 
Strengths Opportunities 
? Basic charges based on detailed cost 
knowledge 
? Basic charges set at a low  
 
? Discount intended to encourage the 
use of the Port Railway Line 
? Discount applied for the portion of 
the train weight over and above 750 
tons 
? Simple application 
 
? Sending of consistent economic 
signals to the railway undertakings 
? Improvement of the market shares for 
railways 
? Possibility of recovering the initial 
investment 
? Incentives to operational efficiency 1 
 
? Implementation of planning strategies 
Weaknesses Threats 
? Low recovery rate by the basic charges
? Independence of the basic charges 
from the type of service 
? High dependence from State subsidies 
? Possible cross-subsidization among 
different services 
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? Independence of the basic charges 
from the type of infrastructure  
? Discount applied only to specific 
services 
? Complex calculation procedure of the 
basic charge 
? Low incentives to cost efficiency 
 
? Risk of unfairness 
? Increase of the administrative costs to 
the infrastructure manager 
 
Remarks: 
1 As the discount is applied to the portion of the train weight over and above 750 tons, railway undertakings will be 
incentivized to carry the maximum possible load and, then, the existing capacity will be increased.  
 
Source: Own from data of ProRail’s Network Statement 
 
 
Poland 
 
The components of the charging scheme considered in the assessment are explained in 
section 3. However, the charges taken into account are listed below in order to facilitate the 
comprehension of the SWOT analysis. 
• Basic charge 
• Reservation charge 
• Performance regime 
• Discount for increase of volume 
• Discount for exceptional trains 
 
Table 37 – SWOT Analysis for the charging scheme applied in Poland 
Strengths Opportunities 
? Basic charge depending on vehicle-
related variables 
? Basic charge depending on the type of 
service and the type of line 
? Possible exploration of the demand’s 
willingness to pay through the agreed 
reservation charge 
 
? Possible optimisation of the existing 
capacity through the performance 
regime 
? Discount encouraging new services 
? Discount capped 
? Discount for exceptional trains 
promoting events related to rail 
? Discounts limited in time 
? Incentive to cost-efficiency 
 
? Incentives to a balanced distribution 
of services 
? Possible optimisation of the capacity 
allocation procedure 
? Avoiding exclusion of valuable 
services from the market 
? Possible incentives to operational 
efficiency 
? Increase of rail market shares 
? Stability of the charging system 
? Approximation of the railroad to the 
society 
? Avoiding distorted signals to the 
market over long periods of time 
 
Weaknesses Threats 
? Low relation to specific infrastructure 
costs 
? Complex application 
 
? Lack of transparency 
 
? Sending of unclear signals to the 
railway undertakings 
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? Low transparency of the agreed 
charges (reservation charge and 
performance regime) 
? Discount applied to freight services 
? No relation of discounts to savings on 
administrative costs 
 
? Risk of unfairness between railway 
undertakings 
 
? Risk  of unfairness 
? Possible distortion of the charging 
scheme 
 
Source: Own from data of PKP PLK’s Network Statement 
 
 
Portugal 
 
The components of the charging scheme considered in the assessment are explained in 
section 3. However, the charges taken into account are listed below in order to facilitate the 
comprehension of the SWOT analysis. 
• Basic tariff for the essential 
• Reservation charge 
• Performance regime 
 
 
Table 38 – SWOT Analysis for the charging scheme applied in Portugal 
Strengths Opportunities 
? Basic tariff based on detailed cost 
knowledge 
? Basic tariff set at a low level 
 
? Basic tariff depending on the type of 
service and the type of line 
? Basic tariff depending on vehicle-
related variables 
? Reservation charge only levied in case 
of “failure to use” capacity 
 
? Percentage based 
? Consideration of the anticipation of 
the cancellation with respect to the 
running date 
? Performance regime based on real 
circulations 
? Performance regime based a delay 
minutes accountancy system 
? Performance regime allocating 
responsibilities 
? Performance regime applied to all 
services 
? Performance regime capped to a 
maximum charge 
? Sending of consistent economic 
signals to the railway undertakings 
? Improvement of the market shares for 
railways 
? Incentives to a balanced distribution 
of services 
? Incentive to cost-efficiency 
 
? Incentives to efficient use of the 
capacity allocated 
? No exclusion of valuable services 
? Proportionality of the tariff 
? Incentive to early notification 
? More possibilities to reallocation of 
capacity 
? Incentives to accomplish planned 
performance 
? Incentives to the infrastructure 
manager to improve the operational 
efficiency 
? Incentives to railway undertakings to 
the efficient use of capacity allocated 
? Fairness 
? Avoiding exclusion of valuable 
services 
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Weaknesses Threats 
? Low recovery rate by the basic charges
? Complex calculation procedure of the 
basic charge 
? Reservation charge independent of 
any variable such as type of service or 
time band 
? Performance regime based on a delay 
threshold 
? Delay threshold depending the type of 
service 
? Performance regime not considering 
compensations to railway 
undertakings which suffer from 
disruptions 
 
? High dependence from State subsidies 
? Increase of the administrative costs to 
the infrastructure manager 
? Not consideration of cost causation 
 
 
? Possible incentive to disruption (for 
those services performing below the 
threshold) 
? Inconsistent valuation of disruptions 2 
 
? Unfairness between railway 
undertakings 
 
Source: Own from data of REFER’s Network Statement 
 
 
Sweden 
 
The components of the charging scheme considered in the assessment are explained in 
section 3. However, the charges taken into account are listed below in order to facilitate the 
comprehension of the SWOT analysis. 
• Track charge (Basic charge) 
• Mark-ups 
• Emission charge 
• Accident charge 
 
Table 39 – SWOT Analysis for the charging scheme applied in Sweden 
Strengths Opportunities 
? Track charge based on detailed cost 
knowledge 
? Track charge set at a low level 
 
? Mark-ups linked to a specific 
investment 
? Levied per crossing 
? Emission and accident charges based 
on marginal costs 
? Emission charge levied per litre of 
diesel fuel 
? Emission charge varies with the type 
of traction unit 
? Accident charge levied per train-
kilometre 
? Simple application 
? Sending of consistent economic 
signals to the railway undertakings 
? Improvement of the market shares for 
railways 
? Financement of specific investment 
? Incentives to operational efficiency 
? Sending of consistent economic 
signals to the railway undertakings 
? Optimum cost allocation 
 
? Incentives to the use of environmental 
friendly traction 
? Correct cost allocation 
? Implementation of planning strategies 
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Weaknesses Threats 
? Track charge not depending on the 
type of service 
? Track charge not depending on 
vehicle-related variables 
? Low recovery rate by the basic charges
? Complex calculation procedure of the 
basic charge 
? High level of the mark-up 
? Mark-up levied to freight services 
 
? Mark-up for passenger services 
applied to the whole network while is 
intended to recover an specific 
investment 
? No link of the emission and the 
accident charge to equivalent charges 
in competing modes 
 
? Possible cross-subsidization among 
different services 
? Low incentives to cost efficiency 
 
? High dependence from State subsidies 
? Increase of the administrative costs to 
the infrastructure manager 
? Possible exclusion of valuable services 
? Possible underutilisation of the new 
built capacity 
? Unfairness 
 
 
? Possible decrease of the market shares 
for railways 
Source: Own from data of Banverket’s Network Statement 
 
 
United Kingdom 
 
The components of the charging scheme considered in the assessment are explained in 
section 3. However, the charges taken into account are listed below in order to facilitate the 
comprehension of the SWOT analysis. 
• Track variable usage charge (Basic charge) 
• Electrification asset usage charge (Basic charge) 
• Fixed charge (Mark-up) 
• Capacity charge (Congestion charge) 
• Performance regime 
• Discount 
 
Table 40 – SWOT Analysis for the charging scheme applied in the United Kingdom 
Strengths Opportunities 
? Basic charges and capacity charge 
based on detailed cost knowledge 
? Track variable usage charge depending 
on the type of traffic 
? Track variable usage charge depending 
on vehicle-related variables 
? Electrification asset usage charge 
depending on geographical areas, 
season and day bands 
? Exploration of the demand’s 
willingness to pay through the 
? Sending of consistent economic 
signals to the railway undertakings 
? Incentives to a balanced distribution 
of services 
? Incentive to cost-efficiency 
 
? Possible consideration of cost-
causation 
 
 
? Maximization of cost recovery 
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franchising process for the mark-up 
? Capacity charge defined according to 
service groups 
? Performance regime based on real 
deviations 
? Performance regime consisting on a 
delay minutes accountancy system 
? Performance regime allocating 
responsibilities 
? Performance regime applied to all 
services 
? Performance regime considering 
compensations to railway 
undertakings which suffer from 
disruptions 
? Discount applied to freight services 
? Simple application 
 
? Avoiding exclusion of valuable 
services 
 
? Incentives to operational efficiency 
 
? Incentives to accomplish planned 
performance  
? Incentives to the infrastructure 
manager to improve the operational 
efficiency  
? Incentives to railway undertakings to 
the efficient use of capacity allocated  
? Fairness 
 
 
 
? Fairness between railway undertakings 
? Implementation of planning strategies 
Weaknesses Threats 
? Track variable usage charge not 
depending on vehicle-related variables 
? Complex calculation procedure 
 
? Mark-up applied to specific services 
? Performance regime based on a delay 
threshold 
? Discount applied only to specific 
services 
 
? Low incentives to cost efficiency 
 
? Increase of the administrative costs to 
the infrastructure manager 
? Unbalanced distribution of services 
? Possible incentive to disruption (for 
those services performing below the 
threshold) 
? Risk of unfairness between railway 
undertakings 
 
Source: Own from data of Network Rail’s Network Statement 
 
 
5.3.2. Conclusions of the SWOT analysis 
 
After assessing every national charging scheme, there are some common opportunities and 
threats in which the different current strengths and weaknesses can derive, respectively, 
and which should be remarked. 
 
As a starting point, the lack of transparency is a very common threat among the charging 
schemes considered as the majority of countries do not specify the relation between the 
charges levied and the specific costs which are intended to recover. However, it is possible 
that in some cases this relation between costs and charges actually exists but the 
infrastructure managers are not likely to publish it. The opposite case is where countries 
recognise to recover marginal cost, in which case the charges are based on detailed cost 
knowledge and, in consequence, the economic signals sent to railway undertakings are 
completely consistent. 
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Another significant threat is the high dependence from Stat subsidies of those 
infrastructure managers that recover a low rate of costs through charges. This is the case of 
those countries that have taken a marginal cost approach to charging. As well, the adoption 
of this approach implies a complex calculation procedure which will lead to a substantial 
increase of the administrative costs incurred by the infrastructure manager. On the 
contrary, when charging at marginal costs these costs are correctly allocated and the 
railways undertakings are only charged for the costs that they impose. 
 
When considering the distribution of services in the network, it appears an opportunity of 
achieving a balanced distribution when the basic charge varies with the type of service, the 
type of line and the time band. On the other hand, there is a risk of exclusion of valuable 
services if a reservation charge is set at a high level or in case that a mark-up is not 
established according to the demand's willingness to pay. As well, if the charges are not 
varying according to the type of service is possible that exists cross-subsidization between 
different services given that it is logical to think that each type of service supposes a 
determined cost to the infrastructure. 
 
Finally, it should be remarked those performance regimes based on real circulations, which 
consist on a delay minutes accountancy system applied to all services and considering 
allocation of responsibilities. These performance regimes imply several opportunities such 
as incentives to accomplish planned performance, incentives to the infrastructure manager 
to operational efficiency, incentives to railway undertakings to efficient use of capacity 
allocated, … However, there is a main threat related to these performance regimes 
consisting on being unfair between railways undertakings since they do not consider 
compensations for secondary delays. 
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6. Conclusions 
During the last half of the twentieth century the role played by rail in transport market has 
been in constant decline due to several causes which have been exposed in this dissertation. 
Given the situation of the rail in the transport market, the European Commission has 
engaged in a long process of revitalising the railways. This process began in the early 
nineties with the publishment of Council Directive 91/440 but the significant changes 
arrived, in 2001, with the publishment of the First Railway Package of Directives. In 
particular, one of the Directives composing this First Railway Package was Directive 
2001/14/EC, focused on the allocation of capacity and development of access charges for 
infrastructure. 
 
The design of a charging scheme is a key issue for an efficient use of the infrastructure and 
for ensuring fair and non-discriminatory access to the network. Given that most national 
rail networks operate under monopoly conditions, charging schemes must be regulated in 
order to avoid the abuse of the monopolistic position, to ensure the efficient use of the 
infrastructure and to prevent the discrimination of certain groups. This is the reason why 
Directive 2001/14/EC plays such important role in the process of revitalising the railways. 
 
Then, Directive 2001/14/EC encourage infrastructure managers to market instruments 
such as infrastructure charging to pursue a business oriented approach in order to improve 
the efficiency of the infrastructure use. However, this Directive allow a considerable degree 
of freedom in its implementation into national legislation and, in consequence, the 
European countries have been implementing the charging provisions in a divergent way. 
Then, as it has been stated in this dissertation, a wide variety of charging schemes have 
appeared in the different countries. As well, it there is a risk that during the process of 
implementation of European Directives into national law, the conditions are fulfilled but 
not the spirit of the EU Commission policy. 
 
Indeed, as it has been concluded in this dissertation, the countries which have been studied, 
in general, fulfil the objectives and conditions established by Directive 2001/14/EC. As 
well, several opportunities and threats have been deduced from the SWOT analysis so the 
European countries  could focus their effort in promoting those opportunities and 
preventing the threats. 
 
It should be standed out that the current lack of harmonisation among the national 
charging schemes could turn to be a barrier to the overall development of the rail market. 
This matter especially concerns international services, which must handle with the 
heterogeneity of charging schemes across its entire journey. This heterogeneity of the 
railways together with homogeneity of the road mode, impede the improvement of the rail 
market shares. Then, the simple fact of the diversity of charging system greatly complicates 
and reduces the transparency of charges for international paths, so anything that can be 
done to reduce this diversity is likely to be helpful to international rail traffic and, in 
consequence, to the improvement of the transport market shares for railways. 
 
This problem could be solved by taking a legislative initiative which followed the spirit of 
Directive 2001/14/EC but which was more focused on regulating the charging schemes 
applied by infrastructure managers and that was more concrete and strict when defining a 
common structure for charging. 
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This common structure of the charging schemes should be oriented to the application of a 
simple tariff accompanied by a performance regime which provided incentives to both 
parties, the infrastructure manager and the railway undertakings, in order to improve the 
operational efficiency. There are several issues that should be treated: 
 
 Concerning the approach taken to charging, the marginal cost approach is the most 
efficient way of charging from an economic point of view. This is due to the fact 
that when charges are set at marginal costs, railways undertakings are only paying 
the actual costs which are directly incurred as a result of operating a train service. 
This provision is already reflected in Directive 2001/14/EC, where the marginal 
cost pricing is mandatory. However, it is remarkable that each pricing principle is 
determined by specific characteristics and there is not a “best approach”. 
Therefore, the adequate approach for each country will depend on the specific 
circumstances of each country (i.e. the case of the Baltic States where the full cost 
approach could be appropriate to freight traffic due to its geographical situation 
while in other countries it is not). 
 
 In relation to the type of tariff, it should be compulsory that the basic charge was a 
linear tariff given that the presence of two-part tariffs (specially if the fixed part of 
the charge is set at a high value) is likely to be a barrier to small size operators as 
well as an impediment for rail international transport. 
 
 Concerning the charging components differentiated by Directive 2001/14/EC, 
only performance regimes should be compulsory given that are the elements which 
provide incentives to both parties, railway undertakings and the infrastructure 
manager, to improve the operational efficiency. These performance regimes should 
be applied as currently establishes the Directive by penalising those actions which 
disrupt the operation of the network, compensating to railway undertakings which 
suffer from disruption and giving bonuses that reward better than planned 
performance. 
 
 The rest of charging components (mark-ups, reservation charges, congestion 
charges, scarcity charges and discounts) should be defined more concretely but they 
should not be compulsory given that their application depends on the actual 
situation of the railways in each European country, i.e. charging of congestion or 
scarcity may be inappropriate in countries where there is little competition or no 
competition. 
 
 Finally, the consideration of elements of rail infrastructure charging recovering 
environmental impacts should become mandatory, in line with future obligations in 
other transport sectors. 
 
There are some countries whose charging scheme could be taken as a reference to establish 
a common structure of charging schemes. These countries are Portugal and the United 
Kingdom they use a marginal cost approach to charging, the type of charge is linear (except 
for franchised passenger operators in the United Kingdom) and they apply performance 
regimes. 
 
Finally, it should be given a general overview of the Spanish case. The vertical 
disintegration of the railways in Spain was completed in year 2005. The liberalisation 
currently affects only freight services and passenger services' liberalisation is foreseen to be 
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accomplished in 2010. The approach taken to charging is marginal cost plus mark-ups with 
a very low recovery rate. This is in line with Directive 2001/14/EC but implies that the 
railways in Spain are subject to a great dependence of the State subsidies. 
 
There are some weaknesses of the Spanish charging scheme that should be considered. It 
applies an Access charge to all services which corresponds to the fixed part of a two-part 
tariff and which could have an adverse effect on competitiveness and on the organisation 
of international rail services. As well, the charging scheme does not consider the 
application of a performance regime which will lead to an improvement of the operational 
efficiency in the rail network. 
 
As a conclusion, Spain has made a great effort in the last years to implement into national 
law the European policy and to organise the railways as this legislation requires. However, 
it is necessary to continue improving this organisation in order to revitalise the railways and 
to turn it into a competitive mode of transport. 
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Annex I : Directive 2001/14/EC 
DIRECTIVE 2001/14/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 26 February 2001
on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of
railway infrastructure and safety certification
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community, and in particular Article 71 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee (2),
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions
(3),
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article
251 of the Treaty (4) in the light of the joint text approved on
22 November 2000 by the Conciliation Committee,
Whereas:
(1) Greater integration of the Community railway sector is
an essential element of the completion of the internal
market and moving towards achieving sustainable
mobility.
(2) Council Directive 91/440/EEC of 29 July 1991 on the
development of the Community’s railways (5) provides
for certain access rights in international rail transport
for railway undertakings, and international groupings of
railway undertakings; these rights mean that railway
infrastructure can be used by multiple users.
(3) Council Directive 95/19/EC of 19 June 1995 on the
allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the
charging of infrastructure fees (6) set out a broad
framework for the allocation of railway infrastructure
capacity.
(4) Those Directives have not prevented a considerable
variation in the structure and level of railway
infrastructure charges and the form and duration of
capacity allocation processes.
(5) To ensure transparency and non-discriminatory access
to rail infrastructure for all railway undertakings all the
necessary information required to use access rights are
to be published in a network statement.
(6) Appropriate capacity-allocation schemes for rail
infrastructure coupled with competitive operators will
result in a better balance of transport between modes.
(7) Encouraging optimal use of the railway infrastructure
will lead to a reduction in the cost of transport to
society.
(8) An efficient freight sector, especially across borders,
requires action for the opening up of the market.
(9) It should be possible for Member States to allow
purchasers of railway services to enter directly the
capacity-allocation process.
(10) The revitalisation of European railways by means of
extended access for international freight on the
Trans-European Rail Freight Network requires fair
intermodal competition between rail and road,
particularly by taking appropriate account of the
different external effects; appropriate charging schemes
for rail infrastructure coupled with appropriate charging
schemes for other transport infrastructures and
competitive operators will result in an optimal balance
of different transport modes.
(11) The charging and capacity allocation schemes should
permit equal and non-discriminatory access for all
undertakings and attempt as far as possible to meet the
needs of all users and traffic types in a fair and
non-discriminatory manner.
(1) OJ C 321, 20.10.1998, p. 10, and
OJ C 116 E, 26.4.2000, p. 40.
(2) OJ C 209, 22.7.1999, p. 22.
(3) OJ C 57, 29.2.2000, p. 40.
(4) Opinion of the European Parliament of 10 March 1999 (OJ C 175,
21.6.1999, p. 120), confirmed on 27 October 1999 (OJ C 154,
5.6.2000, p. 22), Council Common Position of 28 March 2000 (OJ
C 178, 27.6.2000, p. 28) and Decision of the European Parliament
of 5 July 2000 (not yet published in the Official Journal), Decision
of the European Parliament of 1 February 2001 and Council
Decision of 20 December 2000.
(5) OJ L 237, 24.8.1991, p. 25. Directive as amended by Directive
2001/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (see
page 1 of this Official Journal).
(6) OJ L 143, 27.6.1995, p. 75.
15.3.2001 L 75/29Official Journal of the European CommunitiesEN
(12) Within the framework set out by Member States
charging and capacity-allocation schemes should
encourage railway infrastructure managers to optimise
use of their infrastructure.
(13) Railway undertakings should receive clear and consistent
signals from capacity allocation schemes which lead
them to make rational decisions.
(14) In order to take into account the needs of users, or
potential users, of railway infrastructure capacity to plan
their business, and to the needs of customers and
funders, it is important that the infrastructure manager
ensures that infrastructure capacity is allocated in a way
which reflects the need to maintain and improve service
reliability levels.
(15) It is desirable for railway undertakings and the
infrastructure manager to be provided with incentives to
minimise disruption and improve performance of the
network.
(16) Charging and capacity allocation schemes should allow
for fair competition in the provision of railway services.
(17) It is important to have regard to the business
requirements of both applicants and the infrastructure
manager.
(18) It is important to maximise the flexibility available to
the infrastructure managers with regard to the allocation
of infrastructure capacity, but this must be consistent
with satisfaction of the applicant’s reasonable
requirements.
(19) The capacity allocation process must prevent the
imposition of undue constraints on the wishes of other
undertakings holding, or intending to hold, rights to use
the infrastructure to develop their business.
(20) It is desirable to grant some degree of flexibility to
infrastructure managers to enable a more efficient use to
be made of the infrastructure network.
(21) Capacity allocation and charging schemes may need to
take account of the fact that different components of
the rail infrastructure network may have been designed
with different principal users in mind.
(22) The requirements for passenger services may often
conflict with the requirements for freight; the
requirements for passenger services may result in a
network which is more costly to build and maintain
than one designed solely for freight; the increasing
speed differential between freight and passenger rolling
stock can lead to an exacerbation of the conflict
between these two types of traffic.
(23) Different users and types of users will frequently have a
different impact on infrastructure capacity and the needs
of different services need to be properly balanced.
(24) Services operated under contract to a public authority
may require special rules to safeguard their
attractiveness to users.
(25) The charging and capacity allocation schemes must take
account of the effects of increasing saturation of
infrastructure capacity and ultimately the scarcity of
capacity.
(26) The different time-frames for planning traffic types
mean that it is desirable to ensure that requests for
infrastructure capacity which are made after the
completion of the timetabling process can be satisfied.
(27) The use of information technology can enhance the
speed and responsiveness of the timetabling process and
improve the ability of applicants to bid for
infrastructure capacity, as well as improving the ability
to establish train paths which cross more than one
infrastructure manager’s network.
(28) To ensure the optimum outcome for railway
undertakings, it is desirable to require an examination of
the use of infrastructure capacity when the coordination
of requests for capacity is required to meet the needs of
users.
(29) In view of the monopolistic position of the
infrastructure managers it is desirable to require an
examination of the available infrastructure capacity, and
methods of enhancing it when the capacity allocation
process is unable to meet the requirements of users.
(30) A lack of information about other railway undertakings’
requests as well as about the constraints within the
system may make it difficult for railway undertakings to
seek to optimise their infrastructure capacity requests.
(31) It is important to ensure the better coordination of
allocation schemes so as to ensure the improved
attractiveness of rail for traffic which uses the network
of more than one infrastructure manager, in particular
for international traffic.
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(32) It is important to minimise the distortions of
competition which may arise, either between railway
infrastructures or between transport modes, from
significant differences in charging principles.
(33) It is desirable to define those components of the
infrastructure service which are essential to enable an
operator to provide a service and which should be
provided in return for minimum access charges.
(34) Investment in railway infrastructure is desirable and
infrastructure charging schemes should provide
incentives for infrastructure managers to make
appropriate investments where they are economically
attractive.
(35) Any charging scheme will send economic signals to
users. It is important that those signals to railway
undertakings should be consistent and lead them to
make rational decisions.
(36) To enable the establishment of appropriate and fair
levels of infrastructure charges, infrastructure managers
need to record and establish the valuation of their assets
and develop a clear understanding of cost factors in the
operation of the infrastructure.
(37) It is desirable to ensure that account is taken of external
costs when making transport decisions.
(38) It is important to ensure that charges for international
traffic are such as to permit rail to meet the needs of
the market; consequently infrastructure charging should
be set at the cost that is directly incurred as a result of
operating the train service.
(39) The overall level of cost recovery through infrastructure
charges affects the necessary level of government
contribution; Member States may require different levels
of overall cost recovery through charges including
mark-ups or a rate of return which the market can bear
while balancing cost recovery with intermodal
competitiveness of rail freight. However, it is desirable
for any infrastructure charging scheme to enable traffic
to use the rail network which can at least pay for the
additional cost which it imposes.
(40) A railway infrastructure is a natural monopoly. It is
therefore necessary to provide infrastructure managers
with incentives to reduce costs and manage their
infrastructure efficiently.
(41) Account should be taken of the fact that for a great
many years the level of investment in infrastructure and
technology has not made it possible to create the
conditions for any real development of railway
transport. It is therefore advisable, against this
background, for appropriate upgrading to be carried
out, in particular in the context of setting up the
Trans-European Rail Freight Network, by using inter alia
the Community instruments available, without prejudice
to priorities already established.
(42) Discounts which are allowed to railway undertakings
must relate to actual administrative cost savings
experienced; discounts may also be used to promote the
efficient use of infrastructure.
(43) It is desirable for railway undertakings and the
infrastructure manager to be provided with incentives to
minimise disruption of the network.
(44) The allocation of capacity is associated with a cost to
the infrastructure manager, payment for which should
be required.
(45) Measures are needed to ensure that all railway
undertakings licensed under Community law are
required to hold an appropriate safety certificate before
operating on the territory of a Member State; the
granting of safety certificates must comply with
Community law.
(46) The efficient management and fair and
non-discriminatory use of rail infrastructure require the
establishment of a regulatory body that oversees the
application of these Community rules and acts as an
appeal body, notwithstanding the possibility of judicial
review.
(47) Specific measures are required to take account of the
specific geopolitical and geographical situation of
certain Member States as well as a specific organisation
of the railway sector in various Member States while
ensuring the integrity of the internal market.
(48) The measures necessary for the implementation of this
Directive should be adopted in accordance with Council
Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down
the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers
conferred on the Commission (1).
(49) In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty, the
objectives of this Directive, namely to coordinate
arrangements in the Member States governing the
allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the
charges made for the use thereof as well as safety
certification, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States in view of the need to ensure fair and
non-discriminatory terms for access to the infrastructure
as well as to take account of the manifestly international
dimensions involved in the operation of significant
(1) OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 23.
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elements of the railway networks, and can therefore, by
reason of the need for coordinated trans-national action,
be better achieved by the Community. This Directive
does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those
objectives.
(50) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2830/77 of 12 December
1977 on the measures necessary to achieve
comparability between the accounting systems and
annual accounts of railway undertakings (1), Council
Regulation (EEC) No 2183/78 of 19 September 1978
laying down uniform costing principles for railway
undertakings (2), Council Decision 82/529/EEC of 19
July 1982 on the fixing of rates for the international
carriage of goods by rail (3), Council Decision
83/418/EEC of 25 July 1983 on the commercial
independence of the railways in the management of
their international passenger and luggage traffic (4), and
Directive 95/19/EC are superseded by this Directive and
should therefore be repealed,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS
Article 1
Scope
1. This Directive concerns the principles and procedures to
be applied with regard to the setting and charging of railway
infrastructure charges and the allocation of railway
infrastructure capacity.
Member States shall ensure that charging and capacity
allocation schemes for railway infrastructure follow the
principles set down in this Directive and thus allow the
infrastructure manager to market and make optimum effective
use of the available infrastructure capacity.
2. This Directive applies to the use of railway infrastructure
for domestic and international rail services.
3. Member States may exclude from the scope of this
Directive:
a) stand-alone local and regional networks for passenger
services on railway infrastructure;
b) networks intended only for the operation of urban or
suburban passenger services;
c) regional networks which are used for regional freight
services solely by a railway undertaking that is not covered
by the scope of Directive 91/440/EEC until capacity on
that network is requested by another applicant;
d) privately owned railway infrastructure that exists solely for
use by the infrastructure owner for its own freight
operations.
4. Transport operations in the form of shuttle services for
road vehicles through the Channel Tunnel are excluded from
the scope of this Directive.
Article 2
Definitions
For the purpose of this Directive:
a) allocation means the allocation of railway infrastructure
capacity by an infrastructure manager;
b) applicant means a licensed railway undertaking and/or an
international grouping of railway undertakings, and, in
Member States which provide for such a possibility, other
persons and/or legal entities with public service or
commercial interest in procuring infrastructure capacity,
such as public authorities under Regulation (EEC) No
1191/69 (5) and shippers, freight forwarders and combined
transport operators, for the operation of railway service on
their respective territories;
c) congested infrastructure means a section of infrastructure
for which demand for infrastructure capacity cannot be
fully satisfied during certain periods even after
coordination of the different requests for capacity;(1) OJ L 334, 24.12.1977, p. 13. Regulation as last amended by the
1994 Act of Accession.
(2) OJ L 258, 21.9.1978, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by the
1994 Act of Accession.
(3) OJ L 234, 9.8.1982, p. 5. Regulation as last amended by the 1994
Act of Accession.
(4) OJ L 237, 26.8.1983, p. 32. Regulation as last amended by the
1994 Act of Accession.
(5) Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 of the Council of 26 June 1969 on
action by Member States concerning the obligations inherent in the
concept of a public service in transport by rail, road and inland
waterway (OJ L 156, 28.6.1969, p. 1). Regulation as last amended
by Regulation (EC) No 1893/91 (OJ L 169, 29.6.1991, p. 1).
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d) capacity enhancement plan means a measure or series of
measures with a calendar for their implementation which
are proposed to alleviate the capacity constraints leading to
the declaration of a section of infrastructure as congested
infrastructure;
e) coordination means the process through which the
allocation body and applicants will attempt to resolve
situations in which there are conflicting applications for
infrastructure capacity;
f) framework agreement means a legally binding general
agreement on the basis of public or private law, setting out
the rights and obligations of an applicant and the
infrastructure manager or the allocation body in relation to
the infrastructure capacity to be allocated and the charges
to be levied over a period longer than one working
timetable period;
g) infrastructure capacity means the potential to schedule
train paths requested for an element of infrastructure for a
certain period;
h) infrastructure manager means any body or undertaking
that is responsible in particular for establishing and
maintaining railway infrastructure. This may also include
the management of infrastructure control and safety
systems. The functions of the infrastructure manager on a
network or part of a network may be allocated to different
bodies or undertakings;
i) network means the entire railway infrastructure owned
and/or managed by an infrastructure manager;
j) network statement means the statement which sets out in
detail the general rules, deadlines, procedures and criteria
concerning the charging and capacity allocation schemes.
It shall also contain such other information as is required
to enable application for infrastructure capacity;
k) railway undertaking means any public or private
undertaking, licensed according to applicable Community
legislation, the principal business of which is to provide
services for the transport of goods and/or passengers by
rail with a requirement that the undertaking must ensure
traction; this also includes undertakings which provide
traction only;
l) train path means the infrastructure capacity needed to run
a train between two places over a given time-period;
m) working timetable means the data defining all planned
train and rolling-stock movements which will take place
on the relevant infrastructure during the period for which
it is in force.
Article 3
Network statement
1. The infrastructure manager shall, after consultation with
the interested parties, develop and publish a network statement
obtainable against payment of a duty which may not exceed
the cost of publishing that statement.
2. The network statement shall set out the nature of the
infrastructure which is available to railway undertakings. It
shall contain information setting out the conditions for access
to the relevant railway infrastructure. The content of the
network statement is laid down in Annex I.
3. The network statement shall be kept up to date and
modified as necessary.
4. The network statement shall be published no less than
four months in advance of the deadline for requests for
infrastructure capacity.
CHAPTER II
INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES
Article 4
Establishing, determining and collecting charges
1. Member States shall establish a charging framework
while respecting the management independence laid down in
Article 4 of Directive 91/440/EEC.
Subject to the said condition of management independence,
Member States shall also establish specific charging rules or
delegate such powers to the infrastructure manager. The
determination of the charge for the use of infrastructure and
the collection of this charge shall be performed by the
infrastructure manager.
2. Where the infrastructure manager, in its legal form,
organisation or decision-making functions, is not independent
of any railway undertaking, the functions, described in this
chapter, other than collecting the charges shall be performed
by a charging body that is independent in its legal form,
organisation and decision-making from any railway
undertaking.
3. Infrastructure managers shall cooperate to achieve the
efficient operation of train services which cross more than one
infrastructure network. They shall in particular aim to
guarantee the optimum competitiveness of international rail
freight and ensure the efficient utilisation of the
Trans-European Rail Freight Network. They may establish such
joint organisations as are appropriate to enable this to take
place. Any cooperation or joint organisation shall be bound by
the rules set out in this Directive.
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4. Except where specific arrangements are made under
Article 8(2), infrastructure managers shall ensure that the
charging scheme in use is based on the same principles over
the whole of their network.
5. Infrastructure managers shall ensure that the application
of the charging scheme results in equivalent and
non-discriminatory charges for different railway undertakings
that perform services of equivalent nature in a similar part of
the market and that the charges actually applied comply with
the rules laid down in the network statement.
6. An infrastructure manager or charging body shall respect
the commercial confidentiality of information provided to it by
applicants.
Article 5
Services
1. Railway undertakings shall, on a non-discriminatory
basis, be entitled to the minimum access package and track
access to service facilities that are described in Annex II. The
supply of services referred to in Annex II, point 2 shall be
provided in a non-discriminatory manner and requests by
railway undertakings may only be rejected if viable alternatives
under market conditions exist. If the services are not offered
by one infrastructure manager, the provider of the main
infrastructure shall use all reasonable endeavours to facilitate
the provision of these services.
2. Where the infrastructure manager offers any of the range
of services described in Annex II, point 3 as additional services
he shall supply them upon request to a railway undertaking.
3. Railway undertakings may request a further range of
ancillary services, listed in Annex II, point 4 from the
infrastructure manager or from other suppliers. The
infrastructure manager is not obliged to supply these services.
Article 6
Infrastructure cost and accounts
1. Member States shall lay down conditions, including
where appropriate advance payments, to ensure that, under
normal business conditions and over a reasonable time period,
the accounts of an infrastructure manager shall at least balance
income from infrastructure charges, surpluses from other
commercial activities and State funding on the one hand, and
infrastructure expenditure on the other.
Without prejudice to the possible long-term aim of user cover
of infrastructure costs for all modes of transport on the basis
of fair, non-discriminatory competition between the various
modes, where rail transport is able to compete with other
modes of transport, within the charging framework of Articles
7 and 8, a Member State may require the infrastructure
manager to balance his accounts without State funding.
2. Infrastructure managers shall, with due regard to safety
and to maintaining and improving the quality of the
infrastructure service, be provided with incentives to reduce
the costs of provision of infrastructure and the level of access
charges.
3. Member States shall ensure that the provision set out in
paragraph 2 is implemented, either through a contractual
agreement between the competent authority and infrastructure
manager covering a period of not less than three years which
provides for State funding or through the establishment of
appropriate regulatory measures with adequate powers.
4. Where a contractual agreement exists, the terms of the
contract and the structure of the payments agreed to provide
funding to the infrastructure manager shall be agreed in
advance to cover the whole of the contract period.
5. A method for apportioning costs shall be established.
Member States may require prior approval. This method
should be updated from time to time to the best international
practice.
Article 7
Principles of charging
1. Charges for the use of railway infrastructure shall be paid
to the infrastructure manager and used to fund his business.
2. Member States may require the infrastructure manager to
provide all necessary information on the charges imposed. The
infrastructure manager must, in this regard, be able to justify
that infrastructure charges actually invoiced to each operator,
pursuant to Articles 4 to 12, comply with the methodology,
rules, and where applicable, scales laid down in the network
statement.
3. Without prejudice to paragraphs 4 or 5 or to Article 8,
the charges for the minimum access package and track access
to service facilities shall be set at the cost that is directly
incurred as a result of operating the train service.
4. The infrastructure charge may include a charge which
reflects the scarcity of capacity of the identifiable segment of
the infrastructure during periods of congestion.
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5. The infrastructure charge may be modified to take
account of the cost of the environmental effects caused by the
operation of the train. Such a modification shall be
differentiated according to the magnitude of the effect caused.
Charging of environmental costs which results in an increase
in the overall revenue accruing to the infrastructure manager
shall however be allowed only if such charging is applied at a
comparable level to competing modes of transport.
In the absence of any comparable level of charging of
environmental costs in other competing modes of transport,
such modification shall not result in any overall change in
revenue to the infrastructure manager. If a comparable level of
charging of environmental costs has been introduced for rail
and competing modes of transport and that generates
additional revenue, it shall be for Member States to decide how
the revenue shall be used.
6. To avoid undesirable disproportionate fluctuations, the
charges referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 may be averaged
over a reasonable spread of train services and times.
Nevertheless, the relative magnitudes of the infrastructure
charges shall be related to the costs attributable to the services.
7. The supply of services referred to in Annex II, point 2,
shall not be covered by this Article. Without prejudice to the
foregoing, account shall be taken, in setting the prices for the
services set out in Annex II, point 2, of the competitive
situation of rail transport.
8. Where services listed in Annex II, points 3 and 4 as
additional and ancillary services are offered only by one
supplier the charge imposed for such a service shall relate to
the cost of providing it, calculated on the basis of the actual
level of use.
9. Charges may be levied for capacity used for the purpose
of infrastructure maintenance. Such charges shall not exceed
the net revenue loss to the infrastructure manager caused by
the maintenance.
Article 8
Exceptions to charging principles
1. In order to obtain full recovery of the costs incurred by
the infrastructure manager a Member State may, if the market
can bear this, levy mark-ups on the basis of efficient,
transparent and non-discriminatory principles, while
guaranteeing optimum competitiveness in particular of
international rail freight. The charging system shall respect the
productivity increases achieved by railway undertakings.
The level of charges must not, however, exclude the use of
infrastructure by market segments which can pay at least the
cost that is directly incurred as a result of operating the
railway service, plus a rate of return which the market can
bear.
2. For specific investment projects, in the future, or that
have been completed not more than 15 years before the entry
into force of this Directive, the infrastructure manager may set
or continue to set higher charges on the basis of the long-term
costs of such projects if they increase efficiency and/or
cost-effectiveness and could not otherwise be or have been
undertaken. Such a charging arrangement may also
incorporate agreements on the sharing of the risk associated
with new investments.
3. To prevent discrimination, it shall be ensured that any
given infrastructure manager’s average and marginal charges
for equivalent uses of his infrastructure are comparable and
that comparable services in the same market segment are
subject to the same charges. The infrastructure manager shall
show in the network statement that the charging system meets
these requirements in so far as this can be done without
disclosing confidential business information.
4. If an infrastructure manager intends to modify the
essential elements of the charging system referred to in
paragraph 1, it shall make them public at least three months
in advance.
Article 9
Discounts
1. Without prejudice to Articles 81, 82, 86 and 87 of the
Treaty and notwithstanding Article 7(3) of this Directive, any
discount on the charges levied on a railway undertaking by the
infrastructure manager, for any service, shall comply with the
criteria set out in this Article.
2. With the exception of paragraph 3, discounts shall be
limited to the actual saving of the administrative cost to the
infrastructure manager. In determining the level of discount,
no account may be taken of cost savings already internalised
in the charge levied.
3. Infrastructure managers may introduce schemes available
to all users of the infrastructure, for specified traffic flows,
granting time limited discounts to encourage the development
of new rail services, or discounts encouraging the use of
considerably underutilised lines.
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4. Discounts may relate only to charges levied for a
specified infrastructure section.
5. Similar discount schemes shall apply for similar services.
Article 10
Compensation schemes for unpaid environmental,
accident and infrastructure costs
1. Member States may put in place a time-limited
compensation scheme for the use of railway infrastructure for
the demonstrably unpaid environmental, accident and
infrastructure costs of competing transport modes in so far as
these costs exceed the equivalent costs of rail.
2. Where an operator receiving compensation enjoys an
exclusive right, the compensation must be accompanied by
comparable benefits to users.
3. The methodology used and calculations performed must
be publicly available. It shall in particular be possible to
demonstrate the specific uncharged costs of the competing
transport infrastructure that are avoided and to ensure that the
scheme is granted on non-discriminatory terms to
undertakings.
4. Member States shall ensure that such a scheme is
compatible with Articles 73, 87 and 88 of the Treaty.
Article 11
Performance scheme
1. Infrastructure charging schemes shall through a
performance scheme encourage railway undertakings and the
infrastructure manager to minimise disruption and improve
the performance of the railway network. This may include
penalties for actions which disrupt the operation of the
network, compensation for undertakings which suffer from
disruption and bonuses that reward better than planned
performance.
2. The basic principles of the performance scheme shall
apply throughout the network.
Article 12
Reservation charges
Infrastructure managers may levy an appropriate charge for
capacity that is requested but not used. This charge shall
provide incentives for efficient use of capacity.
The infrastructure manager shall always be able to inform any
interested party of the infrastructure capacity which has been
allocated to user railway undertakings.
CHAPTER III
ALLOCATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE CAPACITY
Article 13
Capacity rights
1. Infrastructure capacity shall be allocated by an
infrastructure manager, and once allocated to an applicant may
not be transferred by the recipient to another undertaking or
service.
Any trading in infrastructure capacity shall be prohibited and
shall lead to exclusion from the further allocation of capacity.
The use of capacity by a railway undertaking when carrying
out the business of an applicant who is not a railway
undertaking shall not be considered a transfer.
2. The right to use specific infrastructure capacity in the
form of a train path may be granted to applicants for a
maximum duration of one working timetable period.
An infrastructure manager and an applicant may enter into a
framework agreement as laid down in Article 17 for the use of
capacity on the relevant railway infrastructure for a longer
term than one working timetable period.
3. The definition of respective rights and obligations
between infrastructure managers and applicants in respect of
any allocation of capacity shall be laid down in contracts or
legislation.
Article 14
Capacity allocation
1. Member States may establish a framework for the
allocation of infrastructure capacity while respecting the
management independence laid down in Article 4 of Directive
91/440/EEC. Specific capacity allocation rules shall be
established. The infrastructure manager shall perform the
capacity allocation processes. In particular, the infrastructure
manager shall ensure that infrastructure capacity is allocated
on a fair and non-discriminatory basis and in accordance with
Community law.
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2. Where the infrastructure manager, in its legal form,
organisation or decision-making functions is not independent
of any railway undertaking, the functions referred to in
paragraph 1 and described in this chapter shall be performed
by an allocation body that is independent in its legal form,
organisation and decision-making from any railway
undertaking.
3. Infrastructure managers and allocation bodies shall
respect the commercial confidentiality of information provided
to them.
Article 15
Cooperation in the allocation of infrastructure capacity on
more than one network
1. Infrastructure managers shall cooperate to enable the
efficient creation and allocation of infrastructure capacity
which crosses more than one network. They shall organise
international train paths, in particular within the framework of
the Trans-European Rail Freight Network. They shall establish
such procedures as are appropriate to enable this to take place.
These procedures shall be bound by the rules set out in this
Directive.
The procedure established in order to coordinate the allocation
of infrastructure capacity at an international level shall
associate representatives of infrastructure managers for all
railway infrastructures whose allocation decisions have an
impact on more than one other infrastructure manager.
Appropriate representatives of infrastructure managers from
outside the Community may be associated with these
procedures. The Commission shall be informed and invited to
attend as an observer.
2. At any meeting or other activity undertaken to permit
the allocation of infrastructure capacity for trans-network train
services, decisions shall only be taken by representatives of
infrastructure managers.
3. The participants in the cooperation referred to paragraph
1 shall ensure that its membership, methods of operation and
all relevant criteria which are used for assessing and allocating
infrastructure capacity be made publicly available.
4. Working in cooperation as referred to in paragraph 1,
infrastructure managers shall assess the need for, and may
where necessary propose and organise international train paths
to facilitate the operation of freight trains which are subject to
an ad hoc request as referred to in Article 23.
Such prearranged international train paths shall be made
available to applicants via any of the participating
infrastructure managers.
Article 16
Applicants
1. Applications for infrastructure capacity may be made by
railway undertakings and their international groupings and, in
the territories of those Member States which so allow, by other
applicants complying with the definition in Article 2(b).
Member States may also allow other applicants to apply for
infrastructure capacity on their territories.
2. The infrastructure manager may set requirements with
regard to applicants to ensure that its legitimate expectations
about future revenues and utilisation of the infrastructure are
safeguarded. Such requirements shall be appropriate,
transparent and non-discriminatory. The requirements shall be
published as part of the allocation principles in the network
statement, and the Commission shall be informed.
3. The requirements in paragraph 2 may only include the
provision of a financial guarantee that must not exceed an
appropriate level which shall be proportional to the
contemplated level of activity of the applicant, and assurance
of the capability to prepare compliant bids for infrastructure
capacity.
Article 17
Framework agreements
1. Without prejudice to Articles 81, 82 and 86 of the
Treaty, a framework agreement may be concluded with an
applicant. Such a framework agreement specifies the
characteristics of the infrastructure capacity required by and
offered to the applicant over a period of time exceeding one
working timetable period. The framework agreement shall not
specify a train path in detail, but should be such as to seek to
meet the legitimate commercial needs of the applicant. A
Member State may require prior approval of such a framework
agreement by the regulatory body referred to in Article 30 of
this Directive.
2. Framework agreements shall not be such as to preclude
the use of the relevant infrastructure by other applicants or
services.
3. A framework agreement shall allow for the amendment
or limitation of its terms to enable better use to be made of
the railway infrastructure.
4. The framework agreement may contain penalties should
it be necessary to modify or terminate the agreement.
5. Framework agreements shall in principle be for a period
of five years. The infrastructure manager may agree to a
shorter or longer period in specific cases. Any period longer
than five years shall be justified by the existence of commercial
contracts, specialised investments or risks.
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Any period longer than 10 years shall be possible only in
exceptional cases, in particular, where there is large-scale,
long-term investment, and particularly where such investment
is covered by contractual commitments.
6. While respecting commercial confidentiality, the general
nature of each framework agreement shall be made available
to any interested party.
Article 18
Schedule for the allocation process
1. The infrastructure manager shall adhere to the schedule
for capacity allocation set out in Annex III.
2. Infrastructure managers shall agree with the other
relevant infrastructure managers concerned which international
train paths are to be included in the working timetable, before
commencing consultation on the draft working timetable.
Adjustments shall only be made if absolutely necessary.
Article 19
Application
1. Applicants may apply on the basis of public or private
law to the infrastructure manager to request an agreement
granting rights to use railway infrastructure against a charge as
provided for in chapter II.
2. Requests relating to the regular working timetable must
adhere to the deadlines set out in Annex III.
3. An applicant who is a party to a framework agreement
shall apply in accordance with that agreement.
4. Applicants may request infrastructure capacity crossing
more than one network by applying to one infrastructure
manager. That infrastructure manager shall then be permitted
to act on behalf of the applicant to seek capacity with the
other relevant infrastructure managers.
5. Infrastructure managers shall ensure that, for
infrastructure capacity crossing more than one network,
applicants may apply direct to any joint body which the
infrastructure managers may establish.
Article 20
Scheduling
1. The infrastructure manager shall as far as is possible
meet all requests for infrastructure capacity including requests
for train paths crossing more than one network, and shall as
far as possible take account of all constraints on applicants,
including the economic effect on their business.
2. The infrastructure manager may give priority to specific
services within the scheduling and coordination process but
only as set out in Articles 22 and 24.
3. The infrastructure manager shall consult interested
parties about the draft working timetable and allow them at
least one month to present their views. Interested parties shall
include all those who have requested infrastructure capacity as
well as other parties who wish to have the opportunity to
comment on how the working timetable may affect their
ability to procure rail services during the working timetable
period.
4. The infrastructure manager shall take appropriate
measures to deal with any concerns that are expressed.
Article 21
Coordination process
1. During the scheduling process referred to in Article 20,
when the infrastructure manager encounters conflicts between
different requests he shall attempt, through coordination of the
requests, to ensure the best possible matching of all
requirements.
2. When a situation requiring coordination arises, the
infrastructure manager shall have the right, within reasonable
limits, to propose infrastructure capacity that differs from that
which was requested.
3. The infrastructure manager shall attempt, through
consultation with the appropriate applicants, to achieve a
resolution of any conflicts.
4. The principles governing the coordination process shall
be defined in the network statement. These shall in particular
reflect the difficulty of arranging international train paths and
the effect that modification may have on other infrastructure
managers.
5. When requests for infrastructure capacity cannot be
satisfied without coordination, the infrastructure manager shall
attempt to accommodate all requests through coordination.
6. Without prejudice to the existing appeal procedures and
to the provisions of Article 30, in case of disputes relating to
the allocation of infrastructure capacity, a dispute resolution
system shall be made available in order to resolve such
disputes promptly. If this system is applied, a decision shall be
reached within a time limit of 10 working days.
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Article 22
Congested infrastructure
1. Where after coordination of the requested paths and
consultation with applicants it is not possible to satisfy
requests for infrastructure capacity adequately then the
infrastructure manager must immediately declare that element
of infrastructure on which this has occurred to be congested.
This shall also be done for infrastructure which it can be
foreseen will suffer from insufficient capacity in the near
future.
2. When infrastructure has been declared to be congested,
the infrastructure manager shall carry out a capacity analysis
as described in Article 25, unless a capacity enhancement plan
as described in Article 26 is already being implemented.
3. When charges in accordance with Article 7(4) have not
been levied or have not achieved a satisfactory result and the
infrastructure has been declared to be congested, the
infrastructure manager may in addition employ priority criteria
to allocate infrastructure capacity.
4. The priority criteria shall take account of the importance
of a service to society, relative to any other service which will
consequently be excluded.
In order to guarantee within this framework the development
of adequate transport services, in particular to comply with
public-service requirements or promote the development of
rail freight, Member States may take any measures necessary,
under non-discriminatory conditions, to ensure that such
services are given priority when infrastructure capacity is
allocated.
Member States may, where appropriate, grant the
infrastructure manager compensation corresponding to any
loss of revenue related to the need to allocate a given capacity
to certain services pursuant to the previous subparagraph.
This shall include taking account of the effect of this exclusion
in other Member States.
5. The importance of freight services and in particular
international freight services shall be given adequate
consideration in determining priority criteria.
6. The procedures which shall be followed and criteria used
where infrastructure is congested shall be set out in the
network statement.
Article 23
Ad hoc requests
1. The infrastructure manager shall respond to ad hoc
requests for individual train paths as quickly as possible, and in
any event, within five working days. Information supplied on
available spare capacity shall be made available to all
applicants who may wish to use this capacity.
2. Infrastructure managers shall where necessary undertake
an evaluation of the need for reserve capacity to be kept
available within the final scheduled working timetable to
enable them to respond rapidly to foreseeable ad hoc requests
for capacity. This shall also apply in cases of congested
infrastructure.
Article 24
Specialised infrastructure
1. Without prejudice to paragraph 2, infrastructure capacity
shall be considered to be available for the use of all types of
service which conform to the characteristics necessary for
operation on the train path.
2. Where there are suitable alternative routes, the
infrastructure manager may, after consultation with interested
parties, designate particular infrastructure for use by specified
types of traffic. Without prejudice to Articles 81, 82 and 86 of
the Treaty, when such designation has occurred, the
infrastructure manager may give priority to this type of traffic
when allocating infrastructure capacity.
Such designation shall not prevent the use of such
infrastructure by other types of traffic when capacity is
available and when the rolling stock conforms to the technical
characteristics necessary for operation on the line.
3. When infrastructure has been designated pursuant to
paragraph 2, this shall be described in the network statement.
Article 25
Capacity analysis
1. The objective of capacity analysis is to determine the
restrictions on infrastructure capacity which prevent requests
for capacity from being adequately met, and to propose
methods of enabling additional requests to be satisfied. This
analysis shall identify the reasons for the congestion and what
measures might be taken in the short and medium term to
ease the congestion.
2. The analysis shall consider the infrastructure, the
operating procedures, the nature of the different services
operating and the effect of all these factors on infrastructure
capacity. Measures to be considered shall include in particular
re-routing of services, re-timing services, speed alterations and
infrastructure improvements.
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3. A capacity analysis shall be completed within six months
of the identification of infrastructure as congested.
Article 26
Capacity enhancement plan
1. Within six months of the completion of a capacity
analysis, the infrastructure manager shall produce a capacity
enhancement plan.
2. A capacity enhancement plan shall be developed after
consultation with users of the relevant congested
infrastructure.
It shall identify:
a) the reasons for the congestion;
b) the likely future development of traffic;
c) the constraints on infrastructure development;
d) the options and costs for capacity enhancement, including
likely changes to access charges.
It shall also, on the basis of a cost benefit analysis of the
possible measures identified, determine what action shall be
taken to enhance infrastructure capacity, including a calendar
for implementation of the measures.
The plan may be subject to prior approval by the Member
State.
3. The infrastructure manager shall cease to levy any fees
which are levied for the relevant infrastructure under Article
7(4) in cases where:
a) he does not produce a capacity enhancement plan; or
b) he does not make progress with the action plan identified
in the capacity enhancement plan.
However, the infrastructure manager may, subject to the
approval of the regulatory body referred to in Article 30
continue to levy those fees if:
a) the capacity enhancement plan cannot be realised for
reasons beyond his control; or
b) the options available are not economically or financially
viable.
Article 27
Use of train paths
1. In particular for congested infrastructure the
infrastructure manager shall require the surrender of a train
path which, over a period of at least one month, has been
used less than a threshold quota to be laid down in the
network statement, unless this was due to non-economic
reasons beyond the operator’s control.
2. An infrastructure manager may specify in the network
statement conditions whereby it will take account of previous
levels of utilisation of train paths in determining priorities for
the allocation process.
Article 28
Infrastructure capacity for scheduled maintenance
1. Requests for infrastructure capacity to enable
maintenance to be performed shall be submitted during the
scheduling process.
2. Adequate account shall be taken by the infrastructure
manager of the effect of infrastructure capacity reserved for
scheduled track maintenance on applicants.
Article 29
Special measures to be taken in the event of disturbance
1. In the event of disturbance to train movements caused by
technical failure or accident the infrastructure manager must
take all necessary steps to restore the normal situation. To that
end he shall draw up a contingency plan listing the various
public bodies to be informed in the event of serious incidents
or serious disturbance to train movements.
2. In an emergency and where absolutely necessary on
account of a breakdown making the infrastructure temporarily
unusable, the paths allocated may be withdrawn without
warning for as long as is necessary to repair the system.
The infrastructure manager may, if he deems it necessary,
require railway undertakings to make available to him the
resources which he feels are the most appropriate to restore
the normal situation as soon as possible.
3. Member States may require railway undertakings to be
involved in assuring the enforcement and monitoring of their
own compliance of the safety standards and rules.
L 75/40 15.3.2001Official Journal of the European CommunitiesEN
CHAPTER IV
GENERAL MEASURES
Article 30
Regulatory body
1. Without prejudice to Article 21(6), Member States shall
establish a regulatory body. This body, which can be the
Ministry responsible for transport matters or any other body,
shall be independent in its organisation, funding decisions,
legal structure and decision-making from any infrastructure
manager, charging body, allocation body or applicant. The
body shall function according to the principles outlined in this
Article whereby appeal and regulatory functions may be
attributed to separate bodies.
2. An applicant shall have a right to appeal to the
regulatory body if it believes that it has been unfairly treated,
discriminated against or is in any other way aggrieved, and in
particular against decisions adopted by the infrastructure
manager or where appropriate the railway undertaking
concerning:
a) the network statement;
b) criteria contained within it;
c) the allocation process and its result;
d) the charging scheme;
e) level or structure of infrastructure fees which it is, or may
be, required to pay;
f) safety certificate, enforcement and monitoring of the safety
standards and rules.
3. The regulatory body shall ensure that charges set by the
infrastructure manager comply with chapter II and are
non-discriminatory. Negotiation between applicants and an
infrastructure manager concerning the level of infrastructure
charges shall only be permitted if these are carried out under
the supervision of the regulatory body. The regulatory body
shall intervene if negotiations are likely to contravene the
requirements of this Directive.
4. The regulatory body shall have the power to request
relevant information from the infrastructure manager,
applicants and any third party involved within the Member
State concerned, which must be supplied without undue delay.
5. The regulatory body shall be required to decide on any
complaints and take action to remedy the situation within a
maximum period of two months from receipt of all
information.
Notwithstanding paragraph 6, a decision of the regulatory
body shall be binding on all parties covered by that decision.
In the event of an appeal against a refusal to grant
infrastructure capacity, or against the terms of an offer of
capacity, the regulatory body shall either confirm that no
modification of the infrastructure manager’s decision is
required, or it shall require modification of that decision in
accordance with directions specified by the regulatory body.
6. Member States shall take the measures necessary to
ensure that decisions taken by the regulatory body are subject
to judicial review.
Article 31
Cooperation of regulatory bodies
The national regulatory bodies shall exchange information
about their work and decision-making principles and practice
for the purpose of coordinating their decision-making
principles across the Community. The Commission shall
support them in this task.
Article 32
Safety certification
1. The arrangements for safety certification for railway
undertakings which are or will be established in the
Community and the international groupings which they form
shall be in accordance with this Article.
2. The Member States shall provide for their respective
territories that a safety certificate in which the railway
undertakings’ safety requirements are set out be submitted in
order to ensure safe service on the routes concerned.
3. In order to obtain the safety certificate, the railway
undertaking shall comply with the regulations under national
law, compatible with Community law and applied in a
non-discriminatory manner, laying down the technical and
operational requirements specific to rail services and the safety
requirements applying to staff, rolling stock and the
undertaking’s internal organisation.
In particular, it shall provide proof that the staff whom it
employs to operate and accompany the trains has the
necessary training to comply with the traffic rules applied by
the infrastructure manager and to meet the safety requirements
imposed on it in the interests of train movement.
The railway undertaking shall also prove that the rolling stock
making up the trains has been approved by the public
authority or by the infrastructure manager and checked in
accordance with the operating rules applicable to the
infrastructure used. The safety certificate shall be issued by
whichever body is designated for the purpose by the Member
State in which the infrastructure used is situated.
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Article 33
Derogations
1. For a period of five years from 15 March 2003, the
following Member States:
 Ireland, as a Member State located on an island, with a rail
link to only one other Member State,
 the United Kingdom, in respect of Northern Ireland, on the
same basis, and
 Greece, as a Member State that does not have any direct
rail link to any other Member State,
do not need to apply the requirements set out in:
a) Articles 3, 4(2), 13, 14, 17, 21(4), 21(6), 22, 24(3), 25 to
28 and 30 on the condition that decisions on the
allocation of infrastructure capacity or the charging of fees
are open to appeal, when so requested in writing by a
railway undertaking, before an independent body which
shall take its decision within two months of the
submission of all relevant information and whose decision
shall be subject to judicial review, and
b) Article 32 in so far as rail transport services falling outside
the scope of Article 10 of Directive 91/440/EEC are
concerned.
2. However, where:
a) more than one railway undertaking licensed in accordance
with Article 4 of Directive 95/18/EC, or, in the case of
Ireland and Northern Ireland, a railway company so
licensed elsewhere submits an official application to
operate competing railway services in, to or from Ireland,
Northern Ireland or Greece, the continued applicability of
this derogation will be decided upon in accordance with
the advisory procedure referred to in Article 35(2); or
b) a railway undertaking operating railway services in Ireland,
Northern Ireland or Greece submits an official application
to operate railway services on, to or from the territory of
another Member State (in the case of Ireland, or the United
Kingdom, in respect of Northern Ireland, or both, another
Member State outside their territories), the derogations
referred to in paragraph 1 shall not apply.
Within one year from the receipt of either the decision
referred to in point (a) adopted in accordance with the
advisory procedure referred to in Article 35(2), or notification
of the official application referred to in point (b), the Member
State or States concerned (Ireland, the United Kingdom with
respect to Northern Ireland, or Greece) shall put in
place legislation to implement the Articles referred to in
paragraph 1.
3. A derogation referred to in paragraph 1 may be renewed
for periods not longer than five years. Not later than 12
months before the expiry date of the derogation a Member
State availing itself of such derogation may address a request
to the Commission for a renewed derogation. Any such
request must be substantiated. The Commission shall examine
such a request and adopt a decision in accordance with the
advisory procedure referred to in Article 35(2). The said
advisory procedure shall apply to any decision related to the
request.
When adopting its decision the Commission shall take into
account any development in the geopolitical situation and the
development of the rail market in, from and to the Member
State having requested the renewed derogation.
4. Luxembourg as a Member State with a relatively small
rail network does not need to apply until 31 August 2004 the
requirement to award to an independent body the functions
determining equitable and non-discriminatory access to
infrastructure, as provided for in Articles 4 and 14 in so far as
they oblige Member States to establish independent bodies
performing the tasks referred to in those Articles.
CHAPTER V
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 34
Implementing measures
1. Member States may bring any question concerning the
implementation of this Directive to the attention of the
Commission. Appropriate decisions shall be adopted in
accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article
35(2).
2. At the request of a Member State or on its own initiative
the Commission shall, in a specific case, examine the
application and enforcement of provisions concerning
charging, capacity allocation and safety certification, and
within two months of receipt of such a request decide in
accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article
35(2) whether the related measure may continue to be applied.
The Commission shall communicate its decision to the
European Parliament, the Council and to the Member States.
Without prejudice to Article 226 of the Treaty, any Member
State may refer the Commission’s decision to the Council
within a time limit of one month. The Council, acting by a
qualified majority, may in exceptional circumstances take a
different decision within a period of one month.
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3. The amendments necessary to adapt the Annexes shall be
adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure referred
to in Article 35(3).
Article 35
Committee procedures
1. The Commission shall be assisted by a Committee.
2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Articles 3
and 7 of Decision 1999/468/EC shall apply, having regard to
the provisions of Article 8 thereof.
3. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Articles 5
and 7 of Decision 1999/468/EC shall apply, having regard to
the provisions of Article 8 thereof.
The period laid down in Article 5(6) of Decision 1999/468/EC
shall be set at three months.
4. The Committee shall adopt its rules of procedure.
Article 36
Report
The Commission shall by 15 March 2005 submit to the
European Parliament and to the Council a report on the
implementation of this Directive, accompanied if necessary by
proposals for further Community action.
Article 37
Repeals
Regulation (EEC) No 2830/77, Regulation (EEC) No 2183/78,
Decision 82/529/EEC, Decision 83/418/EEC and Directive
95/19/EC are hereby repealed.
Article 38
Implementation
The Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations
and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this
Directive by 15 March 2003. They shall forthwith inform the
Commission thereof.
When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall
contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by
such reference on the occasion of their official publication.
Member States shall determine how such reference is to be
made.
Article 39
Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the date of its
publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
Article 40
Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 26 February 2001.
For the European Parliament
The President
N. FONTAINE
For the Council
The President
A. LINDH
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ANNEX I
Contents of the network statement
The network statement referred to in Article 3 shall contain the following information:
1. A section setting out the nature of the infrastructure which is available to railway undertakings and the conditions
of access to it.
2. A section on charging principles and tariffs. This shall contain appropriate details of the charging scheme as well
as sufficient information on charges that apply to the services listed in Annex II which are provided by only one
supplier. It shall detail the methodology, rules and, where applicable, scales used for the application of Article 7(4)
and (5) and Articles 8 and 9. It shall contain information on changes in charges already decided upon or foreseen.
3. A section on the principles and criteria for capacity allocation. This shall set out the general capacity characteristics
of the infrastructure which is available to railway undertakings and any restrictions relating to its use, including
likely capacity requirements for maintenance. It shall also specify the procedures and deadlines which relate to the
capacity allocation process. It shall contain specific criteria which are employed during that process, in particular:
a) the procedures according to which applicants may request capacity from the infrastructure manager;
b) the requirements governing applicants;
c) the schedule for the application and allocation processes;
d) the principles governing the coordination process;
e) the procedures which shall be followed and criteria used where infrastructure is congested;
f) details of restrictions on the use of infrastructure;
g) any conditions by which account is taken of previous levels of utilisation of capacity in determining priorities
for the allocation process.
It shall detail the measures taken to ensure the adequate treatment of freight services, international services and
requests subject to the ad hoc procedure.
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ANNEX II
Services to be supplied to the railway undertakings
1. The minimum access package shall comprise:
a) handling of requests for infrastructure capacity;
b) the right to utilise capacity which is granted;
c) use of running track points and junctions;
d) train control including signalling, regulation, dispatching and the communication and provision of information
on train movement;
e) all other information required to implement or operate the service for which capacity has been granted.
2. Track access to services facilities and supply of services shall comprise:
a) use of electrical supply equipment for traction current, where available;
b) refuelling facilities;
c) passenger stations, their buildings and other facilities;
d) freight terminals;
e) marshalling yards;
f) train formation facilities;
g) storage sidings;
h) maintenance and other technical facilities.
3. Additional services may comprise:
a) traction current;
b) pre-heating of passenger trains;
c) supply of fuel, shunting, and all other services provided at the access services facilities mentioned above;
d) tailor-made contracts for:
 control of transport of dangerous goods,
 assistance in running abnormal trains.
4. Ancillary services may comprise:
a) access to telecommunication network;
b) provision of supplementary information;
c) technical inspection of rolling stock.
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ANNEX III
Schedule for the allocation process
1. The working timetable shall be established once per calendar year.
2. The change of working timetable shall take place at midnight on the last Saturday in May. Where a change or
adjustment is carried out after the summer it shall take place at midnight on the last Saturday in September each
year and at such other intervals between these dates as are required. Infrastructure managers may agree on different
dates and in this case they shall inform the Commission thereof.
3. The final date for receipt of requests for capacity to be incorporated into the working timetable shall be no more
than 12 months in advance of the entry into force of the working timetable.
4. No later than 11 months before the working timetable comes into force, the infrastructure managers shall ensure
that provisional international train paths have been established in cooperation with other relevant allocation bodies
as set out in Article 15. Infrastructure managers shall ensure that as far as possible these are adhered to during the
subsequent processes.
5. No later than four months after the deadline for submission of bids by applicants, the infrastructure manager shall
prepare a draft timetable.
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